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the introduction of maternal movements (as traditionally assumed). but rather from 
the standard interpretation of the Generation of Animals represented here by the first 
two premises. In the first place, I shall argue that premise (2) is false and must be 
rejected. Aristotle does not think the father's sperm literally fashions the parts of the 
offspring out of menstrual blood (the spermatic KLVI CEis are not actual informative 
movements of the parent's genetic material). In the second place, I shall argue that 
premise (1) is false when understood in the broad sense to cover all aspects of the 
offspring's physical appearance, internal anatomy, physiology, and characteristic 
behaviour. The claim that the male alone provides the form is true only under a 
certain interpretation of ETBos which is not co-extensive with the organism's 
phenotypic nature taken in this broad sense. '0 
Before turning to this, however, it will be instructive to first look at how 
commentators have traditionally responded to the charge of inconsistency. In what 
follows I shall take up each argument from within the received interpretation of the 
GA. Most importantly, I shall assume in line with that interpretation that the spermatic 
"movements" do indeed refer to actual informing movements, movements that 
literally shape the parts of the offspring into a new individual like a sculptor forming 
the parts of his statue out of bronze. 
§2 Previous responses to the inconsistency charge 
For Furth, the sudden appearance of female movements in GA 4.3 which are 
capable of imposing maternal characteristics on the offspring (and thus directly 
compete with their paternal counter-parts for the privilege of supplying the offspring 
with form) represents a total collapse of the tidy matter-form theory developed in the 
earlier books. As Furth sees it, GA 4.3 is nothing more than an ad hoc attempt on 
10 Traditionally the form transmitted by the male is identified with the species-form. 
However, my argument holds whether "all aspects of the offspring's physical 
appearance, internal anatomy, physiology, and characteristic behaviour" is restricted 
to species-level properties or whether it is taken to include properties below the level 
of species as well. 
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Abstract 
How to build an animal: the metaphysics of Aristotle 's ontogeny examines various 
interrelated themes in Aristotle's account of coming-to-be. This includes the concept 
of the "organism" and its role in the development of the embryo, the mechanisms 
underlying the transmission of biological form, and whether the fourth book of 
Generation of Animals can be understood as an attempt to formulate a genuine 
science of inheritance. My central thesis makes two basic claims. First I argue that 
one of Aristotle's most important insights was to recognise that the replication of 
biological form crucially depends on an ontological distinction between a creature's 
fully developed adult form and the underlying source of that form (what has come to 
be known as the phenotype-genotype distinction). Contrary to virtually all of his 
predecessors, Aristotle maintained that what is directly inherited by an offspring in 
the act of reproduction is not the phenotypic characters of the parent themselves but 
distinct "potentials" for their formation. Second, I argue that the source of an 
organism's form is part of its deep "hylomorphic" structure. This is contrary to the 
standard reading of Aristotle which treats artefacts as a suitable model for 
representing the internal structure of a biological substance: just as a statue is 
composed from the bronze and the shape, so too a horse is a composite of a material 
nature and formal nature. I argue that evidence from the biology suggests Aristotle 
views biological substances as having a more complex structure than artefacts in that 
the formal side of their nature is itself irreducibly complex. 
J 
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Introduction 
This study is divided into two parts. In the first part I examine Aristotle's 
concept of the "organism" and its role in his account of embryonic development. In 
the second part I turn to the question of how exactly an organism's form is passed on 
to its offspring in the act of reproduction. What are the mechanisms underlying the 
transmission of biological form? Although I shall draw on several texts in the 
Aristotelian corpus, the primary focus of this study is Aristotle's ontogeny as 
presented in the Generation of Animals. l 
Chapter one addresses what has come to be seen as the fatal paradox of 
Aristotle's natural teleology. 2 The paradox in question is supposed to arise from 
Aristotle's claim that the "nature" of a biological substance (or organism) is both the 
source and end of its development: it is the internal principle of motion that directs 
the process of development towards the adult form and the form of the creature when 
fully developed. Thus it would appear that one and the same thing ("nature") is the 
cause of its own existence, which is absurd. By way of introduction to the main 
project of part one I consider - and subsequently reject - one of the more popular 
interpretations of Aristotle's ontogeny, what I call "formal preformationism". 
According to this interpretation, Aristotle holds that the offspring's adult form pre- 
exists in the embryo in a state of potentiality. On this reading development becomes 
the gradual actualisation of a pre-existing potential form, which is transmitted to the 
embryo inside the father's seed. 
In chapter two I develop an alternative solution to the paradox of teleology 
suggested by a key passage in the Parts of Animals. There Aristotle divides "nature 
understood as substantial being" (formal nature) into "nature as mover" and "nature as 
end" (64la27-33). What I argue is that these two natures are numerically distinct 
principles that stand to one another as cause and effect. Straightforwardly, nature "as 
end" is the adult form at the end of development while nature "as mover" is the 
moving cause that directs the process towards that end. Finally, I argue that by 
1 The second half of this study is focused almost exclusively on the Generation of 
Animals. while part one is a more general philosophical discussion. 
2 This same paradox has been addressed most recently in King 2001. My own 
discussion of the paradox of teleology arises in part out of a dissatisfaction with 
King's solution. 
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associating these two natures with the creature's substantial being (oisaia) Aristotle is 
saying that they are two distinct "parts" of a biological substance hylomorphically 
speaking. If this is right, then in the biology, at least, Aristotle is working with a 
three-dimensional organism concept. On this reading an organism turns out to be a 
composite of material nature, nature "as end" (observable form), and nature as 
mover" (the genetic source of that form). 3 This is the major conclusion of part one. 
In the second half of this study I turn to the question of how exactly biological 
forms are passed on from one generation to the next. The actual mechanisms behind 
the transmission of biological form are found in Generation of Animals 4.3 in 
connection with the phenomenon of inheritance. The main discussion of the second 
part of this study comes in chapters five and six where I discuss Aristotle's account of 
these mechanisms and how their operation serves to explain various patterns of 
inheritance (including both individual and species resemblances). 4 In chapters three 
and four I examine Aristotle's account of sex determination and the problem of 
maternal inheritance, respectively. In addition to being central topics in Aristotle's 
ontogeny (and thus necessary parts of any study of the GA) they are necessary 
precursors to the main discussion in chapters five and six. For example, in GA 4.3 
Aristotle appears to assign a formal contribution to the mother, which many have 
come to see as being at odds with the strict reproductive hylomorphism set out in the 
first three books. Assuming the GA contains an internally coherent theory, a proper 
understanding of the mechanisms involved in the transmission of biological form 
(embodied in the phenomenon of inheritance) must begin with a solution to this 
problem. 
Finally in chapter seven I examine two issues related to the transmission of 
biological form. The first concerns the on-going debate about whether or not Aristotle 
believed in so-called particular forms. The literature is somewhat muddled on this 
3I shall argue that Aristotle's division between nature "as mover" and nature "as end" 
prefigures the modem genotype/phenotype distinction. In this way we could express 
the idea of a three-dimensional organism in terms of a compound of matter, 
phenotype (nature as end"), and genotype (nature "as mover"). 
4 While some have portrayed GA 4.3 as a relatively minor part of the GA dealing only 
with individual resemblances, as we shall see, the mechanisms introduced in that 
chapter are explicitly connected to the transmission of species-level properties. 
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issue. Ultimately I think there are two different questions one could ask: Are 
biological forms universals or particulars? Are the contents of biological forms 
species- or individual-specific? Eventually I shall come down on the side of the 
debate which takes the form of each organism to be a particular instance of a form 
which includes, in addition to those features which are common to all members of the 
species, those that make it a unique individual. In other words. forms are both 
particular and individual-specific. The second issue that arises concerns the nature of 
teleological explanation. As we shall see, Aristotle allows that some phenotypic 
variation within a species may be due to the activity of an individual's productive 
nature (it is `genetic'). This is not incompatible with his views in the Metaphysics, 
however, since he also claims that such differences will be excluded from a 
definitional account of the creature's substantial being. One of the lessons of GA 5 is 
that intraspecific variation is only subject to explanations in terms of material and 
efficient causes. 5 Only those features of an organism which are common to all 
members of the species are subject to explanations in terms of all four causes. 
As we shall see efficient causality can include the activity of an individual's 
productive nature (its nature "as mover"). 
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Chapter One 
The Paradox of Teleology 
§1 The Paradox of Teleology 
In Physics 2.1 Aristotle famously defines a thing's "nature" as "a source and 
cause of change in that to which it primarily belongs Ka8' airrö" (Physics 2.1, 
192b20-2). ' Again, in Metaphysics A4 nature is said to be "that whence the primary 
change in each natural thing originates" which is "in itself qua itself' (1014b 18-20). 
In the biological works (especially the Generation of Animals and Parts of Animals) 
nature plays a prominent embryological role as the moving cause of growth and 
development. Physics 2.8 is also about nature in this embryological sense. Virtually 
all the arguments in that chapter concern the development of an embryo into its adult 
form. For example, at 199b13-18 (cf. PA 641b24ff. ) Aristotle says: 
Furthermore, among embryos (oTrEppa(n) anything must have come 
to be at random [sc. if Empedocles' account were correct]. But the 
person who asserts this entirely does away with nature and what exists 
by nature. For those things are natural which, being moved 
continuously from a principle inside themselves, arrive at a certain 
end; but <the end arrived at> from each principle is not the same for 
every <principle>, nor is it any chance <end>, but <the movement 
from each principle> always proceeds towards the same <end>, if 
nothing prevents it. 
In this text Aristotle is clearly talking about growth and development; nature is the 
"principle inside" the organism from which its growth and development proceed. 
On the other hand, Aristotle quite often identifies "nature" with the shape and 
form of the organism when fully developed: it is the form at the end of the process of 
development (TO' TEX05 T 1S YEVEßEWS). 3 For convenience I shall continue to refer to 
this nature as "the shape and form" of the creature when fully developed. Determining 
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own. 
2I shall return to "KaO' a -rö" and "in itself qua itself' later on. I shall argue that 
both of these mean that the nature in question is partially constitutive of the biological 
substance itself: it is a "part- of the substance. hylomorphically speaking. 
Metaphysics A4.1015a)-11 (translated in chapter two below). 
precisely what is the form of a biological substance is ultimately subsidiary- to my 
main project, which is an analysis of the hylomorphic structure of biological 
substance as such. Although strictly speaking biological form is soul, which is to say, 
the set of characteristic life functions proper to an organism, in the Parts of Animals 
biological form is identified with "the differentiae in the matter" (643a24). This is a 
much richer conception of biological form than we find in the De anima and is meant 
to include, not only the characteristic functions of an organism (e. g. the capacity to 
swim, the capacity to fly, etc. ), but its functional structures as well (e. g. webbed-feet, 
wings, etc. ). 4 It is in this sense that I shall speak of the nature at the end of a creature's 
development as its adult "form". 5 
As we shall see, this richer concept of biological form is well-suited to the 
Generation of Animals, which is overwhelmingly occupied with the development of 
shape and structure rather than simply life-capacities or "soul". In fact Aristotle only 
considers the question of where the offspring's soul comes from in one chapter, GA 
2.3, and even then the question only arises in connection with a puzzle about what 
happens to the physical part of the sperm. Although it is certainly important that the 
structures that do develop have soul (they are functional structures), my point is that 
Aristotle's embryology is not so much interested in the emergence of different life- 
capacities as it is in the emergence of complex patterns of structural organisation (the 
differentiation of the KürIua into various parts). 
Many scholars have come to see this dual characterisation of nature as the 
fatal paradox of Aristotle's natural teleology: 
Form also provides the link between the mature and the immature 
organism. The growth of an organism is, for Aristotle, a process 
4 At 644b7-9 Aristotle says that animals are primarily grouped together according to 
the structure of their parts (Toil a t1aOt TC )V uopIo. v). This suggests that in the 
biology species-forms are partially morphological in nature rather than strictly 
functional. Contrast DA 2.2,413b33-414a2 (cf. 414a29ff. ) where animals are 
individuated solely in terms of their different combinations of life-capacities or souls. 
In order to avoid any unnecessary complications at this stage I shall postpone the 
question about whether biological forms are species- or individual-specific. I take this 
up in chapter seven. The answer to that question will not affect anything I have to say 
here. 
1? 
directed toward an end (TOOos): the mature functioning organism. The 
mature functioning of the organism is that for the sake of which' the 
process of growth has occurred. And yet Aristotle also identifies an 
organism's nature with the end or the that for the sake of which. ' 
Again there is an air of paradox. If an organism relies on its internal 
principle of change [= nature] in order to reach its end, how could this 
end, which did not exist during the process of growth, be identified 
with the organism's nature? 6 
Now it may be said that despite the close dependence... between 
nature as principle of change, and the developed structure, Aristotle 
exceeds his warrant in concluding that the former is the latter, since by 
the very terms of the argument, the latter is the result of the former, 
and is not always actually present at the same time. This indeed is 
perhaps the main difficulty surrounding the Aristotelian concept of 
`form', which in a living thing at any rate is supposed somehow to 
comprise both efficient and final causes of the substance's natural 
behaviour. How can what something is to be, which it necessarily is 
not yet, be what brings about the present process towards what is to 
be? Writers sympathetic to Aristotelianism do not succeed in 
explaining this to those who are not. 7 
The paradox of teleology is supposed to arise from the fact that an organism's nature 
is both the source and end of its development, both that which directs the process 
towards the creature's fully developed form and the form of the creature when fully 
developed. Thus one and the same thing ("nature") becomes the cause of its own 
existence, which is absurd. Moreover, it seems to imply a sort of finalism where the 
form at the end of development acts as an efficient cause somehow driving (or 
6 Lear 1990,19. See also (same page): "The development of form, as an organism 
grows to maturity, is a process internal to the organism itself. But an organism's 
internal principle of change is its nature. An object's nature would thus seem to be a 
developmental force which impels it toward the realization of its form. How then can 
Aristotle identify an organism's nature with its form'? " (emphasis Lear's). 
7 Broadie 1982.65 (emphasis Broadie). 
13 
pulling? ) the process towards itself so that it terminates in that end. But how can an 
organism's formal nature influence its development if it does not have that nature 
until the end of that change (10150-11)? g Finalism has long since been rejected by 
philosophers and scientists alike on the grounds that moving causes must come before 
their effects. From this perspective the charge that is most often levied against 
Aristotelian teleology is that it involves a strange notion of backwards causation. 9 
Solving the paradox of teleology is not a primary goal of this study. Rather, 
my project here is to examine Aristotle's concept of a biological substance or 
"organism" and its role in his ontogeny as presented in the Generation of Animals. 
Resolving the paradox will simply be an upshot of this. I am compelled to deal with 
the problem in the first place because, historically at least, it has been seen as one of 
the main reasons for rejecting Aristotelian teleology. I am compelled to introduce the 
problem here because once we appreciate that an organism's formal nature is (so I 
shall argue) irreducibly complex, the paradox of teleology becomes much harder to 
motivate. However, by way of introduction, it will be useful to look at an 
interpretation of Aristotle's ontogeny that some find an attractive way out of the 
paradox. 
§2 Formal Preformationism 
As I have said, the main problem traditionally associated with Aristotle's 
natural teleology is understanding how the offspring's adult form, which he identifies 
as its nature, can be responsible for the process of its development given that it is not 
present until the end of that process. One way commentators have tried to reconcile 
this while attempting to preserve the idea that a thing's formal nature is both the 
8 King treats finalism as a separate problem from what he calls the problem of the 
effectiveness of a form which is not present (2001,23-6). For King the real problem is 
that the organism's formal nature is not present until the end of development. He 
argues that finalism is an artefact of our attempt to solve this problem by turning 
Aristotle's final cause into an efficient cause (24). However, as we shall see, in the 
biological works especially the formal nature acts as a moving cause. So finalism, if it 
is a problem at all, is Aristotle 's problem. 
9 Calow 1967,17-18. For a good discussion of this charge see Gallop 1988.257-90 n. 
1. 
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source of the process of development and the form in which that process terminates is 
by denying that the form is not present until the end of development. According to 
this interpretation, which I shall call "formal preformationism". Aristotle holds that 
the shape and form of the adult organism pre-exists in the embryo in a state of 
(unactualised) potentiality. Development on this reading is simply the gradual 
actualisation or fulfilment of that pre-existing potential form. 
The example that is most often associated with this interpretation is the oak 
tree/acorn example, captured in the following passage by Ronald de Sousa: 
... substances, which 
is to say natural objects, are structured by an 
inherent teleology (Met. Z9,1034b l 1). Thus the oak exists potentially 
in the acorn, and becomes actualized when the acorn grows into the 
tree; but the actual oak is prior to the acorn in virtue of the general 
priority of actuality over potentiality (Met. Z13,103 8b27). So the 
nature of any substance involves a natural development in the course 
of which potentiality flowers into actuality. '0 
Formal preformationism is what you get when you adopt a realist interpretation of the 
claim that the oak (or, rather, its form) pre-exists in the acorn. The form of the oak 
tree really is in the acorn, only it is in a state of potentiality: it is a latent or not-yet- 
actualised form. The coming-to-be of the oak is the process in which that potential 
form "flowers into actuality". This interpretation goes all the way back to Alexander 
of Aphrodisias. ll According to Dooley, Alexander "identifies nature, defined as an 
intrinsic principle of movement, with the enmattered form, i. e. soul, present only in 
potentiality in the seed of the generator, but actually present in the <adult> animal". ' 2 
More recently formal preformationism has been vigorously defended by Jonathan 
Lear: 13 
The form in the young healthy organism is an internal force propelling 
it toward the realization of its form. This is not as paradoxical as it 
10 de Sousa 2001,268. Note, however, that the infamous oak/acorn example is not 
found anywhere in Aristotle. 
ii See, e. g.. Alexander in Metaph. 359,30-3; 360,4-6; 9-13; 375,23-5. 
12 Dooley 1993,132, n. 32 (cf. 137 n. 79 and 80). 
13 See also Katayama (1999.91 and 150 n. 45) and Witt (2003,70). According to Witt 
: Aristotle holds that the adult form "really exists in the seed, but only potentially". 
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might initially appear, for when the organism has reached maturity, its 
form will no longer be a potentiality. In the mature organism. the form 
exists as a full-fledged actuality. In the growth of an organism, form is 
itself developing from potentiality to actuality, and it is directing this 
process. 14 
Of course, the existence of potential form at the beginning of 4 
developmental process is due to the antecedent existence of actual 
form. In natural generation, the potential form of the child is due to the 
actual form of (one of) the parents being passed on in sexual 
reproduction. 15 
The form of a man, say, comes from the male parent, and in virtue of 
the possession of this form we can say of the seed that it is a man 
(potentially). What we mean by this is that if the seed is implanted in a 
female's womb it will in ordinary conditions develop into a human 
being. The form exists antecedently to the generation of the natural 
substance and endures to become the form of that substance. In the 
process, though, it changes from being potentially the form of a 
substance to being actually the form. The matter too persists through 
this change, yet it cannot be regarded as the subject of change on its 
own. If the matter which existed in the seed antecedently to the 
generation were not informed by human nature (as a power or 
potentiality) it could not change into a human being. 16 
14 Lear 1990,19; cf. 61: "Because change is the actualization of a potentiality, the 
entire change will be directed toward its fulfilment. And the change will cease as soon 
as the potentiality has developed to an actuality. " 
15 Lear 1990,40. 
16 Lear 1990,60. There are several inaccuracies here which I shall largely ignore. For 
example. Aristotle does not think the father "implants" his sperm in the female which 
then grows into the offspring like a seed planted in the soil. This naive -flower-pot- 
model is inconsistent with the GA theory: it is the menstrual blood of the female. not 
the sperm of the male, that develops into the new organism. 
16 
I will take Lear's interpretation as representative of formal preformationism. This 
interpretation consists of three main claims: 
1) Aristotle posits a single "nature" (identified with the shape and form of the 
adult) which exists at varying levels of potentiality and actuality. At the start 
of development the offspring's form (or "nature") pre-exists in the embryo in a 
state of potentiality; at the end of the process the form is no longer in 
potentiality but exists as a "full-fledged actuality". 
2) During development the form itself develops from potentiality to actuality so 
that at every point along the way there will be a ratio of potential (not-yet- 
actualised) form to actual form. 
3) The potential form which exists antecedently in the embryo is the result of the 
father's actual form (somehow) being passed on to it in the act of reproduction 
inside the father's sperm. 
This is supposed to resolve the paradox of teleology because the "nature" in the 
embryo (which is implanted in it by the father) is its adult form pre-existing in a state 
of potentiality. 
Although there is a substantial amount of literature already devoted to 
Aristotle's distinction(s) between potentiality and actuality, it will be useful to begin 
with an analysis of the concept of potentiality. '7 The reason for this is that both Lear 
and I take the nature which pre-exists in the seed to be a potentiality of some sort; 
however, we differ in what kind of potentiality this is. I take the nature in the embryo 
to be a bvvauts in the sense of an active potential (a causal power). For Lear, this 
nature is a latent or not-yet-actualised form that flowers into actuality (as de Sousa 
17 In what follows I shall largely ignore the distinction between levels of potentiality 
and actuality set out in the De anima. The GA does not make any use of the 
distinction between first-potentiality, second-potentiality/first-actuality, and second- 
actuality (see Balme 1972). Most notably, the key concept of the DA model, that of a 
first-actuality which is also a second-level potentiality, plays no role in the GA 
account of ontogeny. (For an alternative view see Code 1987,51-9. ) In what follows I 
shall mostly confined myself to the concept of potentiality in the iVetaphysics (though 
what I have to say here is compatible with the DA account). 
17 
puts it). 18 I shall argue that Aristotle's ontology does not countenance such potential 
forms. The two main sources of this assumption appear to be the analysis of potential- 
being in Metaphysics 07 and the definition of change in Physics 3. 
§3 Potentiality in Metaphysics O7 
Aristotle not only thinks that we can make claims of the form "x is an F' in 
the sense that x is actually F, but also claims of the form "x is a potential F". 
According to Frede, the truth of such claims depends on an underlying assumption 
about reality: Aristotle not only assumes that there are actual beings (e. g. actual 
houses and actual frogs); there are also potential beings (e. g. potential houses and 
potential frogs). 19 These potential beings, Frede argues, form part of the furniture of 
Aristotle's world. In what does this potential-being consist? That is, in virtue of what 
do we say of a tadpole that it is a frog potentially or that it is a potential frog? 
Formal preformationism can be seen as one way of answering this question. 
On this reading, the property that makes the tadpole a potential frog is the very same 
property that makes the thing at the end of development an actual frog, namely the 
possession of a characteristic shape and form. And this is the nature of a frog (e. g. 
Z17,1041b4-9,25-31). According to formal preformationism, this same nature exists 
in the tadpole in potentiality and in the adult frog in actuality. There is a certain 
intuitive appeal to this answer. If being an actual frog consists in having the actual 
shape and form proper to a frog, then we might expect Aristotle to say that being a 
potential frog consist in having that very same shape and form, only in a state of 
potentiality. One of the places Lear seems to find this is in the discussion of potential- 
being in Metaphysics 07. 
The question Aristotle asks in 07 is when the matter (the subject of change) is 
potentially F and when it is not. The analysis of potential-being in the case of artefacts 
18 Although Lear sometimes speaks of the nature pre-existing in the embryo as a 
"power", mostly he takes it to be a latent or not-yet-actualised form. It is the latter 
idea that I am concerned with. (I think Lear has actually confused the two senses of 
"potentiality' discussed in Metaphysics 0. ) In what follows I shall take Lear as 
representative of the view I am targeting insofar as he treats the nature that pre-exists 
in the embryo to be a potential (latent) form. 
I`' Frede 1994,173. 
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is relatively straightforward. Here the matter is said to be potentially F `when nothing 
has to be added or removed or changed" (1049a 10-11). Earth is not yet potentially a 
statue of Hermes because it still needs to be changed into bronze before it is in a 
condition where a statue can be directly formed out of it (al7-18). Likewise, cement 
mix is not yet a potential foundation because we still need to add water before it is in 
a state where it can be used by the builder to make a foundation. Again the idea is that 
a foundation comes to be directly out of cement, not cement mix. 
What Aristotle wants to say in the case of naturally generated organisms 
(those cases "where the thing has the source of generation in itself', 1049al3) is much 
less clear. Is an apple potentially a human being? 2° Aristotle answers: No, but only 
when it has become human seed (o-rrEppa), though perhaps not even then (al-3). 
Eventually seed is eliminated as a candidate for being a potential human, since it must 
undergo a further transformation in another (al5-16). It is potentially a human only 
when it is in such a condition where, in the absence of anything external impeding it, 
it will straightaway develop into a human being through its own principle (ö1('X r? 
av-rov apxi , a15-16). 
The difference between the seed in this state and the seed in 
the previous state (i. e. when it was not yet potentially a human) is said to be the fact 
that in its previous state it still needed "another äpxfj". 
One of the things that makes Aristotle's analysis of potential-being for 
organisms rather difficult to follow is that it seems to depend (at least to some extent) 
on the particular details of the theory of reproduction behind it. For example, 
"ß-trEppa" (in some state) is eventually eliminated as a candidate for being a potential 
human on the grounds that it must undergo a further transformation in another and 
acquire "another äpXTj". The problem is that "o rEpua" (especially in the biological 
works) is ambiguous between the father's sperm, the mother's menstrual blood, and 
the embryo. (I use "seed" as being neutral between these three alternatives. ) Likewise 
``äpXTI" has several meanings (see, e. g., Metaphysics Al). And so we cannot be 
entirely sure what that other apXrj is that the a-rr9pua must acquire before it counts 
20 Aristotle uses the example of earth here; however, I think the point is better served 
using the food a human being consumes which is converted to a-rrEpt. ta through a 
series of changes. For the significance of this see below. 
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as being a potential human. Any combination of possible meanings for QTrEpua and 
äpXrj alone could yield a wide variety of interpretations of 07. 
However, even without knowing what Aristotle means by ßirEpua. it is easy 
to see how one might arrive at formal preformationism from reading 07. Aristotle 
says that a-nE'pua is not yet a potential human because it still needs to secure another 
äpXrj. On one interpretation of this text, it is the possession of this äp <i that makes 
the o-rrEpua a potential human. According to Lear, this äpXrj will be the offspring's 
potential form: "The form of a man, say, comes from the male parent, and in virtue of 
the possession of this form we can say of the seed that it is a man (potentially). " Thus, 
what makes the a-rrEpua a potential human being is the possession of a potential 
form. 
One disadvantage of this reading is that 07 turns out to be incompatible with 
Aristotle's position in the Generation of Animals. In the GA potential-being is cashed 
out solely in terms of an organism's species-specific matter. In several places 
Aristotle insists that unfertilised menstrual blood is already potentially an animal of 
the same kind as the mother herself (e. g. GA 737a22-5,738b3-4,740b18-20,741b7-8; 
cf. 729a32-3). Yet, this is not because menstrual blood already contains a potential 
form (for one thing the father is supposed to provide the offspring's form). Rather, the 
female's menstrual blood is potentially the same kind of organism as herself because 
it is the type of material which is capable of being formed into that kind of organism. 
On this account each female's species-specific menstrual blood has a determinate 
potentiality associated with it in virtue of the fact that it can be made into that specific 
kind of organism and nothing else. 
Aristotle's position on potential-being in the GA is compatible with at least 
one interpretation of 07. On this reading 07 analyses potential-being in terms of 
necessary and sufficient conditions: under what conditions is x capable of being made 
into an F through a single process of change? 21 In the case of art, some matter x is 
`1 This reading is suggested by Frede 1994. Frede argues that what counts as a 
potential F is determined in part by what single process of change there is that would 
transform the material subject into an actual F. And this in turn is supposed to depend 
on the presence of an active e potential that would govern and explain that change (190; 
cf. 177). 
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potentially F when it is such that nothing further needs to be added, removed, or 
changed before the product can be formed directly out of it by the appropriate causal 
agent. In natural generation, being in a state where nothing further needs to be added, 
removed, or changed is necessary but not sufficient for being the potential F. The 
material must also have the generative principle in itself, since a naturally generated 
embryo must be able to develop of its own accord. 
It is important to note that ®7 does not say anymore than this. In particular. it 
does not tell us what makes the matter potentially F, only when it is potentially F. At 
what point in the causal history of the matter (taken as the underlying subject that 
persists through several changes) do we have a potential F? If this is right, then the 
way of phrasing the question about potential-being above was in fact misleading. The 
question is not `What is that single property in virtue of which a tadpole is a potential 
frog? ' but `Under what conditions is frog-matter such that it will develop into a frog 
through its own agency if nothing external impedes it? '. 
Reading the text in this way reduces the tension between 07 and the GA. For 
the idea that the matter must be in a state where it is capable of being formed into an 
F remains central to both accounts. 07 can simply be read as offering a more robust 
set of criteria for being potentially F in which the matter must be in a state where it 
will immediately develop into an F of its own accord if nothing external prevents it. 
As it turns out unfertilised menstrual blood fails this condition, since something must 
be added, removed, 22 or changed before it is in that state. In this way 07 is not 
antithetical to the GA (as it would be on the formal preformationist reading) but 
simply offers a different answer to the question of when we have a potential human. 
Making 07 and GA compatible does of course require a minor correction to 
the former. It is fairly certain that "aiTE'ppa" in ®7 refers to the male sperm. For 
instance, at 1049a14-15 Aristotle says that arr9pua is not yet potentially a human 
because it must undergo a further change in another". "In another" here can really 
only mean "in the female" and so oTrEpµa must be male seed. As many 
commentators have noticed, this is not Aristotle's view in the Generation of Animals. 
The GA is categorical that the mother's contribution is the thing that develops into the 




evaporates). However, I think this inconsistency is much less problematic than 
commentators have generally made it out to be. What is likely is that Aristotle is 
arguing dialectically in 07; he simply employs what he knows to be the wrong theory 
of reproduction without actually endorsing it. This flower-pot model, according to 
which the male implants his seed in the female where it grows into the offspring like a 
seed planted in soil, would have been fairly common at the time. Nevertheless, I think 
Aristotle's point in 07 can be made just as easily by taking a rrEpµa there as 
menstrual blood (in accordance with the GA theory). For example, when Aristotle first 
says that even a rr ppa may not yet be potentially a human we can read this as 
unfertilised menstrual blood (what the GA identifies as the potential human). When he 
later says that even this is not yet potentially a human because it needs another äpXtj 
(1049a16-17), he would be saying that only fertilised menstrual blood (what we 
would call the zygote) is a potential human being. The point then is that it is only after 
being fertilised by the male that the material supplied by the female is such that it will 
straightaway develop into a human being of its own accord (if there are no external 
impediments). 
When 07 is read as offering a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
determining when a thing is potentially F, the analysis of potential-being there 
actually turns out to be much less theory-dependent than previously suggested. For it 
does not matter what theory of reproduction one actually employs; whatever it is in 
that theory that satisfies those conditions will count as being F potentially. Indeed, 
when we pull out the criteria from 07 and apply them back to the GA, we get a very 
different answer to the question of when something is potentially a human than any 
offered so far. For example: Is male sperm a potential human being? No, according to 
the GA. For although it contains a principle of generation in itself, it will not under 
any conditions develop into a human. For seminal fluid is not the material out of 
which the offspring develops. Yet, neither would unfertilised menstrual blood. For 
although it is the material out of which the offspring eventually develops, it is not yet 
in a state where it will develop into a human being of its own accord when nothing 
external is obstructing it. It must still undergo further change before reaching that 
point. The same applies to fertilised menstrual blood. It is only when the creature's 
embryonic heart has been differentiated that we now have a potential human. For 
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according to the GA it is then, and only then, that the embryo will develop into a 
human being of its own accord, if nothing external prevents it. 23 
For convenience I shall continue to speak of menstrual blood as the candidate 
for being a potential F. Even if we apply the criteria from 07 and call the embryo a 
potential F only when its heart has been differentiated, it will still be in virtue of its 
material nature (its being composed of a species-specific matter) that it is a potential 
F. Speaking of the menstrual blood as the subject (r roKEIIEvov) of the change 
emphasises the fact that we are talking about the embryo's material nature. 
Taking 07 as providing a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
determining when something is a potential F also offers a genuine alternative to the 
formal preformationist reading of that chapter. On this alternative, 07 asks under 
what conditions menstrual blood is potentially a human being. According to Lear, 
menstrual blood would be a potential human in virtue of (actually) possessing a 
potential human form, which is implanted in it by the father's sperm. If the menstrual 
blood were not informed by this human nature, it could not change into a human 
being. 24 However, the male's formal contribution is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for being a potential human. Having the principle which comes from the 
male inside it is necessary if the female's material is going to be able to develop into a 
human being of its own accord. However, it is also necessary that it be the right kind 
of material. If the possession of a potential human form supplied by the male were 
necessary and sufficient for being a potential human (as it is on the formal 
preformationist reading), then the male would be able to generate a human being by 
fertilising the menstrual blood of any animal whatsoever. Thus, even if we grant that 
unfertilised menstrual blood still needs to acquire a potential human form from the 
male sperm before it is potentially a human (assuming this is what Aristotle means by 
saying a rrEpi. ta needs "another äpx "), it will not be the male's formal contribution 
itself that makes the menstrual blood a potential human. Human-specific matter from 
the female is also a necessary condition for this. For the human form can only be 
actualised in the sort of material which is capable of being formed into a human. 
23 See GA 2.1, esp. 735a12ff. I shall have more to say about this important argument 
in chapter four. 
24 Lear 1990.60. 
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The formal preformationist reading of ®7 is even less plausible than I have so 
far allowed. The crucial bit of text for this reading is Aristotle's claim at 1049a16-17 
that arrEpj_ta needs another "äpc" before it is potentially a human being. According 
to the formal preformationist interpretation this äpXrj is the offspring's potential adult 
form. Understood this way, Aristotle is saying that csirEpi to is not yet potentially a 
human being until it secures this potential form from the male. However, there is 
certainly nothing in the text itself that would suggest that the other ap i the 079ptta 
needs before it is a potential human refers to the offspring's adult form in a state of 
potentiality. In fact, the dialectical nature of Aristotle's argument in 07 tells against 
this reading. What 07 actually says is that the father's sperm needs to acquire another 
äpXrj before it is potentially a human being. And none of Aristotle's opponents 
would accept that what the father's sperm still needs to acquire is a potential human 
form from the female. The flower-pot model assumes that the sperm already 
possesses all it needs to become a human being except for a suitable environment and 
a steady supply of nourishment, both of which are supplied by the female. 
A much better translation of ET pas apXfjs would be "another starting point" 
or "another beginning". The idea, then, is that something else needs to happen to the 
matter (something must be added or removed or changed) before we are at the point 
from which the process of development commences. This interpretation of ETEpac 
äpXijs makes sense if we consider all of the transformations that an organism's food 
must undergo before it is finally in a state where it will, without further ado, develop 
into an organism of the same kind through its own agency. 
There is some material out of which a new organism directly comes to be. On 
the GA theory, the offspring is formed directly out of menstrual fluid. 25 Menstrual 
fluid is in turn formed out of a surplus of the mother's nutritive blood, which is itself 
the product of another process, namely digestion. And the process of digestion begins 
from the food the mother consumes. Each process in this chain starts from some raw 
material which is the product of another process: digestion starts from the apple the 
mother eats and converts it to blood; spermatogenesis starts from the surplus of blood 
which is the product of digestion and converts it to menstrual fluid; development 
25 It makes no difference here whether we take the menstrual blood to be the thing 
that develops into the new individual (GA) or the male sperm (07). 
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starts from menstrual fluid (in some state) which is the product of spermatogenesis 
and transforms it into a completely new organism. If I am right, then what Aristotle is 
suggesting in 67 is that unfertilised menstrual blood is not yet potentially a human 
being because it must still undergo a further change. That is, it needs to reach another 
starting point (aTE'pas äp }S). This interpretation makes much better sense of the 
comparison Aristotle draws with art at 1049a17-18: just as seed is not yet potentially a 
human being because it needs another starting point, so too, Aristotle says, earth is not 
yet potentially a statue until it is changed into bronze. This is because the process of 
sculpting begins from bronze not earth. 26 
§4 Two senses of potentiality 
Before turning to the other source of formal preformationism (Aristotle's 
analysis of change in Physics 3), I first want to draw attention to the distinction 
between two senses of potentiality discussed in Metaphysics O. This distinction is 
important to the interpretation of Aristotle's ontogeny I am proposing because both 
Lear and I take the nature which exists antecedently in the embryo (which Aristotle 
identifies as the source and cause of its development) to be a potential of some kind. 
On my reading, the embryo's productive nature is an active buvaµiS: it is a potential 
for the formation of an organism of a determinate shape and form. On Lear's reading, 
the nature in the embryo is that shape and form pre-existing in a state of unactualised 
potentiality. Taking nature to be an active Swains versus a potential (not-yet- 
actualised) form are two very different ways of understanding the concept of 
potentiality. We do not find anything in Metaphysics O corresponding to the idea of a 
potential form that "flowers into actuality" (as de Sousa puts it). 
In Metaphysics O Aristotle distinguishes two senses of potentiality: (1) active 
and passive potentials; and (2) the sort of potentiality whose fulfilment is change. 27 
26 This seems to be Aristotle's point at 1049a21-2 where he says that it is always the 
last term in the series (To 'OTEpOV) that is more properly potentially F. 
27 The sorts of causal potentials included under (1) are further divided into rational 
and non-rational övväIELs in 02. I shall ignore this here. Active and passive 
övvä jELc are discussed in GC 1.7 and more extensively in Meteorologica 4, esp. chp. 
8-11. Although I occasionally refer to potentiality (1) as a "causal power", I prefer 
25 
This distinction is set out somewhat obscurely in 06.1048b6-9 in terms of how each 
is related to actuality. The first sense of potentiality, which is discussed in 01-2. is 
"the potential for acting and being acted upon" (1046a19-22; cf. 08,1049b4-11). 
Here actuality and potentiality are said to be related as building to the art of building 
or seeing to sight (1048b 1), or in general as change to the potential for 
causing/suffering that change. 28 The other sense of potentiality, which is the primary 
target of O (1045b35-1046a4), is discussed in 07.29 This sort of potential-being is 
said to be related to actual-being as bronze to the statue formed out of the bronze or 
wood to the ship built out of the wood (1048b3-5), or in general as a certain sort of 
matter to ovoia (b9). 3° 
(active/passive) "potential". For one thing Aristotle uses the same word bv'vai. us for 
both senses of potentiality (his point in O being that the concept has this two-fold 
meaning). For a good discussion of the causal sense of SÜvauus (potentiality (1)) see 
Gotthelf 1987,215-17. 
28 Although Aristotle will go on to distinguish an activity (EVEpyEia) from a process 
of change (Kivfl(3t5) in 06, this is not the EvEpyEIq/KivrjGt5 opposition he has in mind 
here. In DA 2.5, for example, Aristotle says that change or motion is a kind of activity 
(417a17). 
29 Change is defined in Physics 3 as the fulfilment of the matter insofar as it is 
potentially F. And what 07 tells us is when matter is potentially F. 
30 The matter in question is the raw material at the start of the process (To 
aVEpyaoTov, 1048b4), the unsculpted bronze and the pile of wood, whereas the 
ovßia is the finished product (T6 aTrELpyao Vov). It is important to distinguish this 
sort of potential-being from the passive bvvapE1s that belong to the matter (the 
potentials it has for being acted upon). To be sure, the materials out of which a ship is 
built have certain passive potentials associated with them. For example, the iron has a 
passive svva .u 
in virtue of which it is capable of being liquefied when exposed to 
fire. And each of these causal powers will contribute in some way to the production of 
the ship. However, the process of ship building (the change) is not the fulfilment of 
those passive potentials but of the materials' (collective? ) potentiality to be that 
product. 
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Ship building offers a good example for illustrating the distinction between 
these two kinds of potentiality. The process of ship building (the change) is the 
actualisation or fulfilment of the wood's potential to be a ship (potentiality (2)). 31 The 
art of ship building, on the other hand, is an active power in the builder: it is a 
potential for the formation of a ship (potentiality (1)). Although Aristotle holds that 
the actuality of the builder's potential to build a ship (the art) and the actuality of the 
matter's potential to be built into a ship are "one in being" (Physics 3.3,202a17-21), 
the potentialities themselves are nonidentical. First, the potential to be a ship belongs 
to the materials out of which the ship is built; the art is an active potential or causal 
power in the builder. Second, and more importantly, the potentiality of the matter (the 
potential to be an F) is exhausted at the end of the change whereas the active potential 
in the builder is preserved through the change. 32 
On my interpretation of Aristotle's ontogeny there is an extremely close 
analogy between the production of a ship and the development of an organism into its 
adult form. The potentiality of the menstrual blood to be a human is analogous to the 
potentiality of the wood to be a ship. This potentiality is the material nature of the 
embryo (see below). The development of the embryo into its adult form - the change 
- is the fulfilment of that potentiality (or rather, of the matter qua potentially human). 
On the other hand, the nature in the embryo that Aristotle identifies as the source of 
growth and development is an active b vauus; it is the analogue of the art of ship 
31 Below I shall argue that it is in fact misleading to speak of change as the 
actualisation or fulfilment of a potentiality. Properly speaking, ship building is the 
fulfilment of the wood insofar as it is potentially a ship. This is not to say that the 
wood does not have the potential to be a ship. The point is that we must be careful not 
to mistake this for a separate potential in the wood such that change is that 
actualisation of that potential. I shall continue to speak in terms of the matter's 
potentiality to be an F with the understanding that we are not talking about anything 
over-and-above the matter insofar as it is potentially an F. 
32 See Kosman 1984. (Kosman's "kamikaze" potentiality is what I take to be 
potentiality (2). ) The latter distinction underwrites Aristotle's discussion in De anima 
2.5. 
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building. 33 If this is right, then there is a nonidentity between the menstrual blood's 
potential to be a human (the embryo's material nature) and the active övvauns in the 
menstrual blood which is a potential for the formation of a human (the embryo's 
productive nature). For unlike the potentiality of the menstrual blood, which is used 
up in the course of becoming a human, the productive nature that transforms the 
matter into a human is preserved through that change and eventually transmitted to 
another embryo in the act of reproduction. 34 
On Lear's interpretation, however, the nature in the embryo that Aristotle 
identifies as the source of change is simply the offspring's adult form pre-existing in a 
state of unactualised potentiality. Development is the fulfilment of that potentiality. 
On this model the pre-existing form itself develops from potentiality to actuality. 
Understood in this way, however, natural generation cannot be assimilated to the craft 
model in any straightforward way. For there will be no analogue for this nature in the 
case of art. 35 The nature in the embryo will not correspond to the builder's art. For the 
builder's art does not pre-exist in the wood and become the form of the ship at the end 
of the process; the art does not change from being potentially the form of a ship to 
being actually the form of a ship (the form in the matter). And yet neither will it be 
analogous to the wood's potentiality to be a ship. For the coming-to-be of a ship is not 
the actualisation of some latent or not-yet-actualised ship-form implanted in the wood 
33 cf. 08,1049b8-10. At Physics 2.8,199b26-30 Aristotle compares the nature in the 
embryo to the ship building art in the wood ("if the ship building art were in the 
wood, it would produce the same result naturally"). The analogy between the 
embryo's nature and the craftsman's art is also exploited in several passages in the GA 
(a good example is 740b25-741 a3, translated below). In other texts Aristotle 
compares the father's nature - which I shall argue plays a different role in generation 
- to the craftsman's art (as at GA 730b8ff. ). 
34 The relation between the potential for the formation of an organism (the productive 
nature) and the other active potentials at work in development such as the capacity of 
heat to solidify certain kinds of material substances is an extremely complex issue. Is 
the former reducible to the sum of the latter or is it something over-and-above them? I 
shall remain neutral on this question. For a good discussion of the issue see Gotthelf 
1987. 
35 Compare the following with Lear 1990,60 (quoted above). 
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by the builder. So if nature is a "potential form" pre-existing in the embryo, then it 
must be a completely different kind of potentiality than either of the two discussed in 
Metaphysics e (both of which are found in the case of art). 36 
§5 Change in Physics 3 
The other main source for Lear's formal preformationist interpretation is his 
understanding of how the concept of potentiality figures into the analysis of change. 
On Lear's interpretation, the development of an organism is the actualisation of a 
potential form. This way of understanding Aristotle's ontogeny is supposed to be 
justified by the definition of change in Physics 3. According to Lear, Aristotle defines 
change as the actualisation of a pre-existing potentiality ("the actualizing of potential 
being as such"). 37 When Aristotle's definition is understood this way, it is extremely 
tempting to think of biological development simply as the actualisation of a pre- 
existing potential form implanted in the menstrual blood by the father's sperm. 
I think Lear has misread the text in an important way. It is misleading to speak 
of change as the actualisation or fulfilment of a potentiality (a separate entity inside 
the matter). Properly speaking, change is the actualisation of the matter insofar as it is 
potentially F. The process of becoming hot provides a good example for illustrating 
the way potential-being (of the 07 variety) figures into Aristotle's account of change. 
Something that is actually cold is also potentially hot. Heating is not the 
actualisation of a distinct potentiality in that thing; rather, it is the actualisation of that 
thing, not insofar as it is actually cold but insofar as it is potentially hot. 38 Likewise, 
sculpting is not the actualisation of a potential form in the bronze; rather, it is the 
actualisation of the bronze, not insofar as it is actually bronze but insofar as it is 
36 It is worth pointing out here that the two senses of potentiality in O can be mapped 
onto the DA model. Active and passive bwä1ELS corresponding to first-actualities 
(capacities), while the sort of potential-being discussed in 07 corresponds to a first 
level of potentiality (which the DA identifies with the matter's potential to acquire a 
capacity). 
37 Lear 1990,60. 
38 Note that the cold thing is not potentially hot because there really is heat existing in 
the cold thing in a state of potentiality (some kind of latent or not-yet-actualised heat). 
Cold is the privation or absence of heat (GA 743a36). 
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potentially a statue. Applied to natural generation, the development of a horse is not 
the gradual actualisation of a potential equine form implanted in the menstrual blood 
by the sperm; rather, it is the actualisation of the menstrual blood, not insofar as it is 
actually menstrual blood but insofar as it is potentially a horse. What 07 provides is a 
set of necessary and sufficient conditions for determining when equine menstrual 
blood is potentially a horse. 
Taking development to be the actualisation of the menstrual blood rather than 
a potential form implanted in the menstrual blood makes much better sense of the 
association between matter and form, on the one hand, and potentiality and actuality, 
on the other. For Aristotle, matter is potentiality: it is the potentiality to be and not-be 
(Z7 1032a20-2, GC 2.9 335b5). 39 In contrast to this, Lear associates form with both 
actuality and potentiality. For even if Lear accepts that it is the matter which is 
potentially an F, he insists that it is the possession of a potential form that makes it a 
potential F. But there is no evidence that Aristotle's ontology even countenances such 
potential forms. In fact, the very idea of a potential form is unintelligible in Aristotle's 
metaphysics. Throughout Metaphysics H, for example, it is argued that form is 
actuality. 40 This alone is enough to make formal preformationism an extremely 
implausible interpretation of Aristotle's ontogeny. Nevertheless, it has exegetical 
value for making my own interpretation explicit by way of contrast. Thus I shall 
continue to draw on it throughout this study at various junctures. 
§6 Summary conclusions 
I began this chapter by pointing to the paradox of Aristotle's natural teleology: 
the idea that the creature's "nature" is both the source (äpXrj) and end (TEXos) of the 
process of its development. As we can see, the paradox only arises if one assumes that 
Aristotle is referring to numerically the same principle (the shape and form of the 
adult). In that case a thing's nature turns out to be the source and cause of its own 
existence, which is absurd (nothing can stand to itself as both cause and effect). The 
39 The distinction between the potentiality to be, on the one hand, and the potentiality 
to not-be, on the other, seems to be significant for the distinction between generation 
and destruction. 
40 This is explicitly stated in Metaphysics H6, though form and actuality are used 
almost interchangeably throughout H. 
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formal preformationist solution denies that there is this causal relation and instead 
identifies nature with one ontological item - the creature's adult form - in two states 
of being. This form exists in the embryo in potentiality and in the adult in full fledged 
actuality. In the next chapter I shall propose an alternative solution to the paradox. I 
shall argue that when Aristotle says that "nature" is both the source and end of 
development he is referring to two numerically distinct principles (both of which are 
called cpüßts). In that case there would be nothing strange in identifying the principle 
that initiates and controls the embryo's development into its adult form with its 
"nature". For nature in this sense does not refer to that fully developed adult form. 
This reading preserves the causal relation between nature in the sense of inner 
principle of change and nature in the sense of fully developed adult form (the former 
is the productive source of the latter) and simply denies that "nature" refers to 
numerically the same principle. In the course of setting out this solution we shall gain 
deeper insight into the metaphysical structure of a biological substance. 
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Chapter Two 
The Structure of a Biological Substance 
§1 Three senses of "nature" 
In "Material and Formal Natures in Aristotle's De Partibus Animalium" James 
Lennox draws our attention to several key passages in the PA where Aristotle divides 
the nature of a biological substance into its material nature (640b28-9,641 a26) and its 
formal nature (640b27). The latter is eventually identified with nature understood as 
substantial being (641 a27), which is then distinguished into nature "as mover" and 
nature "as end". 1 This is set out explicitly in PA 1.1,641 a22-33: 
The natural scientist will state both what the soul or that very part of 
the soul is, and speak about the attributes it has in virtue of the sort of 
being it is, especially since the nature of something is spoken of and is 
in two ways: as matter and as substantial being (oüoia). And nature as 
substantial being is both nature as mover and nature as end (Kai CA '35 
Ktvov0a Kai WS TO TEXos). And it is the soul-either the whole soul 
or some part of it that is of this sort in the case of animals. So in this 
way it will be requisite for the person studying nature to speak about 
the soul more than the matter, inasmuch as it is more that the matter is 
nature because of soul than the reverse; for indeed the wood is a bed or 
a stool because it is potentially these things. (Lennox transl. with 
modifications) 
In this text Aristotle elaborates on the hylomorphic structure of a biological substance. 
Generalising to all living things, a biological substance (or organism) is a composite 
of a material nature and a formal nature. However, the formal nature is said to be both 
nature "as mover" and nature "as end". I shall not deal with the concept of material 
nature in any direct manner here. 2 My interest is rather with the hylomorphic structure 
of a biological substance as such, more specifically, with the (real or apparent) two- 
1 Lennox 2001b, 182-304. Note all references to Lennox 2001b are to essays reprinted 
in that volume. 
2 Lennox 2001b, 182-304 offers an excellent discussion of the relation between the 
material nature and the formal nature as mover in the PA. See also GA 743a36-b5 
(translated below). 
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fold structure of its formal nature. The question to ask is whether, by saying nature 
understood as substantial being (formal nature) is both nature as mover and nature as 
end, Aristotle is identifying one thing under different descriptions or two different 
things. 
Traditionally, views on the relation between the material nature and formal 
nature of an organism have been divided into two main camps. On the one side there 
are those who take these to be distinct "parts" of the unified whole. On the other side 
are those who argue that material nature and formal nature are merely conceptual 
abstractions from something that is metaphysically simple. 3 Eventually I shall side 
with the former view. Thus, in what follows I shall assume that the first distinction in 
our text between the organism's material nature and its formal nature is a real 
distinction. Although this involves a number of (ultimately ancillary) problems, in the 
interest of advancing the argument I shall simply take this for granted. The danger 
otherwise is that we will become quickly entangled in the intricacies of Aristotle's 
metaphysics before getting started. 
It should be kept in mind here that the traditional debate surrounding the 
relation between the matter and form of an Aristotelian composite substance cannot 
be perfectly mapped onto the division in PA 641 a22-33. For discussions of Aristotle's 
hylomorphism generally only take into account the matter and the form actualised in 
the matter, which in our text is "nature as end". This leaves "nature as mover" 
unaccounted for. I am assuming that Aristotle's hylomorphism is to be understood on 
the part-whole model; the two approaches to PA 64la22-33 that follow thus represent 
two ways of dealing with "nature as mover" from this perspective. On one view 
nature as mover and nature as end pick out numerically the same "part" of an 
organism's hylomorphic structure (the adult shape and form) under different 
descriptions. On the other view (the one I shall defend) nature as mover and nature as 
end pick out two numerically distinct "parts" (making three in total). 
§2 Nature WS TO' TEXoS and nature cis i Ktvovßa 
On the standard reading of the Metaphysics all composite substances, 
including biological substances, have the same basic two-fold structure (matter and 
form). The problem facing this reading is what to do with the contrast between formal 
For more on this see below. 
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nature "as mover" and formal nature "as end". The most obvious strategy would be to 
collapse the two into a single principle under different descriptions, thereby 
preserving the apparent two-fold analysis of the Metaphysics. 4 Here we would take 
the first division between the material nature and the formal nature as a real 
distinction yielding two parts of the composite and the second division between nature 
as mover and nature as end as a mere `qua' distinction. On this reading both nature as 
mover and nature as end refer to the shape and form of the organism. The latter is the 
form when actualised in the matter; the former is that same shape and form 
(somehow) acting as the efficient cause of the process leading up to it. 
Formal preformationism offers a way to make sense of this in the context of 
generation. On Lear's account, for example, nature as end and nature as mover will 
both refer to a single nature in two states of being: the former is the shape and form of 
the creature when fully developed (the actualised form); the latter is that numerically 
same shape and form pre-existing in the embryo in a state of potentiality (the potential 
form). 
However this first reading is cashed out, it is extremely difficult to square with 
Aristotle's Greek. The suggestion would be that the distinction Aristotle makes 
between nature as mover and nature as end is not a genuine sub-division of the formal 
nature into two distinct principles but simply picks out a single nature under different 
descriptions. Thus we are talking about the nature qua mover and the nature qua end. 
The obvious problem with this is that Aristotle does not employ the `qua' (rj) locution 
here. Rather, he refers to nature cwt TI KLvoüßa and nature wS TO TEXOS. This is the 
same word used to distinguish the material nature from the formal nature: nature 
vA-qc versus nature ws ovatas. And these are said to be ontologically distinct 
(641a26: 8tXc7s ovßr15). This interpretation would thus require taking the same word 
"cis" in two different ways. In the first instance it expresses a distinction between two 
parts of a biological substance, matter and form, and in the second instance a mere 
4I say the apparent two-fold analysis here, since it is not clear whether the 
Metaphysics actually does see biological substances as having a two-fold nature (as 
traditionally assumed) or whether this is simply a by-product of Aristotle's reliance on 
the artefact model there. The current strategy is only attractive if one insists on this 
standard way of reading the Metaphysics (which I shall not). 
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`qua' distinction (one thing under different descriptions). And nothing in the Greek 
warrants this. 5 
In contrast to this first reading, I shall defend the view that nature "as mover" 
and nature "as end" refer to numerically distinct parts of a unified whole. 6 Nature "as 
end" refers to the shape and form of the creature when fully developed while nature 
"as mover" refers to a distinct potential for its formation (an active potential). On this 
reading, nature as mover stands to nature as end as the art of ship building stands to 
the form of the ship when fully constructed (the form in the matter). The force of what 
I shall call the nonidentity reading derives from its explanatory power. It explains how 
Aristotle can consistently hold that the formal nature of an organism is both the 
principle that initiates and controls the embryo's development and the shape and 
structure of the thing when fully developed. For unless Aristotle takes these to be 
(numerically) distinct, we end up with the paradox that one and the same thing is the 
cause of its own existence. 
My argument for this reading will proceed in two steps. First I shall introduce 
several texts to show that Aristotle at least recognises a conceptual distinction 
between formal nature as mover and formal nature as end. 7 I shall then offer three sets 
of arguments to show that this must be understood as a real (as opposed to a mere 
5 Of course this is not a problem for a reading that takes the distinction between 
material nature and formal nature to be a mere `qua' distinction as well. There are 
several reasons for rejecting this view (see below). However, even without those 
reasons, our text tells against this reading insofar as Aristotle says that material nature 
and formal nature are not only two ways in which nature is spoken of but also two 
ways in which it exists (they are different in being). And the standard way of 
expressing the idea that A and B are one thing under different descriptions is to say 
that they are the same in being, though different in account (e. g. Physics 202a20-1). 
6I address the problem of unity (H6) further below. This reading is also endorsed by 
Lennox 2001b, 189. 
7 This first step may seem trivial given that this is at minimum what 641 a22-33 is 
telling us. However, some commentators deny that there is even this conceptual 
distinction. For example. Sarah Broadie argues for what she calls a "conceptual 
coincidence" between these two senses of formal nature. I discuss Broadie's view 
further below. 
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`qua') distinction. If I am right, then nature "as mover" and nature "as end" cannot be 
collapsed into a single nature. For example, they do not refer to the shape and form of 
the organism in two states of being (potentiality/actuality). 
§3 Some terminology 
Before beginning, it will be helpful to introduce some terminology. In what 
follows I shall designate formal nature as mover (cbs i Kwovßa) by "genetic nature" 
and formal nature as end (cws TO' TEXos) by "phenotypic nature". My choice of 
terminology here is certainly not arbitrary. For I shall argue that when Aristotle 
distinguishes between nature "as end" and nature "as mover" he is drawing roughly 
the same distinction modem biology makes between an organism's phenotype and 
genotype. 8 Although these two concepts are not clearly defined even within modern 
biology, the basic distinction is between the organism's fully developed morphology, 
physiology, and behaviour (what we might call its observable form), and the sum of 
underlying genetic factors (whatever these turn out to be) which are in some sense 
productive of those phenotypic characters. 9 To be sure, the extent to which genes are 
8 This insight has also been recorded by Morsink 1982,167. However, Morsink is 
drawing on GA 4.3 rather than PA 641a22-33. For a discussion of Morsink's account 
see chapter five below. Gutierrez-Giraldo 2001 makes the reverse claim that I am 
making here. He argues, not that Aristotle made a distinction akin to the modern 
phenotype/genotype distinction, but that the modern concept of the genotype counts 
as an Aristotelian yuxT .I shall not evaluate this 
interesting claim here. 
9 My use of "phenotypic nature" is intended to be neutral with respect to the kinds of 
features it includes and their level of specificity (whether they are species- or 
individual-specific). Thus, in the first place, it makes no difference whether 
phenotypic nature is restricted to species-level properties or whether it is taken to 
include properties below the level of species as well (though I shall eventually argue 
for the latter). In the second place, supposing we take phenotypic nature to be 
identical with the species-form, it makes no difference whether we take this to include 
all aspects of an animal's physical appearance, internal anatomy, physiology, and 
behaviour characteristic of the species (cf. Furth 1988,72: "Fact 2") or whether we 
restrict it to certain aspects of its observable form. (One might even wish to restrict 
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causally responsible for the phenotype is very controversial-'0 What is important for 
my purposes is simply the fact that modem biology recognises a fundamental 
ontological distinction between the phenotypic characters of an organism, on the one 
hand, and the genes that underlie them, on the other. " It is in this way (so I shall 
argue) that the phenotype/genotype distinction provides a good model for 
understanding the relationship Aristotle envisions between nature cws TO TEAos and 
nature cäs rl Kivovoa and the role he assigns to each in his ontogeny. As we shall see. 
one of Aristotle's most important insights in this respect was to appreciate that the 
replication of biological form (embodied in the phenomenon of inheritance) requires 
that these two kinds of formal nature pick out two distinct parts of an organism. 
The structure of the genetic nature is explored in detail in later chapters (see 
esp. chapter five). I shall argue that an organism's genetic nature is comprised of 
different active potentials (or &iv LEts), each of which is causally responsible for 
producing a different part of its phenotypic nature. However, there is still a good deal 
of exegetical work to be done before we can appreciate this. The first step in the 
argument is to show that Aristotle at least recognises a conceptual distinction between 
what I am calling an organism's phenotypic nature and its genetic nature. And the 
best way to do this is to look at the text itself. 
§4 Phenotypic nature 
The idea that an organism's "formal nature" is its adult form (or phenotypic 
nature) is relatively uncontroversial. The following two texts should be sufficient to 
illustrate this: 
phenotypic nature to (parts of) the organism's soul, though in what follows I shall use 
the concept in the much richer sense of "the differentiae in the matter". ) 
10 To what extent the phenotype is a product of the interaction between the genotype 
and the cellular and extra-cellular environment is still extremely controversial. For a 
good discussion of this see Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, chp. 5. 
11 See Laubichler and Wagner 2000. The claim that there is an ontological distinction 
here should not be taken to imply a substantial dualism, that genes and their 
expressions are two different kinds of substances (as mind and body are for a 
Cartesian). It need not amount to anything more than the idea that genes are one thing, 
their phenotypic expressions another. which is sufficient for my purposes. 
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For it is not enough to say from what things they [sc. animals and their 
parts] are constituted, e. g. from fire or earth. It is just as if we were 
speaking about a bed or any other such thing; we would attempt to 
define its form rather than its matter, e. g. the bronze or the wood. And 
if we could not do this, we would at least attempt to define the matter 
of the composite; for a bed is a `this-in-that' or `this-such', so that we 
would have to mention its configuration as well, and what its visible 
character is. For the formal nature (ý KO(T X TT) V µop(PrIv (Pvo15) is 
more important than the material nature (Tijs vAtKfjs gvcEws). (PA 
640b23-8, Lennox transl. with one modification12) 
Even Empedocles occasionally stumbles on this [sc. nature is more of a 
principle than the matter], led by truth itself, and is forced to say that 
substantial being, i. e. nature, is the ratio (TÖV Aöyov), for example 
when he gives an account of what bone is. He does not say that bone is 
any one of the elements or two or three or all of them together, but 
rather that it is a ratio of the mixture (XOyov -riffs . iýEws) of these. 
And it is clear that he would explain what flesh is and each such part in 
the same way. (PA 642a17-24) 
I shall pass over without comment Aristotle's suggestion in the first passage that in 
those cases where we cannot define the form by itself (i. e. in the case of sensible 
substance), we should instead define the matter of the composite. My interest is in the 
use of the concept of formal nature (nature understood as substantial being). 
By associating the formal nature with a thing's "configuration" (6X1 JaTO5) 
and "visible character" (Ttoiov TT 'IV i&Eav) the first passage is clearly picking out the 
phenotypic nature of an organism. In the second passage we find Aristotle praising 
Empedocles for `stumbling' upon the concept of nature understood as substantial 
being and for recognising that nature in this sense is more of a principle of things than 
the matter. However, PA 641 a22-33 shows us that the association with ovßia alone is 
not sufficient for determining whether Aristotle is picking out the genetic nature 
12 Lennox translates 71 KaTa -rrlv uopcprjv pvßts literally as "the nature in respect of 
shape'". I have translated this simply as "formal nature" for consistency. Other 
constructions include rj K Ta TO Ei&os cpvots and rj KaTa TOV Aöyov vats. 
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(nature as mover") or the phenotypic nature (nature as end"). As such, context will 
always play an important factor. In the present context it is fairly certain that the 
nature in question is the phenotypic nature, which Empedocles believed could be 
adequately expressed in a chemical formula. 
Aristotle praises Empedocles' account of nature (understood phenotypically) 
for two reasons. First, according to Lennox, although Empedoclean accounts of the 
nature of biological tissues are not the preferred functional accounts employed in the 
Parts of Animals, they at least take us in the right direction. For saying that the 
substantial being of bone is a ratio expressed by the formula E2W2A0F4 (DK fr. 96: cf. 
DA 410a4-7) goes beyond merely stating its constituent materials and instead focuses 
our attention on their precise organisation. 13 Second, Aristotle praises Empedocles not 
just for recognising the concept of substantial being, but for refusing to reduce the 
substantial being of each thing to its material nature (even if he was forced to concede 
this): "He does not say that bone is any one of the elements or two or three or all of 
them together, but rather that it is a ratio of the mixture of these. " 
Our working definition of phenotypic nature is the shape and form into which 
an embryo develops. Here, "nature" picks out the actualised form of the individual at 
the end of the process (its observable form or visible character). However, this 
requires qualification. Calling the adult form nature ws TO TEXOs suggests that 
Aristotle is talking about the form that is supposed to result from development and not 
simply the form that actually results. Thus, Aristotle will exclude from the phenotypic 
nature those characteristics of an organism that result from any accidental changes 
that might occur during and after its development (e. g. birth defects, battle scars). 
14 I 
shall take this normative qualification as implicit in our use of the concept of 
phenotypic nature: the phenotypic nature is the form into which the embryo is 
supposed to develop. 
13 Lennox 2001 a, 151. Note that only this first observation about the current passage 
is suggested by Lennox. 
14 To be sure. identifying which features are accidental (not supposed to happen) will 
not be straightforward, since Aristotle thinks both environmental and material factors 
(e. g. diet) can contribute to the normal pattern of development (GA 5). 
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§5 Genetic nature 
No one (I think) would object to the suggestion that the concept of formal 
nature, or nature understood as substantial being, picks out the form of an organism 
when fully developed. However, the same concept is quite often used to pick out the 
productive agent at work in the development of the organism that is causally 
responsible for that form. The Generation of Animals provides a wealth of examples 
of this use of formal nature: 
And just as the products of art are formed by means of the artist's 
tools, or to speak more accurately just as they are formed by means of 
the movement of these (for this movement is the activity of the art and 
the art is the form of the products in another), so too with the power of 
the nutritive soul. Just as at a later stage in the animals and plants 
themselves this soul effects growth out of the nourishment using heat 
and cold like instruments (for the movement of this [sc. growth] is in 
things of that sort and each thing comes into being according to a 
certain formula), so too it [the power of the nutritive soul] constructs 
the naturally generated organism at the beginning. For, since the 
material out of which the organism grows and that out of which it is 
originally constructed are the same, the active potential (rj 1roioCoa 
Svvapis) is also identical with the one which is operative in the 
beginning (but greater than it). If, then, this is the nutritive soul, it is 
also that which generates - and this is the nature of each organism, 
being present in all plants and animals alike. But the other parts of the 
soul, while they are present in some living things, are not present in 
others. (740K5-7410) 
Like a good household manager (oiKovöuos), the nature <of an 
organism> is not accustomed to throw anything away if something 
useful can be made out of it. In home economics the best of the food 
available is reserved for the free men; the surplus from this as well as 
the inferior food goes to the servants, and the worst of all goes to the 
domestic animals. Here, then, is an instance of a mind external to them 
acting so as to provide for their growth. Likewise, the nature is at work 
within organisms that are coming to be and constructs the flesh and the 
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somatic parts of the other sense-organs out of the purest material, while 
it constructs bones and sinews and hair out of the residues, which 
means they must wait until the organism's nature has some residue at 
hand - and that is why they are the last to be formed. (744b16-27; cf. 
740a3 ff. ) 
For nothing occurs contrary to nature with respect to what is 
everlasting and necessary (-d v äEi Kai -rrIv Eý äväyKfls) but in the 
case of things that happen in a given way for the most part but can also 
happen in another way. In fact, even in the case of monstrosities, what 
occurs is contrary to this particular order, indeed, but it never takes 
place in a merely random fashion; and it therefore seems to be less of a 
monstrosity because even that which is contrary to nature is in certain 
sense according to nature, namely when the formal nature (i KaTä TO' 
Eiöos cpv6ºS) fails to master the material nature (T1 v Ka-rä -º-rIv iiAr1v 
<(pV'aºv>). (770b 11-17) 
We can ignore the first sense of nature in the last text which is used as shorthand for 
the statistical frequency of natural phenomena (cf. GA 777al8-21, PA 663b27-9). 
Again my interest is in Aristotle's use of formal nature. 15 In each of these three texts 
the formal nature is the principle that constructs the organism (genetic nature) rather 
than the shape and form of the organism when fully constructed (phenotypic nature). 
This use of the concept of formal nature stands in stark contrast with its use in the 
other two passages looked at earlier. 
This is most explicit in the third passage where "the formal nature" acts on 
"the material nature". Although Aristotle insists that the origin of a monstrous form is 
the material nature of the embryo (770a4-7), it is ultimately caused by a failure of its 
formal nature to impose the parent's shape and form on the matter (cf. 768b 10-15, 
769b8-13). Here formal nature is the genetic nature of the embryo, the productive 
agent; the phenotypic nature would be the shape and form that this nature fails to 
impose on the matter. This text gives us a clear picture of the role played by each of 
15 Although only the last text uses the full expression ij Ka-rä TO EISos ( rGLS, it is 
clear that "the nature" in the other two refers to the formal nature and not the material 
nature. 
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these natures in Aristotle's ontogeny. Development is a process in which the genetic 
nature transforms the material nature into an organism with a certain phenotypic 
nature. 
In both of the other texts the formal nature also picks out the organism's 
genetic nature rather than its phenotypic nature. Although there is a good deal to say 
about the second passage, all that is important here is the generative role it assigns to 
the formal nature: it is a teleological principle inside the developing embryo that is 
causally responsible for the formation of its adult structures. In the first passage 
Aristotle explicitly refers to organism's formal nature as the active potential (r 
rrotoOaa Svvainc) that is responsible for generating (i yEvvwoa) the new 
individual. 
A caveat is necessary here. The two stages Aristotle is referring to in the first 
text are morphogenesis (the differentiation of the organism's primary structures out of 
menstrual blood) and the subsequent growth of those structures in the period 
following morphogenesis. Aristotle's point is that the genetic nature regulates both of 
these two processes. It is important that the growth "at a later stage" which the genetic 
nature governs is the augmentation of the immature structures and not the day-to-day 
metabolic activities that maintain the mature organism's body through the course of 
its adult life. We can see this clearly by comparing the first text with 777a3-8: "It is 
clear, then, that milk has the same [material] nature as the secretion out of which each 
part is formed, as has been said earlier. " Here, Aristotle is contrasting the mother's 
breast milk (the matter used to grow the parts of the baby) and her menstrual blood 
(the matter used to build those parts). The "earlier discussion" to which Aristotle 
refers here is presumably 740b25-7410. If this is right, then "the material out of 
which the organism grows and that out of which it is originally constructed" (in 
740b25-741a3) refer to the mother's milk and the menstrual blood, respectively. 
In PA 640b23-8 and 642al7-24 Aristotle used the concept of formal nature to 
pick out the shape and form of an individual when fully developed (its 
"configuration" and "visible character"). However, as our second set of texts clearly 
shows, Aristotle is quite willing to use that concept to pick out the productive agent at 
work inside the developing embryo which is responsible for generating that shape and 
form. Indeed, this is its primary application in the Generation of Animals. 
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§6 The distinction between the natures 
Each of the texts I have introduced so far deals with one or the other of these 
uses of formal nature. However, there are several places where Aristotle is explicitly 
concerned with the distinction itself. One such place is Metaphysics Z7. What is 
interesting here is that Z7 appears to articulate the very same three-fold distinction 
between an organism's material nature, phenotypic nature, and genetic nature that we 
find in PA 641a22-33. At 1032a15-25 Aristotle identifies three principles of natural 
generation. The first two - that "out of which" biological substances are generated 
and that "according to which" they are generated - correspond to the matter and the 
form (or phenotypic nature), respectively. The third principle, the moving cause of 
natural generation, is explicitly identified with the creature's formal nature (a24-5). 
Aristotle's Greek here is quite difficult: 
Kai vp' O? 7j KaT X TO E &ö XEyouEVrI q)'015 TI ' öuoE1b1js (avr bE 
Ev a"Xaw. äv6pc nios yäp äv6pwirov yEvv ). 
Ross translates this text as, ... and so 
is that by which they are produced-the so- 
called `formal' nature, which is specifically the same as the nature of the thing 
produced (though it is in another individual); for man begets man". 16 Tredennick 
renders it, "And that by which they are generated is the so-called `formal' nature, 
which has the same form as the thing generated (although it is in something else); for 
man begets man". 17 Neither of these seem to capture Aristotle's point. 
The central idea is packed into the phrase rý KaTä To' EiSoS q VC 15 rj 
6poELSr15. A literal translation of i KaTa TO' Eiöos gvois (standardly translated 
simply as "the formal nature") would be "the nature with respect to the form" or "the 
nature according to the form". Since Aristotle is talking about the moving cause of 
natural generation ("that by the agency of which" (Ü(p' ov) an organism comes to be), 
we can be sure that he means the genetic nature. Thus i ptois should be read in the 
sense of an internal source of motion or change. Substituting "internal source of 
motion" for "nature". Aristotle is saying that the moving cause of natural generation is 
an internal source of motion according to the form, where "according to the form" 
(Ka-rä TO Ei os) specifies the kind of motion for which the genetic nature is a source. 
16 Translation from Barnes 1995. 
17 Tredennick 1996. 
43 
This rather odd-sounding phrase can be understood by way of contrast. For 
Aristotle, a developing embryo changes according to what it is (i. e. according to its 
form). In contrast to this his materialist rivals claimed that an embryo changes 
according to what it is made out of (i. e. according to its matter). But if the materialists 
are right, then we should expect an embryo to separate into its constituent elements, 
its fiery constituents moving upwards, its earthy constituents moving downwards, and 
each of its other elements moving according to their own natures. However, this is not 
what we find. When left to its own an embryo does not break down and separate into 
its constituent elements (contrast a paper cup). Rather, it undergoes a complex series 
of movements and changes that collectively transform the matter into a organism of a 
determinate kind - indeed the same kind as its parents - whose functioning parts all 
work together in ways that contribute to its ability to survive and flourish within its 
particular environment. Clearly this complex change does not originate from the 
simple natures of the materials themselves. 18 The fact that an embryo does not break 
down into its constituent matter but instead undergoes a series of complex 
transformations that build it into an organism of the same kind as its generating 
parents suggests that there is something else at work inside the embryo that regulates 
its development according to that form. For Aristotle, this principle is the creature's 
genetic nature: it is an internal principle of motion or change that organises the matter 
according to the pattern of its adult form (i KaT I TO Eiöos (p%OLs). 
As I understand Aristotle's point, i 6POEºbijs further modifies the kind of 
motion initiated by the organism's genetic nature. What he is saying, then, is that the 
moving cause of natural generation is an internal principle of change whose activity 
organises the embryonic materials according to the same form as the generating parent 
(the form which is "in another"). 
The introduction of the genetic nature at 1032a24-5 underwrites Aristotle's 
attack on Forms as paradigmatic causes in Z8: 
18 cf. GC 2.9. As Lennox notes (2001 b, 191-2), most of the changes that take place 
inside an organism are in fact contrary to its material nature. Lennox points to PA 
663b25-36 where earthen material in the organism is said to `flow upwards of 
necessity'. whereas the natural, unconstrained motion of Aristotle's element earth is 
downwards. 
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Obviously, then, the cause which consists of the Forms-as some are 
wont to speak of the Forms, if they are something over-and-above 
(Trapa) the particular things-is useless (ovOty Xprjatpa), at least 
with respect to coming-to-be and being. Nor for this reason should 
these Forms be regarded as self-subsistent entities (ovaiat Ka0' 
auras). Indeed, in certain cases it is even obvious that the generator is 
of the same kind as that which is generated, not, however, identical or 
one in number, but one in form, e. g. in the case of natural things (for 
man begets man).... Thus, it is obvious that it is not necessary to set up 
a Form as a pattern, for we should have looked for Forms in these 
cases especially, since <natural things> are substances in the strongest 
sense, but the thing which generates is sufficient to produce, and be a 
cause of, the form in the matter (tKavöv TO yEvvwv Trotfaat tcai TOO 
ETSovs ai-rtov ET vat Ev Tfi VAT I). (1033b26-1034b5) 
Aristotle's point here is about ontological economy. In the case of biological 
substances, we do not need to introduce separately existing Forms as models to 
explain how particulars come to be F. The reason is that organisms contain the source 
of a specific organism-building motion in themselves, what we might call a 
developmental `programme'. For Aristotle this heritable programme is the creature's 
genetic nature. The force of this argument will become clearer when we turn to the 
analysis of the mechanisms of inheritance in Generation of Animals 4.3. For now we 
will have to make do with an analogy. Fire does not need a map to get to the upper 
cosmos because (in Aristotle's physics) it contains a source of upward motion in 
itself. The activity of its nature carries it there automatically. A horse's genetic nature 
is like the nature of fire, except it is the source of a much more complex horse- 
building motion. Aristotle's point, then, is that because the embryo contains a source 
of horse-building motion in itself, it does not need a model or blueprint (a separate 
Trapä3ELypa) of its adult form in order to achieve that end. The activity of its nature 
generates the form in the matter automatically. 
The final bank of texts that I want to draw attention to here in order to make 
explicit the conceptual distinction between genetic nature and phenotypic nature 
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comes from Metaphysics A4.19 Once again we find Aristotle deploying the concept of 
formal nature in both ways: 
[In one sense nature means] that whence the primary change in each 
natural being originates [which] is in itself qua itself. (1014b 18-20) 
Hence as regards the things that are or come to be by nature, though 
that out of which they naturally come to be and are [sc. the matter] is 
already present, we say they do not yet have their nature until they 
have their shape and form. Therefore, that which is composed from 
both of these (e. g. animals and their parts) exists by nature, while both 
the primary material... and the form (i. e. the substantial being) are 
natures; 20 and the latter is the end of the process of development (To 
TEXOS Tfis YEVEOEWS). (1015a3-12) 
From what has been said, the primary and chief sense of nature is the 
substantial being of those things that have a principle of change in 
themselves qua themselves; for the matter is said to be nature in virtue 
of being receptive of this, and development and growth are said to be 
nature in virtue of being changes from it. And nature in this sense is 
the source of the changes of natural beings, which is somehow inherent 
in them either potentially or actually. (1015 al 3-19) 
The first two texts are fairly straightforward. The first picks out the creature's genetic 
nature; "the primary change" is the growth and development of the new individual 
that proceeds from this nature (1015a13-19). The second opposes the material nature 
19 I have chosen Metaphysics 04 rather than Physics 2.1 because it makes the 
distinction between the three senses of nature (material nature, phenotypic nature, 
genetic nature) more explicit. There do not appear to be any major philosophical 
differences between the two discussions. 
20 This is a slightly liberal translation of the Greek; however, it captures the contrast 
Aristotle is after more effectively than a literal translation. The contrast in question is 
between wßEI (pEv), "by nature", and wßis (&), "a nature". The point is that the 
organism, which is a composite of matter and form, exists by nature (q)vaEi), whereas 
the matter and the form of which it is composed do not exist by nature but each of 
them is a nature (waLs, note the absence of the definite article). 
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(that out of which the organism naturally comes to be) with the phenotypic nature (the 
form at the end of the process of development). The third text is more complicated. 
For Aristotle makes two references to what we would identify as the formal nature. 
The reference to nature in the final sentence is quite clearly genetic nature (the 
source of change). Alexander takes Aristotle's statement that this nature is "somehow 
inherent" in natural beings "either potentially or actually" to mean that the adult form 
pre-exists in the embryo in potentiality and in the adult in actuality. 21 However, 
Aristotle does not say that the (adult) form is somehow inherent in natural beings 
either potentially or actually but the source of the change that produces that form. 
And unless one already accepts that nature in the latter sense is nature in the sense of 
fully developed adult form, there is no reason to accept Alexander's reading of this 
text. As I read the text, growth and development are called "nature" in virtue of 
proceeding from the genetic nature, which is nonidentical with the shape and form in 
which those processes terminate. 
On the other hand, the opening reference to nature understood as substantial 
being (which is nature "in the primary and chief sense") is ambiguous given 
Aristotle's remarks in PA 641a22-33. For it could refer to genetic nature or 
phenotypic nature. Having said that, it is fairly certain that Aristotle is picking out the 
organism's phenotypic nature. For it is in virtue of being receptive of this that matter 
is said to be "nature" (cf. 1050a15-16), and it does not receive that form until the end 
of the process of development (1015a3-12). 22 
21 Alexander in Metaph. 360,9-13. See Dooley 1993,137 n. 80 (cf. n. 79). 
22 My way of reading 1015a13-19 requires that we take the reference to the formal 
nature of which matter is receptive (= T(l) w TaITrýs 
bEKTLKf1) to point backwards to 
phenotypic nature (= nature in the primary and chief sense) and the reference to the 
formal nature from which growth and development proceed (= T(l) w 
äirö Tav-rrls) to 
point forward to genetic nature (the source of change in natural beings). This is not at 
all unreasonable, though. For the point of M4 is that "nature" is said in many ways. 
And it would certainly add rhetorical effect if the sentence in question was seen to be 
trading on that very ambiguity. 
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Thus. ignoring nature in the sense of the process of growth and development 
(which is more properly said to be according to nature rather than a nature). 2" 
1015a13-19 countenances the same three-fold division that we find in our main text at 
PA 641a22-33. 
Like the other texts we have looked at so far, Metaphysics 04 demonstrates 
Aristotle's willingness to use the concept of formal nature in two different ways. In 
the one case it refers to the form which is actualised in the matter, in the other it refers 
to the principle inside the embryo that is causally responsible for that form (insofar as 
growth and development proceed from it). However, there is another way to read 
1015a13-19 that would suggest there is not even a conceptual distinction between 
these two natures. On this reading the fully actualised form of an adult organism is 
both the nature from which development proceeds (genetic nature) and the nature 
towards which it advances (phenotypic nature). This reading is suggested by Sarah 
Broadie. 
According to Broadie, Aristotle argues for a "conceptual coincidence" 
between phenotypic nature and genetic nature: 
But the natural process of growth denoted by the word `vats' (in the 
sense in which it means `genesis') does result in a state that in turn 
gives rise to such processes, and this state is also called `gnvßts'. 
Evidently Aristotle is thinking of the fact that man generates man: i. e. 
that a full-grown man is a source of processes (in offspring) identical 
in kind to that by which he developed.... Thus a kind of conceptual 
coincidence obtains between (a) the concept of the developed natural 
state and (b) the concept of the source of the process that gives rise to 
that state.... 24 
The suggestion is that, contrary to what I have been arguing, Aristotle's twin concepts 
of phenotypic nature and genetic nature coincide in the fully developed adult form 
which is actualised in the matter. On this reading, to talk about the organism's fully 
23 cf. Physics 193a1. "According to nature" is properly applied to motions and 
changes. In this sense the development of an embryo is on a par with the natural 
motion of fire towards the upper limit. which is the example Aristotle uses in the 
Physics passage as something that is "according to nature" rather than "a nature". 
24 Broadie 1982,64. 
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actualised form as "phenotypic" nature is to talk about that form as the end of that 
creature's development; to talk of the "genetic" nature is to pick out that same 
actualised form in its role as the source and cause of its offspring's development. 25 
It is important to appreciate how this reading differs from a reading like 
formal preformationism, which accepts there is a conceptual distinction between two 
senses of formal nature (insofar as there is a conceptual distinction between 
potentiality and actuality). Formal preformationism takes the genetic nature which 
pre-exists in the embryo to be the offspring's potential form and the phenotypic nature 
to be that same form when fully actualised in its adult body. The current reading 
denies there is even this distinction. Instead it takes the fully developed adult form 
actualised in the matter (Socrates' visible shape and form) to be both phenotypic 
nature and genetic nature. 
There are three major problems with this interpretation. First the form in 
which the parent's own development terminates - its developed form - will count as a 
source of change "in another" whereas (genetic) nature is supposed to be a source of 
growth and development "in the thing itself qua itself". Second the idea that the 
25 Broadie is not commenting on, nor even seems to be aware of, the distinction in 
641 a22-33. Her evidence for conceptual coincidence is drawn exclusively from 
Physics 2 (specifically 193b8-18). Broadie gives two conflicting versions of 
conceptual coincidence. In the above passage she is saying that (what 641a22-33 
calls) nature as end and nature as mover both pick out the parent's fully actualised 
form under different descriptions: the parent's shape and form is both the end of its 
own development and the source of its offspring's development. However, in the 
argument deployed immediately after this (pp. 65-6, §20: see further below) Broadie 
claims that the conceptual coincidence obtains between the offspring's fully 
developed form and its internal principle of change. On this version of conceptual 
coincidence an organism's shape and form is both the end and source of its own 
development. Here genetic nature refers, not to the parent's developed form qua 
source of motion for its offspring, but to the principle of motion inside the developing 
embryo itself (which Broadie argues is also its nature in the sense of its fully 
developed structure). The present section is targeting Broadie's first version of 
conceptual coincidence (nature as mover and nature as end pick out the parent's own 
full- developed form under different descriptions). 
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offspring's growth and development proceed from the parent's actualised form is 
extremely difficult to square with Aristotle's views on reproduction in the Generation 
of Animals. The idea that the fully developed structures of the parent organism play a 
direct role in reproducing those structures was one of the prevailing theories at the 
time (so-called pangenesis). Given the amount of time devoted to undermining that 
theory in the GA (see esp. 1.17-18), it is extremely unlikely that the nature Aristotle 
says is the source and cause of development refers to the parent's fully developed 
structures. Third, even if this were the case, we still end up with a conceptual 
distinction between the source of biological development and the end in which that 
development terminates (even if they turn out to be numerically the same thing). 
§7 Arguments for nonidentity 
I now want to turn to the arguments in favour of the nonidentity reading of PA 
641 a22-33. I shall argue that Aristotle does not just think there is a conceptual 
distinction between an organism's phenotypic nature and its genetic nature; they are 
two distinct principles of an organism. Some of the most compelling evidence for this 
comes from Aristotle's general treatise on coming-to-be, Generation and Corruption. 
§7.1 The ontological argument 
The strongest argument comes from Generation and Corruption 2.9 where 
Aristotle's ontology of coming-to-be is said to include three numerically distinct 
items. As in Z8, GC 2.9 focuses on the problem of ontological economy. However, in 
this case the problem is not one of proliferation (as it was in Z8) but deficiency: 
The principles <of coming-to-be> are equal in number to, and identical 
in kind with. those in the sphere of the eternal and primary things. For 
there is one in the sense of matter, and a second in the sense of form; 
and there must be a third principle present over-and-above (h t 
lrpooultäpXEtv) these. For the two [sc. matter and form] are not 
sufficient (oü iKavai) for coming-to-be any more than they are 
sufficient in the case of the primary things. (335a28-32, translated after 
Joachim) 
This [sc. the potentiality of each thing to be and not-be] is a cause in 
the sense of matter for the things which are such as to come into being, 
while the cause in the sense of that for the sake of which <they come to 
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be> is the shape and form; and this is the formula of the substantial 
being of each thing (o AOyos ö rc EKaCYT0 /ovaias). But there must 
be the third principle in addition (1rpoaCtvat), which was vaguely' 
dreamed of by all our predecessors but definitely stated by none of 
them. On the contrary, some amongst them thought the nature of the 
Forms was adequate for coming-to-be. Thus, Socrates in the Phaedo 
first blames everyone else for having given no explanation, and then 
lays it down (11ToT16ETat) that some things are Forms, others 
participants of the Forms (Tä BE LEBEKTIKa Tcwv EISwv), and that 
while a thing is said to be in virtue of the Form, it is said to come to be 
and pass away in virtue of sharing in and losing the Form. So that he 
believes if these are true, the Forms must be causes of coming-to-be 
and passing-away of necessity. On the other hand, there were others 
who thought the matter alone was sufficient for coming-to-be, since 
the movement derives from (äiro) the matter. (335b3-17, translated 
after Joachim) 
In the second passage Aristotle targets the theory of Forms in the Phaedo. According 
to Lennox, this is also Aristotle's target in Z8.26 However, it is more likely that the 
argument in Z8 is directed at the theory of Forms in the Timaeus. For Aristotle's 
complaint against the Phaedo is that it does not posit enough ontological items to 
account for natural generation, whereas in Z8 Plato is criticised for introducing too 
many. In both Z7 and GC 2.9 Aristotle insists that natural generation involves three 
principles: matter, form, and a productive cause which supplies the motion that 
organises the matter according to that form. The Timaeus introduces a fourth 
ontological item: separately existing Forms that serve as models after which the 
productive agent (the Demiourge) patterns its movements. 27 
26 Lennox 2001 b, 141 f 
27 The four ontological items of the Timaeus are matter (the receptacle), sensible 
forms ("the copies", e. g. 29BC, 48E-49A), a productive agent (the Demiourge), and 
separately existing Forms that serve as models. I have argued that Aristotle's genetic 
nature makes separately existing models unnecessary since it is a source of motion 
according to the parental form. 
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In GC 2.9 Aristotle argues that none of his predecessors managed to posit all 
three principles. Specifically, they failed to recognise a distinct moving cause. While 
"Socrates in the Phaedo" recognised the importance of forms in natural generation, he 
went wrong in taking them to be productive causes. Philoponus interprets this as 
suggesting that Plato actually identified the moving cause with the Forms themselves: 
For some rendered the Form as moving cause, as Plato in the Phaedo. 
He [Plato]... says that the Form produces that which is endowed with 
form by being present. But [Aristotle] criticises him, saying that the 
Form is not sufficient for production: for neither is the image (i 
EiKC)v) said to produce what comes to be in relation to it but rather the 
craftsman, nor does health heal the one who is ill without there being a 
doctor.... In this way he [Aristotle] refutes those who say that forms 
are productive causes. (in GC, 281,25-282,2) 
In this respect Aristotle thinks the materialists offered a much better account of 
natural generation than the Platonists: 
For to say that matter generates owing to its movement would be, no 
doubt, more naturalistic (cpv61KwTEpov) than to make such claims as 
are made by the thinkers we have been criticizing. For that which 
brings about alteration and structural change is more explanatory 
(aiT1c')TEpov) of coming-to-be, and in everything (in both nature and 
art alike) we are more accustomed to speak of what is capable of 
initiating motion (KLvrITtKov) as the productive cause (-rö lTotovv). 
(335b26-30) 
However, the materialists went too far in attempting to reduce natural generation to 
matter and its intrinsic motions. 28 Even if we accept that matter is a source of motion, 
those simple motions could not be responsible for producing complex living 
organisms which are functionally adapted to their particular environments except by 
chance - and it is too regular for that. 
29 The generation of these substances must be 
28 cf. Philoponus in GC 282,2-20, Joachim 1999,249-50. 
29 
: Aristotle makes a similar point against Empedocles in GC 2.6 (see Sorabji 1980. 
179; Joachim 1999.231). 
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traced to a goal-directed productive activity. which Aristotle thinks is supplied by a 
separate principle (the creature's genetic nature) . 
30 
While Aristotle's account of natural generation in Z7 makes explicit the 
conceptual distinction between phenotypic nature and genetic nature, GC 2.9 
emphasises their nonidentity. In both accounts natural generation is said to require 
three principles: matter, form, and a source of motion that puts the matter together 
according to that form. These correspond to the three senses of nature identified in PA 
641a22-. 33: material nature, phenotypic nature, and genetic nature. 31 What is not 
explicit in Z7, however, is that the third principle is something distinct from the other 
two. This is unmistakable in GC 2.9. First, Aristotle tells us that the principles of 
natural generation are three in number (335a28). Thus, material nature, phenotypic 
nature, and genetic nature are not only conceptually different, they are numerically 
different as well. Second, and more importantly, Aristotle says that matter and form 
are "not sufficient" for generation (ov itcavai); there must also be a moving cause 
"over-and-above" these two principles (E T1 TrpOGulTäpXELV; cf. 335b7, ýrrpoGEivaI). 
Indeed, the point of GC 2.9 is that previous attempts to account for natural generation 
failed precisely because they did not posit a distinct moving cause: the materialists 
identified it with the matter while "Socrates in the Phaedo" identified it with the form. 
§7.2 The causal argument 
The idea that an organism's phenotypic nature and genetic nature are 
numerically distinct principles can also be established by appealing to their different 
causal roles in the generation of an organism. One of Aristotle's objections to the 
Phaedo account of coming-to-be in GC 2.9 is that, while forms exist (they are real 
ontological items), they are not productive of anything. It is the doctor who produces 
health in the patient and the scientist who produces knowledge in the student, not 
health and knowledge themselves (335b20-4). This objection appears to be a 
restatement of an earlier argument from GC 1.7 against turning forms into moving 
causes: 
30 GC 335b30-4,336a8-12; cf. GA 734b24-735a4. 
31 It is important to note here that this moving cause (in natural generation) will not be 
the parent organism but the embryo's own nature. For natural generation requires an 
internal source of motion. 
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The productive agent is a cause in the sense of that from which the 
change begins, but the end for the sake of which it takes place is not 
productive. That is why health is not productive, except 
metaphorically. For when the productive agent is present the patient 
becomes something; but when states are present the patient no longer 
becomes but now is <that thing>, and forms (i. e. ends) are a kind of 
state. (324b13-17) 
This passage supplies us with two different ways to establish the nonidentity of a 
particular organism's genetic nature and phenotypic nature. 
One argument appeals to their teleological relation. Consider the following 
passage from GA 2.6: 
While both [sc. heating and cooling] are employed by the nature, 
having a capacity for making one thing into this and another into that 
from necessity, in the generation of organisms it is certainly for the 
sake of something that the heating and cooling of these things takes 
place and that each of the parts is formed, the flesh being made soft, 
heating and cooling making it such on the one hand from necessity and 
on the other hand for the sake of something, while the sinews are made 
solid and elastic, the bones solid and brittle. (743a36-b5) 
Given the active role assigned to nature here, it is certain that Aristotle is talking 
about the embryo's genetic nature. Flesh, bone, and sinew, on the other hand, as well 
as their functions are taken as being partially constitutive of the end for the sake 
which this nature acts (they are part of its phenotypic nature). Aristotle is categorical 
in GC 324b13-17 that the end for the sake of which change occurs (the form at the 
end of the process) is not the thing that produces that change: "The productive agent 
is a cause in the sense of that from which the change begins, but the end for the sake 
of which it takes place is not productive. , 32 It follows from this that the offspring's 
genetic nature must be distinct from its phenotypic nature. For the nature that "uses" 
heating and cooling is the productive agent - it is a cause in the sense of that from 
which the change originates - while nature in the sense of adult form is the end for the 
sake of which it acts. And this nature is not productive of anything. 
32 cf. 335h5-7. 
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We can put the current argument in more formalised terms. What GC 324b13- 
17 is saying is that for any two things A and B, if A is the productive agent and B is 
the end for the sake of which it acts, then A and B must be different things, since the 
end is not productive of anything. In this case A is the genetic nature (the nature that 
"uses" heating and cooling as instruments) and B is the phenotypic nature (the end for 
the sake of which that heating and cooling takes place). Therefore, genetic nature and 
phenotypic nature must be different. 33 
§7.3 The temporal argument 
The second half of 324bl3-17 suggests a third means for establishing the 
nonidentity of an organism's genetic nature and phenotypic nature. The basic form of 
this third argument is straightforward. The genetic nature and phenotypic nature 
cannot be the same principle since an embryo has its genetic nature but lacks its 
phenotypic nature. In more formalised terms, the argument consists of three premises: 
(1) A developing horse has the genetic nature of a horse. 
(2) A developing horse does not have the phenotypic nature of a horse. 
(3) One and the same thing cannot be both present and absent in the embryo at 
the same time. 
It follows from this that the genetic nature and phenotypic nature cannot be one and 
the same thing, since the former is present in the embryo during development while 
the latter is not. That Aristotle holds premise (1) it is sufficiently clear, both on textual 
grounds and on logical grounds. For the productive nature must be present in the 
embryo during the process of its development, since it is the source of the change. We 
can offer different formulations of this argument by offering different reasons for 
accepting premise (2). 
One version of the argument can be obtained from 324b 13-17 itself. Aristotle 
says that the productive agent must be present during corning-to-be, since it is the 
source of change. However, when the form is present the matter is no longer 
becoming a thing but now is that thing. This establishes the nonidentity I am after: the 
nature which is present in a developing horse cannot be the phenotypic nature (the 
adult form). because when that nature is present it is no longer becoming a horse but 
already is a horse (cf. Z 17,1041 b4-9). 
1A similar argument can be found in Lennox 2001b, 185. 
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This same conclusion can also be established on slightly different grounds. 
The genetic nature must be present in the embryo before it begins to develop, since 
development proceeds from that nature (nature is an internal source of growth and 
development). On the other hand, Aristotle insists that a thing does not acquire its 
phenotypic nature until the end of that process (10150-12, translated above). 34 Thus, 
since the developing embryo has its genetic nature before it acquires its phenotypic 
nature, they must be numerically distinct natures. 
A third version of this argument can be obtained by looking at Physics 
193a31-b6. Here Aristotle uses the example of flesh and bone rather than complete 
organisms, but the point is the same: 
For just as what is in accordance with art and what is manufactured 
(TO' TExvIKÖv) are called `art', so too what is in accordance with nature 
and what is natural are called `nature'. But we would not say in the 
former case that there exists (ExEty) anything in accordance with art, if 
it is a bed only potentially, not yet having the form of a bed; nor would 
we call it manufactured. The same is true of things formed by nature. 
For what is flesh or bone potentially does not yet have its proper nature 
(TT) V EauTOV pvai5); nor does it exist by nature, until it acquires the 
form specified in the definition, which we name in defining what flesh 
or bone is. 
Generalising the point in this passage to horses, what is potentially a horse does not 
yet have its proper nature until it acquires the form specified in the definition of a 
horse (phenotypic nature). And it acquires this form at the end of the process of its 
development. As we have seen, 67 tells us that a thing is potentially a horse only 
when it is in such a condition where, in the absence of anything external impeding it, 
it will straightaway develop into a horse through the agency of its own generative 
principle (cf. 1049al3). Therefore, by definition, a potential horse already has the 
34 cf. 08,1050a3-9: "the adult is prior to the child, and the human being to the 
embryo, because the one now has the form while the other does not". See also GA 
736b l -b5, translated below. 
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genetic nature of a horse but not the phenotypic nature (which comes at the end of 
development), and so the two must be distinct. 35 
The foregoing discussion introduced three basic arguments in favour of the 
nonidentity reading of PA 641a22-33 (that genetic nature and phenotypic nature are 
numerically distinct principles and not one principle under different descriptions). 
First, Aristotle's ontology of coming-to-be posits three numerically distinct entities: 
matter, form, and an internal principle of change that organises the matter according 
to that form. The nonidentity of these three entities is most explicit in GC 2.9 where 
Aristotle insists that generation requires there to be a moving cause present over-and- 
above the matter and the form. Second, GC 324b13-17 argues for a nonidentity 
between the end and the productive agent of change. In this way the nonidentity of 
phenotypic nature and genetic nature simply falls out of their different causal roles in 
natural generation. The genetic nature is the productive agent while the phenotypic 
nature is the end for the sake of which production takes place but is not itself 
productive of anything (GA 743a36-b5, GC 335b5-7). Third, I argued that genetic 
nature and phenotypic nature cannot be one and the same thing on the grounds that a 
developing embryo has the one but lacks the other. I offered three variations on this 
basic argument. One appeals to Aristotle's claim in GC 324b13-17 that "when the 
productive agent is present the patient becomes something; but when states are present 
the patient no longer becomes but now is <that thing>, and forms (i. e. ends) are a kind 
of state". Another appeals to Metaphysics A4 where Aristotle insists that an organism 
does not have its phenotypic nature until the end of development, though it must 
already have its genetic nature at the start since development proceeds from that 
nature. Finally, I argued that the genetic nature cannot be the phenotypic nature on the 
grounds that a potential F has the former but lacks the latter by definition (07). 
35 Recall that 07 provides the criteria for determining when we have a potential F so 
that anything that meets those criteria is a potential F. The current point is that having 
the genetic nature of an F and not already having the phenotypic nature of an F are 
necessary conditions for being a potential F. Indeed, GC 324b 13-17 has just said that 
when a thing has its phenotypic nature it is not becoming an F but is now an actual F 
(cf. Z17). 
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§8 Broadie's objection 
I now want to turn to an objection raised by Broadie against the nonidentity 
reading being defended here. Broadie argues for a "conceptual coincidence" between 
nature in the sense of fully developed structure (phenotypic nature) and nature in the 
sense of inner principle of change (genetic nature). Broadie is inconsistent on what 
exactly this conceptual coincidence amounts to. 36 In the version considered earlier 
Socrates' fully developed structure is both the end of his own development and the 
source of the process that terminates in those same structures in Menexenos (his 
offspring). In the following argument, however, Broadie claims that Menexenos' fully 
developed structure is the source of his own development. This is why Broadie thinks 
Aristotle's natural teleology generates a paradox. In what follows I shall be concerned 
only with this second formulation of conceptual coincidence and ignore the 
inconsistency. 
Broadie's objection to the nonidentity thesis targets the third pattern of 
argument offered above. According to this argument, genetic nature and phenotypic 
nature cannot be the same principle since an embryo has the one when it lacks the 
other. At the start of development the embryo already has its genetic nature but not its 
phenotypic nature. Broadie objects to this on the grounds that refusing to identify 
these two principles leads to consequences which are unacceptable to Aristotle. Her 
argument for this is quite complicated, and so it will be helpful to reproduce it in its 
entirety here rather than attempting to summarise it. 37 
But however paradoxical the equation of final with efficient cause, 
consider the consequences of denying it, i. e. refusing to identify nature 
as principle of change or development with nature in the sense of fully 
developed structure. Suppose that we reject this, on the ground that the 
developing creature has one but lacks the other. It follows that when 
the creature attains developed form, it has a property which earlier it 
lacked. If this developed form is, as Aristotle always holds it to be, that 
in virtue of which the creature is a substance of the kind that it is, it 
follows that the still developing creature was not a substance of that 
36 See note 25 above. 
37 This passage is a continuation of the passage quoted at the outset of chapter one in 
which Broadie sets out the paradox of teleology. 
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kind. Either [1]it was of a different kind, or [2] it was no substance at 
all. In either case, it is impossible that developing and developed 
should be the same individual substance at different phases in its 
history, for the same individual Aristotelian substance must, for as long 
as it exists, be of a single nature throughout all changes, including 
development. But if developing and developed are not the same 
individual, the developed never did develop, and there is no such thing 
as development. [3] The alternative, for Aristotle equally absurd, 
would be to deny that the fully developed structure is an essential 
property of the creature which attains it. In that case, the developing 
creature lacked nothing in virtue of which the developed is the kind of 
substance that it is. But then what is the essential or substantial nature 
that was present throughout? The only likely candidate is the property 
of being a source of development (or developments) into such and such 
a type of structured object. This property is common to the developing 
and also to the developed (the latter being a potential parent of like 
offspring). This implies that being endowed with a source of 
development into mature structure F is of the essence of the object, 
even though having F itself is not of the essence; from which it follows 
that the substance might itself cease to be characterized by F (e. g. the 
structure of a mature human being) while retaining the essential power 
of giving rise to developments towards F: thus what is no longer a man 
(of human structure) could nonetheless generate man. To conclude: if a 
developing thing is a substance of the kind it is on account of the 
principle within it of development, and if a developed one is of the 
kind it is on account of its fully structured form, then these two 
natures, natura naturans and natura naturata, must be and all along 
have been in some sense identical, or else the same individual 
substance has different substantial essences. 
38 
38 Broadie 1982,65-6 (§20). The numerical notations are my insertion. For 
consistency with my own discussion I have also changed Broadie's "C" to "'F" (e. g. 
"This implies that being endowed with a source of development into mature structure 
C [F] is of the essence of the object"). 
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The argument in this passage is a reductio ad absurdum: (1) -- (3) represent the 
consequences of refusing to identify genetic nature ("nature as principle of change'') 
and phenotypic nature ("nature in the sense of fully developed structure") which 
Aristotle is supposed to find unacceptable. 
I think Broadie is too quick to dismiss these three alternatives. As we shall see, 
each represents a viable position and thus three possible escape routes from the 
dilemma. Now it would certainly be enough for avoiding Broadie's objection if it 
could be shown that at least one of these alternatives is a live option for Aristotle and 
is not (as Broadie suggests) an absurd consequence of refusing to collapse genetic 
nature and phenotypic nature into a single principle. However, it will strengthen my 
position enormously if i could show that all three of them are acceptable in this way. 
Since the three alternatives represent mutually exclusive positions, I shall not insist on 
any one of them but simply offer them up as three possible ways to respond to 
Broadie's objection. This will be enough to show that her objection is in fact no 
objection at all. 
Before beginning, it will be useful to isolate what appear to be the two main 
philosophical assumptions driving Broadie's argument. I shall call these two 
assumptions the substance criterion and the unity criterion, respectively. Stated 
negatively, the substance criterion holds that x cannot be said to be an F unless it 
possesses the essential property that makes something an F. According to the unity 
criterion, embryo (xi) and adult (x2) must be the same individual F at different points 
in its ontogenetic history in virtue of a single common substantial nature (i. e. they 
both have the essential property that makes a thing anF). This is necessary for saying 
that the embryo develops into the adult, which I take to be what is really at stake. 
The satisfaction of the unity criterion is parasitic on how the substance 
criterion is filled out. For example, on Broadie's reading an organism is an F just in 
case it possesses the characteristic shape and form proper to an F. Thus embryo and 
adult will be (numerically) the same F at different points in its ontogenetic history in 
virtue of possessing (numerically) the same phenotypic nature. Obviously this would 
require something like formal preformationism to work. For the claim being made is 
that nature in the sense of inner principle of change (the nature which pre-exists in the 
embryo) is nature in the sense of fully developed structure. And Aristotle denies that 
the undifferentiated embryo possesses any actual structures proper to its adult form 
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(e. g. 734a16-25,74lb22-4). However, I think the substance criterion is still open at 
this point. 
The general structure of Broadie's argument is a two-homed dilemma (with 
the first horn dividing into two consequences identified here by (1) and (2)). These 
two horns represent two alternative readings of the substance criterion. The first takes 
the property in virtue of which x is an F to be the fully developed structure of an F 
(phenotypic nature). The second horn takes the property in virtue of which x is F to be 
the productive source of that structure (genetic nature). Broadie wants to force us into 
accepting the identity of these two properties on the grounds that their nonidentity 
leads to absurdity. My strategy in answering Broadie's objection will be to show that 
each of the three alternatives is an acceptable conclusion for Aristotle and so do not 
force us to identify the two senses of formal nature. The first two solutions both 
involve accepting Broadie's reading of the substance criterion -x is a substance of 
kind F in virtue of possessing the phenotypic nature proper to an F- but rejecting the 
unity criterion. (As we shall see, there are two ways to reject the unity criterion. ) The 
third solution accepts Broadie's unity criterion - embryo and adult are the same 
substance in virtue of possessing a single formal nature -- but rejects her reading of the 
substance criterion. On this alternative, embryo and adult are the same individual 
substance at different points in its ontogenetic history in virtue of possessing 
(numerically) the same genetic nature. (This is numbered (3) in the above passage. ) 
§8.1 First Horn 
The first horn of Broadie's argument takes phenotypic nature as the substance 
criterion: it is the possession of a characteristic shape and form that makes an 
organism a substance of kind F (e. g. a horse or a human being). This seems to be 
Aristotle's position, for example, at 1015a3-12. If, as I hold, the embryo does not 
have this nature until the end of development, then the developing embryo will not be 
an F until the end. Thus, either it was a different kind of substance than the thing at 
the end of the process or it was not a substance at all. In either case, Broadie argues, it 
is false to say that embryo and adult are the same individual substance at different 
points in its ontogenetic history. And if they are not the same individual, then it is 
false to say that the embryo developed into the adult and there is no such thing as 
development. This is supposed to force us into accepting that, if phenotypic nature is 
the essence of an F, the genetic nature and the phenotypic nature "must be and all 
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along have been in some sense identical, or else the same individual substance has 
different substantial essences". 
One response to this would be to accept that embryos are not substances at all 
(numbered (2) in the above passage) and simply deny that this is an absurd 
consequence of nonidentity. Indeed, at PA 641 b31-2 Aristotle tells us that an embryo 
is a yE'VECIS (a process) while the adult at the end is the ovßia (the entity). What 
Aristotle seems to be saying here is that the embryo is not an F but the coming-to-be 
of an F. In other words, pace Broadie, a tadpole is not a developing frog but the 
development of a frog. Admittedly, this is the only text where we find Aristotle 
making this interesting claim; he certainly never argues for it. 39 However, the point is 
simply that denying an embryo is a substance at all would not be as absurd a 
consequence as Broadie makes it out to be. For Aristotle himself entertains that idea 
(whether or not he can be shown to hold it consistently). 
Another way to avoid Broadie's objection would be to accept that a 
developing organism is a substance but deny that Aristotle thinks it must be the same 
kind of substance at every point in its ontogenetic history (consequence (1) in the 
above passage). Broadie rejects this alternative on the grounds that the same 
individual substance will have different substantial essences, which violates the unity 
criterion. However, when we turn to the Generation of Animals we find that Aristotle 
does not actually accept this criterion: 
It is as they develop (rrpoiövTa) that embryos acquire the capacity for 
sensation, in virtue of which a creature is an animal. For it is not the 
case that an animal and a human being are formed at the same time, or 
an animal and a horse, and likewise for the other animals; for the end is 
formed in the final stage, and what is distinctive (To ibiov) is the end 
of the process of development. (736b1-5) 
Aristotle's denial that when an embryo comes to be an animal it also comes to be a 
human or horse or any other particular kind of animal exposes a critical weakness in 
Broadie's argument. Broadie claims that "the same Aristotelian substance must, for as 
long as it exists. be of a single nature throughout all changes, including development" 
and that the consequence of refusing to collapse the genetic nature and phenotypic 
nature is that "the same individual substance" will turn out to have "different 
39 Though see Freeland 1987. 
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substantial essences", which Aristotle is supposed to find absurd. Yet, Aristotle is 
categorical in this text that the same individual substance does have different 
substantial essences at different points in its ontogenetic history. 
Aristotle's point here is that as soon as an organism develops the parts of its 
sensory system, while it is now true to say of that creature that it is an animal 
("animal" can be truly predicated of it), it is false to say that it is a horse or human 
being or any other particular kind of animal ("it is not the case that an animal and a 
human being are formed at the same time, or an animal and a horse, and likewise for 
the other animals"). The reason is that it does not yet have the shape and form proper 
to any particular kind of animal. So, pace Broadie, it is not true to say of the tadpole 
that it is a frog anymore than it is true to say that it is a horse or is a human being. 
Since the tadpole does not acquire the distinctive phenotypic nature of a frog until the 
final phase of its development, it will not be that particular kind of organism until that 
phase. 
Of course there is a sense in which Aristotle thinks it is true to say of the 
tadpole that it "is" a frog: it is a potential frog. However, his point in 736b 1-5 turns on 
the claim that it is not an actual frog until it has the characteristic shape and form 
proper to that type of creature. This exposes another presupposition of Broadie's 
argument that Aristotle would not accept. Broadie assumes all along that it is true to 
say of the embryo that it is an F at every point in its ontogenetic history. More 
importantly, she assumes that embryo and adult are both actual Fs (indeed 
numerically the same F) and that F is predicated of them both in virtue of 
(numerically) the same nature. 40 As such, Broadie argues, the nature which pre-exists 
in the embryo (nature in the sense of inner principle of change) must be its nature in 
the sense of the fully developed adult form. For this is the property in virtue of which 
we predicate F of the adult. 41 However, Aristotle would object to this on the grounds 
40 cf. 64: "... when we ask... what the growing thing is, i. e. what sort of growing thing 
it is, the answer is given by predicating of that object the same word as is used of it in 
the developed state" (emphasis Broadie). 
41 cf. 65: "Putting all this together, we may say (i) that both qua developing and qua 
developed, the natural substance is endowed with an inner principle of change; and 
(ii) that if `F' is the predicate expressing the shape or form when fully developed, the 
creature both qua developing and qua developed is to be defined as an F. From this 
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that F is not predicated of embryo and adult in the same way. 42 It is predicated of the 
embryo potentially and of the adult actually. More importantly, it is not predicated of 
them in virtue of the same property. For something is an actual F in virtue of its actual 
shape and form (Z 17) but a potential F in virtue of the fact that its matter is capable of 
developing into that form when acted on by the appropriate causal agent (07; cf. 08, 
I050a15-16). 
The main point is that Aristotle is categorical in the GA that the still 
developing embryo is not an actual F until it acquires the distinctive property that 
makes something an actual F. And it does not acquire that property until the end of its 
development. Thus, since the embryo is not an actual F (even if it is a potential F), 
Broadie's consequence (1) does not force us into identifying genetic nature and 
phenotypic nature. 43 
There is one outstanding issue that needs to be addressed before moving on to 
the third solution to Broadie's dilemma. It has to do with the unity criterion itself. If 
the possession of a distinctive phenotypic nature is the criterion for being a substance 
of kind F, then Aristotle's insistence that the embryo does not acquire this property 
until the end of its development does lead to the two consequences that Broadie 
highlights. Either a developing embryo is not a substance at all or it is a different kind 
of substance than the thing at the end of the process. I have argued that both of these 
alternatives would be acceptable conclusions for Aristotle and so do not pose a 
problem for the nonidentity thesis. However, Broadie argues that in either case it will 
still be false to say that embryo and adult are the same individual substance at 
different points in its ontogenetic history. And thus it will be false to say that the 
embryo develops into the adult - which is an absurd conclusion. Thus, one might 
object that neither of our first two solutions actually manages to escape Broadie's 
dilemma. 
The crucial move here is the claim that if the embryo is not a substance 
(consequence (2)), or if it is a different kind of substance than the thing at the end of 
Aristotle concludes that nature in the sense of inner principle of change is the 
developed form. " 
42 That is, assuming F is predicated of the embryo at all (641b31-2). 
'3 Unless otherwise stated, I shall continue to speak of something's being an F in the 
sense of being an actual F. 
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the process (consequence (1)), then it cannot be identified with the adult at an earlier 
stage in its ontogenetic history. However, this does not follow. What Broadie has in 
mind is diachronic unity, being the same individual over time. And she sees this as 
being bound up with substantial unity, being the same kind of substance over time. 
What GA 736b1-5 makes perfectly clear, however, is that (in the GA at least) 
diachronic unity is severed from substantial unity in Aristotle's mind. For Aristotle, 
being numerically the same entity over time does not necessarily require being the 
same kind of entity: "For it is not the case that an animal and a human being are 
formed at the same time, or an animal and a horse, and likewise for the other 
animals. " Given the divorce of diachronic unity from substantial unity, all we would 
need to show in order to be able to say the embryo develops into the adult is that they 
are numerically the same individual, that the embryo is the thing at the end of the 
process (diachronic unity), not that they are the same individual F (substantial unity). 
It is entirely possible that when it came to biological development Aristotle 
simply did not find questions about diachronic unity very puzzling (which is not to 
say he was not interested in questions of identity at all: see the problem of Siamese 
twins at 773a5-13). He may have simply taken it as obvious that the embryo is the 
same individual as the thing at the end of the process. ' We can explain this, I think, 
by remembering that for Aristotle the process of development is one continuous 
change (cf. 741b9: ßwEipETaL TO EcpEýfjs). For, being one and continuous, there is 
nothing to threaten the diachronic unity of the developing organism. Diachronic unity 
" Here I am talking about Aristotle's mature theory of biological development as 
presented in the GA. The Physics' preoccupation with the question of diachronic unity 
is noticeably absent from the GA, whose underlying metaphysics must be assumed to 
supersede those of the Physics on the question of substantial coming-to-be. The 
Physics is mainly concerned with diachronic unity in the context of accidental 
changes such as Socrates coming to be healthy from being sick. Here there is a clear 
subject that persists through the change, Socrates, who simply exchanges one 
accidental property for another. However, in biological development things are 
radically different. Here the properties acquired along the way are constitutive of the 
thing's substantial being (understood phenotypically). What the underlying subject is 
in this case (what I have been calling the "embryo", though properly speaking it is the 
material nature) is not as clear. 
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only becomes a problem if one thinks development is composed of discrete stages. 
Consider the modem labels "zygote", "blastula", and "gastrula". Each of these 
represents the embryo in different stages of development. If we imagine these to be 
like actual points on a line, then the question naturally arises: In virtue of what can we 
say of the zygote, blastula, and gastrula that they are all the same entity at different 
points in its ontogenetic history? In this case we might (as Broadie does) look for a 
single property which is common to all three entities. However, for Aristotle, as 
indeed for modern developmental biology, this is simply the wrong way to think 
about development and (for Aristotle at least) the wrong way to think about lines. Just 
as Aristotle denies that a line is composed of actual points, so too he denies that 
development is composed of actual stages. Now the distinction between a developing 
embryo and the development of an embryo is deceptive here. For the process of 
development just is the embryo in the process of developing into its adult form. Thus, 
the analogy with Aristotelian continuous lines equally applies to the embryo itself 
considered as a temporally extended being (though one that is undergoing 
transformation). 45 Thus, since development is one continuous change or, alternatively, 
since it is the coming-to-be of one thing, there is nothing to threaten the diachronic 
unity of the developing organism. And so the question of whether embryo and adult 
are the same individual simply does not arise. 
Having said that, I think we can offer a third solution which allows for 
Broadie's unity criterion. The first two solutions to Broadie's dilemma involved 
accepting her reading of the substance criterion (x is a substance of kind F in virtue of 
possessing the phenotypic nature proper to an F) but rejecting the unity criterion, 
either by denying that embryo and adult must be the same kind of substance or by 
denying that the embryo must be a substance at all. In either case, there is no reason to 
insist that the embryo must already have the phenotypic nature proper to an F and 
thus no reason to identify this with its genetic nature (the nature it does have). The 
45 In modern biology, zygote, blastula, and gastrula are not three distinct entities either 
but conceptual abstractions from what is essentially one temporally continuous entity. 
"Zygote", "blastula", and "gastrula" are simply names we give to the embryo at 
arbitrary points in its continuous development (cf. Maienschein 2000,124-5). It is as 
if we were to give a name to three arbitrary (potential) points on an Aristotelian 
continuous line. 
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third solution would involve accepting Broadie's claim that embryo and adult must be 
the same individual F in virtue of possessing (numerically) the same formal nature 
and simply deny that this is the phenotypic nature. In that case the embryo will not 
lack any essential property in virtue of which the adult is an F. The only alternative, 
Broadie says, is to take the property in virtue of which they are both F as "the 
property of being a source of development (or developments) into such and such a 
type of structured object". In other words, the substantial nature which is common to 
embryo and adult is the genetic nature. On this reading, although the embryo does not 
yet have its fully developed adult form, it will still be the same individual substance as 
the thing at the end of the process in virtue of possessing (numerically) the same 
genetic nature. 
§8.2 Second Horn 
On the current reading of the substance criterion it is the possession of a 
characteristic genetic nature ("the property of being a source of development (or 
developments) into such and such a type of structured object") that makes a creature 
an organism of kind F. Again, Broadie dismisses this alternative as absurd: 
This implies that being endowed with a source of development into 
mature structure F is the essence of the object, even though having F 
itself is not of the essence; from which it follows that the substance 
might itself cease to be characterized by F (e. g. the structure of a 
mature human being) while retaining the essential power of giving rise 
to developments towards F: thus what is no longer a man (of human 
structure) could nonetheless generate man. 
By the structure of a mature human being Broadie means (what I am calling) the 
phenotypic nature of a human and by the source of development into that mature 
structure its genetic nature. I have argued that a human being's phenotypic nature and 
genetic nature are numerically distinct on the grounds that the developing human has 
its genetic nature but lacks its phenotypic nature. Moreover, as we shall see, only the 
former is passed on to the offspring in the act of reproduction. As Broadie rightly 
points out, it follows from this that a mature human being could (at least in principle) 
lose its phenotypic nature whilst retaining its genetic nature. 
46 However. it doesn't 
46 cf. 722a11-14. 
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follow in this case that what is no longer a human can nevertheless generate a human. 
For to say that the human ceases to be a human when it loses its phenotypic nature 
simply assumes that it was the possession of that nature that made it a human being in 
the first place. And this is precisely what is being denied here. On the current reading 
of the substance criterion it is the possession of a characteristic genetic nature that 
makes something a human being, not the possession of a characteristic phenotypic 
nature. And since the organism in this example retains the genetic nature of a human 
being, it follows that what still is a human generates a human. 
§9 Genetic nature as o , oia? 
In the end Broadie does not present a convincing case against this third 
alternative, since her objection merely begs the question. But is there any reason for 
thinking that Aristotle would accept this alternative reading of the substance criterion 
(that what makes a creature an organism of kind F is the possession of a characteristic 
genetic nature)? Pace Broadie, Aristotle does not always take phenotypic nature to be 
the property in virtue of which an organism is a substance of the kind it is. As we 
have seen, the Parts of Animals also identifies the creature's genetic nature with its 
substantial being: nature understood as substantial being is both genetic nature and 
phenotypic nature. It is not entirely clear how we are supposed to understand this. On 
Broadie's (and Lear's) reading there is just one ontological item (the shape and form 
of the adult) which is the creature's substantial being; genetic nature and phenotypic 
nature are this one ontological item under different descriptions. However, I have 
already presented several arguments in favour of taking genetic nature and phenotypic 
nature to pick out two numerically distinct parts of an organism. Given this 
nonidentity, we need to find a way to understand Aristotle's claim that both of these 
two natures count as substantial being. 
Aristotle could simply be saying that genetic nature and phenotypic nature 
both qualify as substance whereas material nature does not. However, in Zeta/Eta the 
matter is also said to be substance; it is just that the form is substance in the primary 
sense. In that case PA 641 a22-33 may be read as suggesting that both phenotypic 
nature and genetic nature are proper candidates for being the substance of an 
organism in the primary and chief sense while remaining silent (or neutral) on which 
of them this is. 
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Is there any evidence outside Parts of Animals 1.1 for thinking that what 
makes a creature an organism of kind F is the possession of a characteristic genetic 
nature? Is there any reason besides this one statement for thinking that Aristotle ever 
entertained the idea that both phenotypic nature and genetic nature are proper 
candidates for being the substance of a biological organism in the primary and chief 
sense? I shall argue that Aristotle's view in the Parts of Animals (as expressed in 
641a22-33) is consistent with at least one interpretation of the central books of the 
Metaphysics. On the one hand, it is almost universally agreed that Z17 reaches the 
conclusion that an organism's substantial being is to be identified with its phenotypic 
nature (its fully developed adult form). On the other hand, H6 seems to suggest that 
an organism's substantial being can also be identified with the productive agent (TO' 
-rrot iaav, 1045a31) or moving cause (605 KLvrjoav, 1045b22) of its generation. I 
want to argue that this productive agent is the creature's genetic nature, what Aristotle 
calls its nature "ws i icuvoüoa". 
The account of substantial being in Z 17 is well-rehearsed in the literature and 
its conclusions are relatively uncontroversial with respect to what it identifies as 
substantial being. At the outset of ZI 7 Aristotle announces a "fresh start" in his search 
for oiioIa by introducing a new criterion for determining what the substance of a 
thing is. According to this new criterion, substantial being is whatever it is that is 
primarily responsible for making the matter (the subject or 1TroKEI&EVOV) an 
individual of such-and-such a kind: What makes this body a horse? What Aristotle is 
after here is "the cause of the matter in virtue of which it is a definite thing", which is 
identified with the indwelling form (1041 b4-9). In the case of biological substances 
this turns out to be the formal nature (1041b25-31). Here formal nature is clearly 
meant to pick out the organism's phenotypic nature. In the second part of the chapter 
phenotypic nature is said to also be the thing responsible for the unity of the adult 
body. The connection between substantial being and unity is made explicit in H6. 
There Aristotle tells us that asking what makes x an F is the same as asking what 
makes x one F. 47 Thus, according to Z17, phenotypic nature turns out to be the cause 
of a thing's membership in its kind (insofar as it makes this body an F) and the cause 
of its unity (insofar as it makes this body one F). 
47 1045b19-21. Cf. Charles 2-000,297. 
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When the question of substantial unity arises again in H6, we appear to get a 
very different answer. In this case the cause of a thing's unity (and thus its substantial 
being) is identified with its producing agent or moving cause: 
But if, as we say, one is matter and the other form, the one potentially 
and the other actually, then what is being sought would no longer seem 
to be a puzzle. For this puzzle would be the same even if the definition 
of X were `bronze sphere'. For this name would be an indication of the 
account. So that the cause we are searching for is what it is that causes 
the bronze and the spherical to be one. But it is apparent that this is no 
longer a puzzle, because the one is matter and the other form. What, 
then, is the cause of this - of what is potentially F being actually F- 
except the productive agent (T6 -rrotfioav) in those things which admit 
of coming-to-be? For there is no other thing that causes the potential 
sphere to be an actual sphere. And this is the essence of each thing. 
(1045a23-33) 
H6 is an extremely controversial chapter. In what follows I shall attempt to develop a 
reading of the text which supports the view that the substance of a thing is to be 
identified with its genetic nature. 
There is no clear consensus as to what exactly "this" (in the final sentence) is 
supposed to pick out. According to one reading, "this" refers back to the "thing that 
causes what is potentially spherical to be actually spherical", namely the productive 
agent (TO' no«j(3av). 48 On this reading, Aristotle's point is that the productive agent 
is the essence of each thing that comes into being. 49 
Aristotle has already cleared the way for this idea back in Z 17. There we are 
told that the object of inquiry is "the cause" and that this is the essence of each thing 
(1041 a27-8). In some cases, Aristotle says, this will be the end for the sake of which a 
thing exists. But in other cases the essence will be the primary source of motion (a30). 
We look for the final cause in those cases where we are interested in being and the 
48 Charles also reads "this" as referring to "the cause" but takes the cause to refer to 
some other cause and not the productive agent (2000,295 n. 40). For more on this 
reading see below. 
' This is how I read the final sentence of the text (see also Gill 1989.169). For an 
alternative reading see Burnyeat et al. 1984,41; Harte 1996 (esp. 292 n. 42 and 43). 
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moving cause when we are interested in coming-to-be (a30-4). 1 would construe Z 17 
and H6 as pursuing these two alternatives, respectively. 
We can ignore most of the details of 1045a23-33. What is important for my 
immediate purposes is the suggestion that the cause of unity (what it is that makes a 
potential F into an actual F) is the productive agent. Aristotle reiterates this idea in the 
closing lines of the chapter when he says that in the case of substances that contain 
matter "there is no cause [of unity] except whatever it is that causes development [lit. 
the cause "as mover" (w5 Klvfic3av)] from potentiality to actuality" (1045b21-2). 
Now the productive agent here cannot refer to the Unmoved Mover. 50 For one thing. 
the Unmoved Mover is not an efficient cause. What we are talking about is the 
particular moving cause of an individual's development. Looking at Z7, this could 
refer either to the parent organism itself (1032a15-17) or to the creature's genetic 
nature (1032a24-5). However, given the connection between a thing's substantial 
being and the cause of its unity, taking the productive agent in H6 (the cause of unity) 
to be the parent organism would imply that the substance of a thing is another 
individual distinct from itself. It follows from this that a thing's substantial being 
could pass out of existence before it does (unacceptable for Aristotle). Taking the 
productive agent to be the creature's own genetic nature avoids this consequence. 
On my reading, then, the productive agent which is primarily responsible for 
changing the potential F into an actual F is the thing's own genetic nature (what PA 
641 a22-33 calls nature CO's ý Kºvoüoa). It is fairly easy to see why this nature should 
be responsible for unifying the organism's matter and form. For it is the principle that 
is responsible for the matter supplied by the female developing into its adult form. 
The idea that the matter develops into its adult form is significant insofar as it avoids 
the model of production where two entities (a matter and a form) are compounded 
together to make a third entity (the composite). In this case one might seriously 
wonder why the thing compounded from them is not a mere aggregate of matter and 
form. The idea that the one develops into the other avoids the problem, especially 
when the things in question are one and the same F in two states of being (viz. 
potentiality and actuality). 
50 Contrast Rist 1989,239-41. 
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Gill also takes H6 to be identifying the cause of a thing's unity with the 
moving cause of its generation. 5' However, she takes this cause to be necessary 
because material compounds are unstable. On this reading the productive agent is a 
cause of a thing's unity in virtue of being responsible for its material elements holding 
together at the chemical level: 
The simpler matter is a source of difficulty because the elements are 
most [sic] themselves, not in combination, but in simple separation- 
because they tend to be recreated and thereby to destroy the higher 
object that they compose. The elements must therefore be controlled 
and coordinated when the object is generated and must still be 
controlled while the construct lasts. A controlling cause is required 
precisely because the unity of a composite substance is so easily 
destroyed. Given the recalcitrance of the lower level material 
properties, composite bodies must be preserved as unities or they will 
simply degenerate into something simpler. Aristotle appeals to the 
[moving] cause in H. 6 to explain why composites come to be unities 
and why they remain the unities that they have become. 52 
Gill's reading, though clever, seems to go well beyond anything that is given in H6. 
Nothing in that chapter suggests that the explanadum is the structural integrity of 
highly unstable material substances (unity at the chemical level). Moreover, although 
Aristotle is certainly asking about how things come to be unified in H6, I do not see 
him asking the further question about how they remain unified. 
On my reading of H6 the genetic nature (Gill's controlling cause) is 
responsible for the unity of matter and form in virtue of being the cause of 
development from potentiality to actuality. This also provides a clue as to why an 
organism's genetic nature, as the moving cause of its development, should count as its 
essence or substantial being. The key lies in the fact that the development of an 
embryo into its adult form is precisely the development of a potential F into an actual 
F. 
s1 Gill's characterisation of this moving cause (below) strongly suggests that she also 
takes it to be a principle internal to the developing organism itself (the creature's own 
genetic nature) rather than the parent organism. (Though see Harte 1996,293 n. 44. ) 
52 Gill 1989,170. 
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Recall that according to Z 17 the substance of an x (where x is the matter in the 
sense of ýrrrOKEuEEVOV) is whatever it is that is primarily responsible for making that x 
an F: What makes this body a horse (let us call him `Sir Desmond')? Z17 and H6 
offer different answers to this question by exploiting an ambiguity in the word 
"make". 53 In Z17 the phenotypic nature "makes" Sir Desmond's body a horse by 
being present in it as form (104 l b4-9). If the phenotypic nature of a frog came to be 
present in that same body, that is, if Sir Desmond's body suddenly came to be 
organised according to a frog's formal nature, then Sir Desmond would now be a frog. 
When Aristotle turns to the context of generation in H6 it is the genetic nature which 
is primarily responsible for "making" the matter (into) a horse. However, it does not 
do so by being present in the matter as its form but by bringing it from a state of 
potentiality to actuality. It is in this sense that Sir Desmond's genetic nature can be 
said to be the cause of his being a horse. 
This reading of H6 has two advantages. First, the substantial being of an 
organism turns out to be an internal structural component of the thing. For its genetic 
nature will be the source and cause of its growth and development "in itself qua 
itself'. Second, and more importantly, it provides us with an explanation for why 
Aristotle thinks both phenotypic nature and genetic nature are proper candidates for 
the substantial being of an organism. Since there are two ways in which something 
can be said to "make" this matter a horse - either by being present in it as form or by 
turning what is potentially a horse into an actual horse - there will be two answers to 
the question, What is it that is responsible for Sir Desmond's being a horse? 
Before leaving H6 I should say a few words about a competing interpretation 
of the text. The crucial lines for my reading are the last few sentences of 1045a23-33: 
What, then, is the cause of this - of what is potentially F being actually 
F- except the productive agent (Tr -rroLf oav) in those things which 
admit of coming-to-be? For there is no other thing that causes the 
potential sphere to be an actual sphere. And this is the essence of each 
thing. 
53 The ambiguity I have in mind is present in both the English "make" and the Greek 
"7TO1E1V". 
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Charles reads the first sentence as an earnest (as opposed to rhetorical) question. 54 He 
sees Aristotle asking: What is the cause of unity besides the productive agent? That is, 
setting the efficient cause aside, what else causes the potentially F to be an actual F? 
Charles reads "this" in the last line as referring to that other cause (namely the 
essence) and not the efficient cause. The point (on this reading) is that both matter and 
form share the same cause (e. g. they have the same teleological goal) which 
determines what it is to be each of them. 
This seems wrong to me. Charles is concerned with avoiding what he calls the 
nonexplanatory or dissolutionist reading of H6. According to this reading, if one 
excludes the efficient cause, there is no cause of substantial unity at all; the unity of a 
composite substance is basic and needs no further explanation. 55 In an attempt to 
avoid this reading, Charles takes para at 1045a31 to mean something like "in addition 
to": In addition to the efficient cause, what else is the cause of a thing's substantial 
unity in those things that come into being? But Aristotle clearly means to say there is 
no other cause of substantial unity except for the efficient cause. This is confirmed by 
the closing lines of the chapter: "Thus, there is no other cause [of unity] except 
(TrkrIv) whatever it is that causes development from potentiality to actuality. "'6 
Charles recognises that this last line is inconsistent with his reading of H6 and 
attempts to explain it away as follows: 
The explanatory interpreter, by contrast, can avoid this inconsistency if 
he can show that the final sentences of H. 6 mean only that (if one 
excludes the efficient cause) there is no cause of unity of substance 
distinct from the relevant actuality and potentiality (since these 
encapsulate all the causal features required to explain the unity of the 
composite substance). 57 
There is no inconsistency when the text is read my way. The problem is that Charles 
ignores the efficient cause. 58 As a result he sees the reading of the text where Aristotle 
says there is no other cause of substantial unity except the efficient cause as 
" Charles 2000,295. See also Lewis 1996. 
55 Charles 2000,297. 
56 1045b21-2. 
'' Charles 2000,297-8 (Charles' emphasis). 
58 This is fairly common in the literature on F6. 
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nonexplanatory or dissolutionist. But why ignore the efficient cause? Aristotle is 
clearly not a dissolutionist here, since he says explicitly that there is a cause of 
substantial unity; namely the efficient cause. And this (the efficient cause) is the 
essence of each thing. The idea that "essence" might pick out the efficient cause does 
not seem to occur to Charles. However, we have already seen that in cases of coming- 
to-be the essence is identified with the source of motion (1041 a27-32). 
Like Charles, Lewis also reads Aristotle as merely brushing aside the moving 
cause in H6, which is "relevant only in cases of becoming, which are not his target 
here". 59 Thus Lewis reads the text as saying that when we ignore the efficient cause it 
turns out that there is no other cause of substantial unity beyond the form and matter 
themselves. But that is clearly not what Aristotle says. He says there is no other cause 
beyond the moving cause (1045a31, b21-2). Straightforwardly, then, the only thing 
that accounts for the unity of the matter and the form of a composite substance is the 
moving cause. Thus, either Aristotle thinks there is no cause of unity for the kind he is 
interested in here (if Lewis is right that moving causes are irrelevant) or there is a 
cause and it is the moving cause. There is no third option. 
The main problem with Lewis' reading is his claim that moving causes are 
irrelevant in H6 since Aristotle is not interested in cases of becoming. As a 
consequence Lewis is forced to downplay any attention to coming-to-be in the 
chapter. For example, he says: "Aristotle does not use the language of becoming in 
the chapter except to bracket such cases at [1045]a31 (ýv öaots E"GT1 YEVEGIS). ). )60 On 
my reading Aristotle is interested in coming-to-be and so this is not an attempt "to 
bracket such cases". The strongest evidence in favour of this again comes in the 
closing lines of the chapter, which summarise the discussion: the cause of substantial 
unity is whatever it is that causes development from potentiality to actuality (Etc 
SuväI. tEws Eis Ev pyEIav, 1045b22). 6' Far from setting aside such cases, Aristotle's 
language here strongly favours talk of becoming: the cause of Substantial unity is 
whatever it is that causes the potential F to become an actual F. And according to 07 
59 Lewis 1996,54. 
60 Lewis 1996.73 n. 36. 
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"the potential F' is the matter when it is in a state where it will immediately develop 
into an actual F of its own accord if nothing external prevents it (embryonic matter). 
My reading of H6 supports the idea that an organism's genetic nature is a 
proper candidate for its substantial being. This is consistent with Aristotle's remarks 
in PA 64l a22-33 that an organism's phenotypic nature and genetic nature both count 
as nature understood as substantial being. In the end, however, phenotypic nature will 
most likely turn out to be the substance of an organism in the primary and chief 
sense. 62 For it is prior to the genetic nature both in account and in being. First, the 
phenotypic nature is the end or T XO specified in the account of the genetic nature 
insofar as the genetic nature is a potential for the formation of just that shape and 
form. Thus, the genetic nature of a horse is not identifiable independently of the 
phenotypic nature for which it is a potential (whereas the phenotypic nature is 
independently identifiable). Second, although the genetic nature is prior in coming-to- 
be, 63 Aristotle insists that the -rEXoS of development (which is the phenotypic nature 
towards which the genetic nature directs the process) is always prior in being 
(646a25-7). Indeed, for Aristotle, the genetic nature is present in an organism for the 
sake of reproducing its phenotypic nature rather than vice versa. 1 
61 This is supported by Ross' view that in moving from Z to H Aristotle "passes from 
the static consideration of substance to the dynamic consideration of change" (Ross 
1924, cxxiv). 
62 Metaphysics 1015a13-19. 
63 Eventually I shall argue that Aristotle's analysis of natural generation entails that 
the reproduction of the phenotypic nature (the observable form) must be preceded by 
the reproduction of the genetic nature (the source of that form). This is consistent with 
the argument for nonidentity above according to which the offspring acquires its 
genetic nature before its phenotypic nature. 
64 Some modern philosophers of biology think that this gets things the wrong way 
round. For example, Dawkins (1976) takes the `real' entities to be the genes which 
make use of the phenotype in order to replicate themselves. On Dawkins' view, then, 
the organism's phenotypic nature exists for the sake of its genetic nature. 
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§10 The three-dimensional organism concept 
Up to this point I have been arguing that genetic nature and phenotypic nature 
pick out two numerically distinct principles of an organism rather than the same 
principle under different descriptions. Aristotle's remarks in the PA that both of these 
count as nature understood as substantial being imply that these two principles are 
both internal structural components of the biological substance itself (hylomorphically 
speaking). If I am right, then in the biology at least Aristotle is working with a three- 
dimensional organism concept. 65 On this reading, a biological substance is a 
composite of material nature, phenotypic nature, and genetic nature. To make this 
clearer it will be useful to say a word about Aristotle's hylomorphism. 
The traditional interpretation of the Metaphysics takes all sensible substances, 
including biological substances, to be composites of matter and form. Aristotle's 
hylomorphism is set out, for example, at the outset of Z3: 
In one sense we say matter is of this sort [sc. the subject], in another 
the form, and in a third that which is composed from these. By matter I 
mean, for example, the bronze; by form, the configuration of the 
outward appearance (TO' ßßµa Tf s tUas); and by that which is 
composed from these - the composite (TO' ßwoXov) - the statue. 
(1029a2-5) 
In Z8 we are told that hylomorphic substances are not only composed from (EK) 
matter and form but, conversely, they are also divisible (&i(XLpETÖV) into them. For 
example, a statue is divisible into the bronze and the shape. Of course this does not 
mean that the bronze and the shape can be physically pulled apart so that I can hold 
65 In what follows I shall use the term "dimension" interchangeably with "part". 
("Principle" is intended to be neutral on the question of internal structure. ) This is 
mainly for stylistic reasons. For example, "three-part organism concept" may sound 
too much like I am saying the concept itself has three parts to it, which is not my 
point. It may turn out that dimensions are a better way to characterise the components 
of a hylomorphic substance than parts. However. exploring this possibility would take 
us too far outside the scope of my current project. For my purposes I shall simply treat 
dimension talk and part talk as equivalent. 
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the matter in one hand and the form in the other. 66 Rather, the statue can be analysed 
into those two constituents. 
Where commentators on the Metaphysics disagree is how best to characterise 
the relationship between matter, form, and composite. Answers to this question have 
tended to fall into two main camps. On one side are those who argue that matter and 
form are (in some sense) "parts" of a unified whole. 67 On the other side are those who 
treat matter and form as mere conceptual abstractions from something which is in 
itself simple and atomic. 68 On this interpretation hylomorphic substances are 
incomposite and have no genuine internal structure. Their being "composite" is 
simply an artefact of our way of looking at them. Thus, at best, we are justified in 
talking about statues and horses qua matter and qua form. 69 
There are several reasons for thinking that Aristotle treats matter and form as 
proper "parts" of a hylomorphic substance and that such compounds are therefore 
irreducibly complex. I will mention three here. 
First, the view that hylomorphic compounds are metaphysically simple and 
atomic is difficult to square with the fact that throughout Zeta and Eta we are 
constantly reminded that sensible substances are composed from and divisible into 
matter and form. Talk of composition and division is extremely ill-suited for an 
ontology whose paradigm objects are essentially incomposite. 
Second, in the closing lines of H6 Aristotle distinguishes substances that 
contain matter (hylomorphic compounds) from those that do not (e. g. essences: 
1037a1) by saying that in the former case there is a cause of unity (namely, the 
moving cause) while the latter are one without qualification (äcTrXc ). 7° The 
implication is that being composed of form and matter makes a thing complex and 
66 This might be one area where "dimensions" has an advantage over "parts". 
67 Haslanger 1994, Charles 1994, Lewis 1994, Loux 1995a, Lewis 1996. Charles 
2000. 
68 Ackrill 1972-3, Rorty 1973, Kosman 1987, Balme 1987b, Halper 1989, Gill 1989, 
Scaitsas 1994. Witt 2003. Loux (1995a) offers an excellent and fairly exhaustive 
treatment of the different versions that fall into this camp. 
69 Lewis (1996) refers to this view as the `'constructivist" or "projectivist" 
interpretation. 
70 At 1045b3 the latter are said to be `immediately one" (EvOvs ev). 
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only "one" in a qualified sense (e. g. it is one human or one horse). I shall return to 
this again below. 
Finally, matter and form are listed among the several senses of "part" in 
Metaphysics A25: 
Again [part means] that into which a thing is divided or from which the 
whole is composed, either the form or that which contains the form 
[the matter]; for example, of a bronze sphere or cube, the bronze is a 
part (this is the matter in which the form is induced) and the angle [the 
form] is a part. (1023b 19-22; cf. Physics 4.3,210b3 0-1) 
Although Aristotle does not tell us exactly what being a part amounts to here, the 
passage is clear that the relation of matter and form to the composite shares some 
essential feature with other types of part-whole relations. 71 
On the standard reading of the Metaphysics all composite substances are alike 
in having the same two-fold hylomorphic structure. Dogs, horses, statues, houses, and 
even mountains, are all composites of matter and form. What I am arguing is that in 
the biological works organisms are treated as three-dimensional objects. 72 On this 
conception of an organism the genetic source of its form is included in its 
hylomorphic make-up. Thus, dogs and horses (unlike statues, houses, and mountains) 
are composites of material nature, phenotypic nature, and genetic nature. 
As I have said, one of the primary reasons for thinking that Aristotle treats the 
genetic nature as a third dimension of a biological substance (hylomorphically 
speaking) is the fact that in the Parts of Animals it is explicitly identified with the 
o&cla of an organism along with its phenotypic nature: "And nature as substantial 
being is both nature as mover and nature as end. " Taking the productive source of an 
organism's form to be a part of its internal hylomorphic structure provides us with a 
way to understand Aristotle's claim that (genetic) nature is a source and cause of 
development in that to which it primarily belongs "Ka6' a rrö" (Physics 192b20-2) or 
"in the thing itself qua itself' (Metaphysics 1014b 18-20). This does not simply mean 
71 For a good discussion of parts and wholes in Plato and Aristotle see Harte 2002. 
72 Below I shall consider the question of whether or not the three-dimensional 
organism concept is peculiar to the biological works. There I confront an objection to 
my thesis which points to the apparent absence of any three-fold hylomorphic analysis 
of organisms in the Metaphysics. 
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that a naturally generated organism has the source and cause of its form in itself in the 
spatial sense. It has that principle as part of its ontological make-up. In other words, 
the genetic nature of a living thing is partially constitutive of the substance itself. 
An upshot of this is that it provides Aristotle with a much more robust 
distinction between genuine organisms and mere artefacts. Houses and statues are 
clearly two-dimensional objects in the relevant sense: they are composites of matter 
and form only. Here the generative principle is located in something else (the builder 
and sculptor, respectively). However, this also holds for cases where the generative 
principle is in the thing itself. In these cases Aristotle says that the productive source 
of the artefact's form (the art) is in the thing itself "qua other" (e. g. Metaphysics 
1049b7). The idea of being "in itself qua other" is significant. For it suggests that "in 
itself qua itself' is a much stronger sense of being "in" something than simply being 
inside it in the spatial sense. To be "in itself qua itself' must mean being part of that 
thing's ontological make-up. If this is right, then the idea that an organism's genetic 
nature is a source and cause of development "in itself qua itself' means that it is 
partially constitutive of that object (it is a "part" of the substance, hylomorphically 
speaking). 73 
Another interesting implication of the three-dimensional organism concept is 
that spontaneously generated organisms will not count as biological substances in the 
strict sense. 74 For the genetic source of their form is not part of their internal 
73 This is also suggested by the alternative phrase, "in that to which it primarily 
belongs Ka6' airro". Consider the case where patient and doctor happen to be the 
same individual (e. g. Hippocrates). Physics 192b 16ff. says that in this case the art of 
healing is in the patient not Ka6' airrö but KaT X 6ou4E 311KÖs. Here body (matter), 
health (form), and art (source of change) are only accidentally unified in the same 
individual (Hippocrates). Just as in the case of the statue, to pick out Hippocrates as 
the product of healing (to pick out the artefact in this case) is to identify him as a two- 
dimensional object composed of body and health. 
74 Spontaneously generated organisms (abiogenetic kinds) are discussed in GA 3.11 
and throughout HA. It is important to keep in mind here that by saying these creatures 
are the result of "spontaneous" organisation (ä1r© ßvoT6GEros airropaTOV) 
Aristotle does not mean they are in some way the product of chance. For one thing it 
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hylomorphic structure. For example, spontaneous generation is characterised in 
Metaphysics A3 as generation in the absence of a nature (1070a6-9). The idea is that 
the development of, say, a sea urchin counts as "spontaneous" in the sense that the 
process is not initiated and controlled by a principle of change in the thing itself qua 
itself. In this case the various material forces, including environmental conditions 
such as the place where the `foetus' develops, are sufficient for producing the kinds of 
motion and change that genetic natures bring about in biological substances (Z9, 
1034b4-7). 75 This means that spontaneously generated creatures are only two- 
dimensional organisms consisting simply of a material nature and phenotypic nature 
(or visible form). Unlike genuine biological substances, these organisms have an 
external rather than internal source of form. 
Thus an important corollary of my thesis is that biological substances are 
neatly marked off from all other non-biological substances in terms of having a 
unique three-dimensional hylomorphic structure. And most notable among these are 
artefacts and spontaneously generated creatures, both of which are two-dimensional 
objects consisting of matter and visible form alone. For Aristotle, a biological 
substance differs structurally from these other kinds of substance insofar as the 
genetic source of an organism's shape and form is partially constitutive of the 
substance itself. 
§11 Objections to the three-dimensional organism concept 
I want to close the first part of this study by confronting two potential 
objections to the idea that biological substances are composites of material nature, 
phenotypic nature, and genetic nature. The first draws attention to the apparent 
absence of any three-dimensional organism concept in the central books of the 
Metaphysics where Aristotle's hylomorphism is at the fore. The second argues that 
introducing the genetic nature as an additional constituent (hylomorphically speaking) 
makes organisms complex in ways that are unacceptable to Aristotle. 
It is certainly true that throughout the central books of the Metaphysics 
biological substances are continually analysed as composites of matter and form, in 
is far too regular in Aristotle's view to be a mere coincidence (Aristotle thinks entire 
kinds come into being spontaneously). See Henry 2003. 
75 1 discuss this in detail in Henry 2003,197-201. 
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each case form picking out what I am calling the organism's phenotypic nature. Not 
once are they said to be composites of material nature, phenotypic nature, and genetic 
nature. 76 How do I account for this? I think we can offer two different stories here 
using the transition from the Categories to the Metaphysics as our model. 
One thing that stands out about the analysis of substance in the Categories is 
the total absence of the hylomorphism characteristic of the Metaphysics. There are 
two ways one might account for this. According to Furth, the concept of substance 
underwent an evolution between the Categories and the Metaphysics marked by an 
increase in complexity of the sort I have in mind. 77 The substantial individuals of the 
Categories (e. g. Socrates) lack any internal structure. Once we get to the Metaphysics, 
however, substances are no longer viewed as one-dimensional subjects of predicates 
but as two-dimensional composites (ßw6ETa) of matter and form. 78 Furth puts this 
rather colourfully by saying that moving from the Categories to the Metaphysics "is 
like travelling from the complex surface of a solid into its multiply-complex 
interior". 79 
Wedin offers a different story. According to Wedin, although the analysis of 
primary substances in terms of matter and form is absent from the Categories, this is 
not because Aristotle thought they were devoid of internal structure. The Categories 
is simply not interested in the structure of its primary entities: 
From the point of view of the Categories, primary substances... are 
taken as unanalysed primitives. Although some find in this evidence 
that Aristotle did not yet have the idea of hylomorphism, according to 
the basic idea of this essay the Categories exhibits no interest in the 
structure of its fundamental entities because this is irrelevant to their 
role in its theory of underlying ontological configurations for standard 
categorical statements. Metaphysics Z, on the other hand, is consumed 
by the question of structure precisely because of the specific nature of 
76 Z7-9 is a potential exception to this (though see note 81 below). There Aristotle 
countenances three principles of coming-to-be: material nature, phenotypic nature, 
and genetic nature. 
77 Furth 1988.50ff. 
78 Furth 1988,50,67, cf. 38,60. 
79 Furth 1988,49. 
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its explanatory project. In particular, it undertakes to explain the nature 
of those entities that are the fundamental primitives of the theory of the 
early treatise. It has no interest in replacing them with something better 
suited to perform their function. 8° 
On this second story, the substantial individuals of the Categories are the same 
composite substances of the Metaphysics. It is only when Aristotle undertakes to 
explain the nature of the being of those entities in the Metaphysics that their 
hylomorphic structure becomes salient. 
These two competing accounts of the relation between the Categories and the 
Metaphysics with respect to Aristotle's hylomorphism offer us different ways to 
explain the apparent absence of the three-dimensional organism concept from the 
Metaphysics. 
As in Furth's story, we could accept that the organisms of the Metaphysics are 
in fact two-dimensional composites of matter and form (or material nature and 
phenotypic nature) and simply argue that the three-dimensional organism concept is a 
further evolution in Aristotle's thinking about substance. On this story the concept of 
substance will have undergone yet a further evolution in the biological works 
analogous to the one that marks the transition from the Categories to the Metaphysics. 
However, in this case it is only the concept of a biological substance that evolves; 
artefacts and other non-biological substances remain the same two-dimensional 
objects that they were in the Metaphysics. 
According to the second story, Aristotle already has the three-dimensional 
organism concept in the central books of the Metaphysics. It is simply that the specific 
nature of his explanatory project there (the causes of being a substance) does not 
require it. For the study of being it is sufficient to treat organisms like any other 
material object, namely, as two-dimensional composites of a certain matter together 
with a characteristic shape and form. On this story Aristotle does not replace the 
biological substances of the Metaphysics with something better suited to perform the 
functions required of them in the biology (as the first story implies). Rather, although 
he has the same organism concept throughout, it is only when he turns to the subject 
80 Wedin 2000,4 (cf. 5). 
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of biological generation that its full three-dimensional structure becomes salient. 8' 
The advantage of this second story, then, is that it allows us to account for why we do 
not seem to find a three-fold hylomorphic analysis of biological substance in the 
Metaphysics without having to retreat to claims about the development of Aristotle's 
thought. 
There are perhaps other ways to account for the apparent absence of the three- 
dimensional organism concept from the Metaphysics. Whatever the correct story turns 
out to be, I do not think this poses a significant challenge to my thesis. 
The second objection is more serious. One might argue that taking genetic 
nature and phenotypic nature to be two nonidentical constituents of a biological 
substance makes organisms complex in ways that are unacceptable to Aristotle. 82 I 
think there are two ways that my interpretation might suggest this. 
Consider Aristotle's statement at the end of H6 where we are told that "the 
ultimate matter and the shape are the same and one, the one potentially the other 
actually" (1045b18-19). On one reading of this text Aristotle is saying that at the 
moment of actualisation the matter and the form of a substance are numerically the 
same. 83 This solves the problem of unity (according to this reading), since 
hylomorphic substances turn out to be essentially incomposite: they have no genuine 
internal structure. Since I am claiming that the genetic nature cannot be collapsed into 
either the material nature or the phenotypic nature, biological substances would turn 
out to be irreducibly complex. As such (the objection goes) organisms would not be 
genuine substance, since they will not count as genuine unities. 
If being a genuine unity means being one in the unqualified sense (ärrXws), 
then this is no objection at all. For even after saying that the matter and the form are 
"the same and one", hylomorphic compounds are still distinguished from substances 
81 When Aristotle does turn to the causes of becoming in Z7-9 we actually do find him 
appealing to the three principles in question (material nature, phenotypic nature, and 
genetic nature). Admittedly, these chapters may have been a later insertion and not 
part of the original treatise. 
82 I am grateful to MM McCabe for pressing me on this. 
83 See, for example, Balme: "But a solution appears in the next book; at the moment 
of actualization matter is identical with the form realized in it, so that the composite is 
a definable unity (Metaph. H. 6)" (Balme 1987b. 295). 
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which do not contain matter in that only the latter count as being one in the 
unqualified sense. At 1045b21 Aristotle qualifies the unity of a composite substance 
by saying that potentiality (matter) and actuality (form) are one "in a sense" (Ttcoa ). 
Moreover, there are several readings of 1045b18-19 that do not involve 
eliminating the complex structure of a hylomorphic substance by collapsing matter 
and form into each other. 84 For example, Lewis argues that the claim that matter and 
form are "the same and one" is not a claim about their numerical identity. Rather, 
Aristotle is saying that the matter and the form are one and the same F, the one 
picking out what is potentially F the other what is actually F. 85 This idea picks up on 
H2 where Aristotle had said that in asking what a house is those who say it is bricks 
and timber (the matter) only tell us what is potentially a house whereas those who say 
it is a receptacle for containing goods and persons (the form) tell us what is actually a 
house (1043a14ff. ). 
As I read Aristotle's point in H6, the puzzle about the unity of a composite 
substance disappears, not because the matter and form of the composite are 
numerically identical so that what at first appeared to be composite turns out to be 
incomposite on closer inspection, but because the relation between potentiality and 
actuality (and thus matter and form) is not especially puzzling. For the actuality is the 
actuality of the potentiality. On this reading, matter and form are one and the same 
individual F at different points in its ontogenetic history. 86 And so to ask for the cause 
of their unity is to ask what is responsible for the development of the potential F into 
the actual F. 87 
A caveat is necessary here. An important part of my interpretation of H6 is 
that the matter Aristotle is talking about is embryonic matter (the matter at the 
beginning of the process of development). One might object to this by pointing to 
1045b 18-19 where Aristotle makes reference to the "ea) ä 'n1" matter. The general 
84 For examples see note 67 above. 
85 Lewis 1994,254-5 n. 20 (cf. Harte 1996,296). 
86 Lewis calls this being "genidentical" (1996,77 n. 59). Lewis rejects this idea 
because he needs to play down the emphasis on coming-to-be in H6 (see above). 
87 If Aristotle thinks we need some further account of the unity of the phenotypic 
nature and genetic nature, then this could easily be cashed out teleologically: the 
genetic nature is a potential. for that phenotypic nature. 
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assumption among commentators is that this picks out the constitutive or `'proximate" 
matter of the fully developed body (the material substratum of the adult form). 
Indeed, this is one of the primary reasons for thinking that I 045b 18-19 is saNing that 
at the moment of actualisation the matter and form of a thing are numerically one and 
the same so that a hylomorphic substance is essentially incomposite. 
In the first place, there is a problem with taking i Ecyxä -n tArI to refer to the 
constitutive matter of the adult body. For it leads to the puzzling notion that 
constitutive matter is somehow both potentially F and actually F at the same time. 88 
Some commentators have tried to account for this by appealing to the different levels 
of potentiality and actuality in the De anima. 89 The only thing from the DA model that 
would help in this situation is the level of first-actuality, which is also a potentiality. 
However, the DA is categorical that it is the form (i. e. the soul) that occupies this 
level, not the matter. The soul is both an actuality relative to the body and a 
potentiality (capacity) relative to the exercise of a capacity. 
On the other hand, there are strong reasons for taking rj EoXäT-q vXr1 as the 
embryonic matter. 1045b18-19 identifies the matter with the potential F. And 
according to 07, the matter is an F potentially only when it is in a state where it will 
develop into an F of its own accord if nothing external impedes it. Here Aristotle is 
definitely talking about embryonic matter (oTrEppa in some state). Moreover, using 
EQXaTTI to refer to the matter out of which the product is directly formed is common 
practice in the biological works. For example, an animal's nutritive blood is 
"ultimate" (ecx rrq) matter because the parts of its body are formed directly out of 
it. 90 Blood in this state is not the informed matter of the body but the material at the 
start of the nutritive cycle before it gets distributed to the parts. It is the matter before 
the body's shape has been imposed on it (the equivalent of unsculpted bronze). 
The other reason one might think that my interpretation makes organisms 
complex in ways that are unacceptable to Aristotle has to do with my reading of 
641a22-33. Aristotle is explicit in that passage that nature understood as substantial 
88 1045a23-33 identifies the bronze as an actual sphere. 
89 This strategy is pursued in Kosman 1987 and Witt 1989b. 
90 e. g. 725a1 l -18,726a26-8, b l-3. This is fully consistent with the analysis of 
potential-being in 07. 
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being includes both phenotypic nature and genetic nature. On the reading suggested 
above Aristotle is saying that the phenotypic nature and the genetic nature are both 
proper candidates for being the substance of an organism. One might object to this on 
the grounds that it raises problems of competing classification which the Metaphysics 
desperately tries to avoid. For in that case an organism will turn out to have two 
substantial beings, which would seem to make it not one but two kinds of thing. The 
problem I have in mind here is captured by Lewis: 
In the latter case [sc. questions about the unity of the compound 
material substance], Aristotle himself believes that the bronze sphere, 
for example, has two constituents, its matter and its form, each of 
which is a nature and is a candidate for the nature of the thing. Does it 
follow that the sphere is equally bronze, thanks to its matter, and (a) 
sphere, thanks to its form? 91 
But the suggestion that an organism's genetic nature and phenotypic nature both count 
as nature understood as substantial being (even substantial being in the primary and 
chief sense) is not a problem here. For the contents of the phenotypic nature and the 
genetic nature will be identical. The phenotypic nature is the form of a horse; the 
genetic nature a potential for the formation of a horse. There is no problem of 
competing classifications, then, since Sir Desmond is (a) horse, thanks to his 
phenotypic nature, and (a) horse, thanks to his genetic nature. 92 
91 Lewis 1996,51-2. 
92 Talk of "content" is Lewis'. The claim that the phenotypic nature and genetic 
nature are identical in account (i. e. they share the same content) actually depends on 
the level at which definition is sought. For a difference in content is revealed by a 
more precise account of a thing's phenotypic and genetic natures. This has to do with 
the problem of resemblance to ancestors (atavism). Briefly stated, in order to explain 
why Menexenos has his grandfather's straight nose, Aristotle posits a "movement" in 
Socrates' sperm that transmits that property. And this "movement" is said to be 
derived from a corresponding potential (büvauic) of Socrates' genetic nature. (For 
this discussion see especially chapter five below. ) A more precise account of 
Socrates' genetic nature will thus include a reference to a snub nose, which is a part of 
his phenotypic nature. and a straight nose, which is not part of his phenotypic nature. 
So at this level a definition of Socrates would be different depending on whether we 
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In the end. I do not think the addition of a third dimension to an organism's 
hylomorphic structure generates any special problems of unity that do not already 
arise simply from the claim that biological substances are complex. For example. the 
problem of competing classifications is a problem even for the standard reading of the 
Metaphysics according to which organisms are simply composites of matter and form 
(or material nature and phenotypic nature). At most the addition of a further 
dimension to an organism's hylomorphic structure exacerbates this problem; it 
certainly does not generate it. 
§12 Some concluding remarks on biological structure 
In the first part of this chapter I argued that an organism's genetic nature and 
phenotypic nature are distinct principles, not the same principle under different 
descriptions. The three-dimensional organism concept can be seen as falling out of 
this nonidentity. For in the Parts of Animals Aristotle tells us that both phenotypic 
nature and genetic nature are proper candidates for being the substance of a thing. It 
follows from the nonidentity of these two principles that they are both partially 
constitutive of an organism's hylomorphic structure: they are the two formal 
dimensions of an organism which, together with the material nature, make up the 
biological substance itself. There may be room here for one to accept the idea that an 
organism's genetic nature and phenotypic nature are nonidentical without accepting 
the stronger claim that the genetic nature adds a further dimension to its hylomorphic 
make-up. On this reading only the phenotypic nature of an organism would be 
partially constitutive of the biological substance itself. Here one might simply wish to 
treat the genetic nature as a mechanism or tool that the substance (the two- 
dimensional entity) has for reproducing its phenotypic nature. However, in that case 
one would have to explain away the fact that in the opening Book of the Parts of 
Animals Aristotle brings both phenotypic nature and genetic nature under the heading 
of substantial being. And given the strength of the evidence in favour of their 
nonidentity, it is unlikely that one can simply retreat to some sort of conceptual 
coincidence here. 
took his phenotypic nature or his genetic nature as the object of definition. This gives 
us good reason for keeping definitions at the level of species. For that way Aristotle 
can avoid problems of competing classifications. I shall return to all of this later on. 
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Introduction to Part Two 
In the second part of this study I shall explore the question of how exactly an 
organism's form is passed on to its offspring in the act of reproduction. I shall argue 
that, for Aristotle, an organism does not directly transmit its form but only the source 
of that form. In the language of the first part of this study, an organism reproduces its 
phenotypic nature indirectly by directly reproducing its genetic nature. The actual 
mechanism behind the transmission of biological form is set out in Generation of 
Animals 4.3. Although that chapter is primarily about the inheritance of individual 
differences below the level of species, I shall argue that the mechanism at work there 
is meant to explain the transmission of all phenotypic resemblances including the 
common species resemblance. 
In order to properly understand GA 4.3, however, two preliminary issues need 
to be addressed. The first is Aristotle's account of sex determination from GA 4.1-2. 
Although Aristotle's account of inherited resemblances in GA 4.3 is clearly an 
extension of this discussion, the two accounts actually employ different (albeit 
related) causal mechanisms. This is something that is not sufficiently appreciated by 
commentators on the GA. The second is the controversial issue of the mother's 
contribution to inheritance. The problem is that GA 4.3 appears to assign a formal 
contribution to the mother, which many have come to see as being at odds with the 
strict reproductive hylomorphism set out in the first three books. I take up these two 
issues in chapters three and four, respectively. This will clear the way for the central 
topic of this part of my study: the transmission of biological form as embodied in the 




§1 The generation of the sexes 
Book four of the Generation of Animals opens with the following 
programmatic remarks: 
The coming-to-be of animals has now been dealt with, both in general 
and with respect to them all separately. But since in the most perfect of 
animals the female and the male are separate, and since we have said 
these capacities are principles of all animals and plants alike (though in 
the latter these are not separated while the former have them 
separated), we must first of all speak about the generation of the sexes; 
for the embryo is differentiated into male and female while it is still 
imperfect in its kind. However, it is not generally agreed whether one 
animal is male and another female even before the difference is evident 
to our senses, <and if so whether> the difference is acquired within the 
mother or even earlier. (763b20-9) 
The stated aim of GA 4.1 is to investigate "the generation of the sexes". Aristotle's 
dissatisfaction with the answers given by his predecessors was due to the way they 
understood the difference between male and female. Clearly how one answers the 
question of why one animal becomes male and another female depends on what one 
takes males and females to be. 
In order to understand Aristotle's account we first need to recognise the subtle 
distinction he makes between an animal's sexual identity and its sexual morphology. 
An animal's sexual identity is that property in virtue of which it is ultimately male or 
female, while its sexual morphology refers to the parts, traits, characteristics, etc. 
proper to its sexual identity. ' Thus to ask "whether one animal is male and another 
'I have chosen the term "sexual identity" for the lack of a better term. "Gender" is too 
broad and is believed by many to be socially constructed, whereas the property 
Aristotle is targeting is something fundamentally biological. As we shall see, sexual 
identity is linked to a particular function or capacity whose physiological basis is the 
principle of natural heat in the animal's heart. Moreover, although Aristotle treats 
sexual identity and sexual morphology as primary and secondary sexual 
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female even before the difference is evident to our senses" is to ask whether the 
offspring's sexual identity is determined before it develops its sexual morphology. 
If one takes sexual morphology to be constitutive of sexual identity. that is. if 
being male and female is simply a matter of having certain parts, then one will answer 
this question negatively. At the other extreme are those among Aristotle's 
predecessors who held that the difference between males and females is reducible to a 
quantitative property. For example, Empedocles is said to have held that being male 
or female is simply a matter of being hotter or colder (764a1-6,12-15). On this theory 
embryos that enter a hot womb are males while those that enter a cold womb are 
females. Anaxagoras is also said to have reduced the differentiation of animals into 
males and females to the causal history of the seed from which the organism 
develops. On this theory, seeds that come from the father's right testicle are males 
while those that come from his left testicle are females (763b31-764a1). For 
Empedocles, then, the difference between males and females is "acquired within the 
mother" while for Anaxagoras it is acquired "even earlier", namely back in the 
father's body. 
Modern biology can be seen as occupying the middle position. While having 
certain parts is an important part of an organism's sex, what ultimately makes one 
animal a male and another a female is its sex chromosomes (e. g. in mammals male = 
AT female =, M. As we shall see, this is closer to Aristotle's own views. 2 
characteristics of an animal, this cannot be mapped onto our modern distinction 
between primary and secondary sexual characteristics. According to modem biology, 
primary sex characteristics are those phenotypic characters proper to males and 
females that are directly involved in reproduction (e. g. the male gonads), while 
secondary sex characteristics are those specific to males and females but are not 
directly involved in reproduction (e. g. pitch of voice, patterns of body hair). 
2 One way Aristotle's views differ from modern biology is that for him the distinction 
between sexual identity and sexual morphology is not divided along 
genotype/phenotype lines. What I call an organism's "phenotypic" nature (taken in 
the broad sense) will include its characteristic sexual morphology; its "genetic" nature 
will include a set of active potentials (or &vväpEts) for the formation of that sexual 
morphology. However. those potentials do not constitute the animal's sexual identity. 
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Although both the reductionists and modern biology hold that an organism's 
sexual identity is determined before it develops the morphology corresponding to that 
identity, the difference between them is significant. One of Aristotle's major 
complaints against the reductionists is that they completely ignore the importance to 
being male or female of having certain parts. 3 This is highlighted in Aristotle's 
dialectical argument against Empedocles at GA 764al2ff. On the one hand, 
Empedocles is a preformationist, and so he thinks the parts of the offspring are 
already there preformed inside the seed. On the other hand, he held that males differ 
from females in virtue of hot and cold alone, so that a seed which enters a hot womb 
is a male and one that enters a cold womb is a female. But this means that if a seed 
containing female parts were to enter a hot womb, the offspring would be a male 
despite the fact that it had a uterus and other such parts. For Aristotle, as for modern 
biology, although sexual identity can be traced to something more primary, we cannot 
ignore the importance of sexual morphology in determining whether an animal is a 
male or a female. 
§2 Anatomical versus functional definitions of sex 
The main philosophical issue in GA 4.1 is the question, In virtue of what is 
one animal male and another female? Aristotle offers two candidates for this property, 
both of which must be included in an adequate account of the generation of males and 
females. The first (which most of Aristotle's predecessors neglected) is the obvious 
anatomical difference (sexual morphology). From this perspective one animal is male 
and another female in virtue of having certain parts. However, Aristotle also holds 
that "male" and "female" in the primary sense refer to the ability and inability to 
produce sperm (respectively). For Aristotle, it is this second, functional property 
which is constitutive of an animal's sexual identity. It is the presence and absence of 
this function that ultimately makes one animal male and another female. 4 
3 Later I consider Aristotle's other major complaint against Empedocles and 
Anaxagoras, that they fail to demonstrate any necessary connection between sexual 
identity and sexual morphology. 
4 Note (I) Aristotle treats the ability to produce sperm or yovrI as a natural function of 
all sexual reproducing organisms. This will be important for Aristotle's notorious 
claim that a female qua female is a "TrEmMpc .1 vov" male (see 
below). (II) The 
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A caveat is necessary here. The ability to produce sperm would be the form 
specified in the definition of a male animal (the inability being the privation). 
However, the Metaphysics denies that male-animal is a proper object of definition. 
There are several reasons for this, but all of them come down to the fact that male 
stands to animal as snub stands to nose (Z5). So, for example, the definition of a 
male-animal would be an account formed from an additional term (EK 'rrpooOl oEws). 
And Aristotle denies that such accounts are proper definitions. Again, just as `snub- 
nose' expands to concave-nose nose, so too 'male-animal' expands to animal-with- 
the-ability-to-produce-sperm animal. However, Aristotle does allow that definitions 
can be applied in a secondary way to all those attributes which belong to substance 
per se and cannot be defined apart from it. It is in this secondary sense that males are 
definable (since `male' cannot be defined apart from animal). 
Generation of Animals 4.1-2 is primarily concerned with the generation of 
males and females in the functional sense. GA 4.1 is a classic Aristotelian opening 
chapter. It begins with Aristotle reviewing the theories of sex offered by his 
predecessors before turning to his own account of the mechanism behind the 
generation of males and females. GA 4.2 goes on to provide empirical evidence to 
support the account set out in GA 4.1. Finally, GA 4.3 introduces the theory of 
inheritance and the mechanisms behind regular patterns of formal resemblance. I shall 
argue that Aristotle treats the inheritance of sexual morphology as a special case of 
resemblance and so is governed by the same mechanisms that explain standard 
familial resemblances. What is important is that in GA 4.3 "male" and "female" 
generally refer, not to the ability and inability to produce sperm (sexual identity), but 
to the parts of the offspring's sexual morphology. 5 I shall have more to say about this 
functional definition of male and female qua male and female (= the capacity and 
incapacity to produce sperm) must be distinguished from the functional definition of 
them qua father and mother (= the capacity to generate "into another" (Eis ETEpOV) 
and the capacity to generate "into itself' (Eis a rrÖ)). For the latter see Book 1, esp. 
716a17ff. 
Eventually I shall argue that the spermatic KLV1 OE1s (or "movements") that Aristotle 
refers to in GA 4.3 are the genetic factors responsible for the transmission of those 
morphological characters. For example, .. the movement of the male" (768a28) is the 
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later. First I focus on the account of sexual identity in GA 4.1 in order to set out the 
causal mechanism responsible for the generation of males and females functionally 
defined (what we would call sex determination). 
§3 Sexual Identity 
According to GA 4.1 an animal is ultimately male or female insofar as it is 
capable or incapable of fully concocting its nourishment and converting it to sperm 
(yovrj). 6 Whether or not a particular animal has this ability, and thus whether or not it 
is male or female, depends on its source of natural heat. The stronger the animal's 
principle of natural heat, the greater its ability to effect concoction and so produce 
sperm. 7 Since an animal's sexual identity is determined by the relative strength of its 
natural heat at its source, Aristotle concludes that the source of an animal's sexual 
identity must lie in its heart (or its analogue). 8 For that is where the source of its 
natural heat resides: 
If, then, male is a certain principle9 and cause, and one animal is male 
in virtue of a certain ability and the other female in virtue of a certain 
inability, and the line of determination between the ability and inability 
is whether it concocts or does not concoct the nourishment (which in 
the blooded animals is blood and in the bloodless ones the analogue of 
vehicle through which the parts of the male's sexual morphology are physically 
transmitted to the offspring in the act of reproduction. I discuss this mechanism in 
detail in chapter five. 
6 In Aristotle's biology, an animal's reproductive material (its "a-rrE'pua") is produced 
by concocting a portion of blood left behind in its heart after the nutritive cycle. 
Menstrual blood (KaTaurjvta) and sperm (yovrj) are the two kinds of animal 
aiTEppa. The latter is fully concocted orrEpua while menstrual blood is only partially 
concocted (or inconcocted) a-rrEppa. The "ability" in question is thus the ability to 
fully concoct the nutritive blood and convert it to yovrj (male sperm). For more on 
this see below. 
7 See note 27 below. 
8 See 788a5ff. (cf. 716b3-12,788a13-16). 
9 The "principle" (äp)Oj) in question is the principle of natural heat in the male's 
heart (cf. 76012-14). 
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blood) in the final stages, and the cause of this is in the heart and the 
part which contains the principle of natural heat, then it follows of 
necessity that a heart must be formed in the blooded animals (and in 
the other [sc. bloodless] kinds where males and females come to be 
present, the analogue of the heart) and the offspring will be either male 
or female. (GA 766a30-b3) 
The idea that the individual members of those species that contain males and females 
must necessarily possess a heart (or its functional analogue) is interesting. The reason 
is that the property that ultimately makes an animal male or female is located there. I 
will call this the heart-based model of sex determination. According to this model, the 
differentiation of animals into male and female can ultimately be traced to a 
difference in their hearts and the principle of natural heat contained therein. ' 0 
Aristotle's account of sex determination is underwritten by his account of 
spermatogenesis, which is the process in an organism responsible for the production 
of ar pia (its genetic material). " In the case of animals, this material is generated 
by concocting the portion of nutritive blood left behind in the heart after the nutritive 
cycle. For Aristotle, both males and females produce o rrEpi is of some form. '2 So just 
10 The heart-based interpretation is also endorsed by Peck 1990, lxvi-lxvii (§68). For 
an alternative interpretation see Coles 1995 (cf. Deslauriers 1998). I will not address 
this alternative interpretation here, since I do not think it is a viable reading of the 
text. 
11 With the following see GA 1.18-20. 
12 Female c rrEppa is explicitly mentioned at (e. g. ) 728a26-7, b21-2,767b 16-17, 
771 b20, b22-3. Aristotle does say at 728a31 that "the female does not emit o- rEp . ia"; 
however, he is being careless here. Sometimes (as in the present case) Aristotle will 
simply refer to "=Eppa" when he really means male sperm, yowl. A more carefully 
qualified statement is made at 727b7 where Aristotle says the female does not emit 
the same kind of 01TEppa as the male (cf. 728a26-7: the female emits a less purified 
form of oir pua). We should note two further things about the female's QTrEpua. 
First, properly speaking, the material cause of the offspring is not the female's entire 
blood-like discharge. Aristotle saw the menstrual discharge as having two 
components: the fluid. which is the useless portion of the menstrual discharge. and the 
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like the male, the female has the ability to concoct the surplus of blood left behind in 
her heart after the nutritive cycle and turn it into am ppa. And she does this by means 
of her own principle of natural heat. The difference is that her principle is weaker than 
the male's (she is colder), which accounts for her inability to produce yovrj (sperm, 
which is fully concocted animal seed). This is easy to miss. For it requires a proper 
understanding of the difference between Aristotle's concepts of "concoction" (76wtc) 
and "inconcoction" (äTrE ta). 
§4 Spermatogenesis: concoction and inconcoction 
During nutrition the animal's blood or "ultimate" nourishment gets distributed 
from the heart to the various parts of its body. oTrEpi a is what results from 
concocting the surplus of undistributed blood left behind in the creature's heart. 13 
Menstrual blood (KaTauujvLa) and sperm (yovi) are the two kinds of GTrEpua 
produced by animals. Male sperm is fully concocted o rr ppa. Menstrual blood is 
inconcocted c3-rr¬pi. ia (728a22). Being inconcocted (äirElrrov) is quite different from 
being unconcocted (µr) -rrE=ov). 14 Things which are inconcocted have undergone 
partial concoction (Meteorologica 379al -2). This is significant because an 
inconcocted substance, unlike one that is unconcocted, will still have undergone some 
level of concoction and so contains some degree of heat. It has just not undergone the 
level of concoction needed to produce the change that would have resulted had that 
o rEpua, which is the useful part that resides in it (739a7-10; cf. 728b21-2). The parts 
of the offspring are formed out of the latter. Second, Aristotle refers to the female's 
contribution using the plural Tä KaTaurivta. This is because he thinks there are 
several bits of spermatic material in the fluid discharge. During conception the heat in 
the sperm draws these bits of 6rrEpua together and forms them into one solid mass (= 
the Kvrlua; see 739b20-7). I will continue to use "menstrual blood" generally for both 
the entire blood-like discharge and for its spermatic contents. Nothing I have to say 
here turns on this. 
13 725a21-8,726b9-15. 
14 Peck mistranslates a'TrETrrov at 774a2 as "unconcocted". This is significant for the 
current point, since Aristotle is describing the state of the female's am ppa there: it is 
an inconcocted (or partially concocted) residue. 
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process been carried to completion. In this case the process of concoction ends 
prematurely. And the reason for this, Aristotle says. is a failure on the part of the 
concocting agent due to a lack of sufficient heat. 
The concept of inconcoction as partial concoction (as opposed to not being 
concocted at all) is reflected in the definitions of "concoction" and `inconcoction'' 
from Meteorologica 4. i5 Concoction is defined as a perfection of the undetermined 
moisture in a natural body by means of its internal heat (379b17); inconcoction is the 
corresponding imperfection that results from a deficiency in that same heat (380a5-6). 
In other words, inconcoction is incomplete concoction owing to a deficiency of 
natural (or proper, oiKEia) heat. This is important because substances which are only 
partially concocted are necessarily colder, greater in volume, and more fluid than 
those which are more fully concocted. '6 And these are characteristics of the menstrual 
blood. 
It is evident from this that the difference between male and female o rEpµa is 
not a difference in what is being concocted-both forms of animal oirEppa are a 
residue of the same substance (nutritive blood)--but the stage at which the residue is 
produced. 17 Male sperm (yowl) is what results when the process of concoction is 
brought to completion (it is the end of the production of animal seed). Female 
menstrual blood is what results when that same process falls short of the end owing to 
a deficiency of natural heat (it is the result of an incomplete concoction). 
The point of this excursion into the nature of concoction was to show that the 
line of determination between males and females (functionally defined) is not a 
general capacity and incapacity to concoct the surplus of blood left over after the 
nutritive cycle. Aristotle thinks both sexes have the ability to concoct this blood and 
turn it into o rEpjicx of some form. Rather, the ability and inability that defines males 
1-" See esp. Meteorologica 4.1-3. 
16 726b30-2. This follows from Aristotle's chemistry. Concoction is inversely 
proportional to bulk and fluidity and directly proportional to heat and density (380a4- 
5). Therefore something that is more concocted will be hotter and more compact (and 
thus smaller in bulk) than something that is only partially concocted (which will be 
colder. more fluid, and greater in bulk). This will be important later on. 
17 cf 725a11-18. 
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and females has to do with concocting the blood in the final stages of spermatogenesis 
(rfic vOTäTrjs, 766a3I-3). For Aristotle, the female is female in virtue of her 
inability to produce sperm (yovrj), which is the type of residue produced in the final 
stages of spermatogenesis. ' 8 And the source of this inability is a deficiency in natural 
heat, which is the physiological basis of her sexual identity. It is the property that 
defines females qua female. So the female does have the ability to produce airEpua; 
it is just that the kind of oTrEpua she produces is a partially concocted or inconcocted 
residue (menstrual blood). Male sperm is fully-concocted of p . ia, which 
is the form 
of genetic material that is produced when spermatogenesis is carried to completion. 
Before leaving the discussion of spermatogenesis I want to make one final 
point. Aristotle often says that the female is "colder" and that her principle (of natural 
heat) is "weaker" than that of her male counterpart. 19 The terms "colder" and 
"weaker", like "hotter" and "stronger", must be understood in relation to the capacity 
to concoct the surplus blood left over from nutrition. 20 Females are "colder", not in 
the ordinary sense of being colder to the touch, but in the sense that they lack the 
capacity to fully concoct the surplus of nutritive blood owing to a deficiency in (or 
"weakness of') natural heat. 21 It is in this sense-and only in this sense-that the 
female qua female is a "1 rrIpwpEVOV" male. 22 
TtEmIpw1Evov is usually translated as "deformed". However, this is an 
extremely loaded word and is inappropriate for Aristotle's point. In Greek it implies 
the lack of a capacity or function that a thing would otherwise naturally possess. The 
function in this case is the ability to produce sperm, or fully concocted airEpua. A 
18 cf. 728a18-25. 
19 e. g. 726b30-727a2,775a14-15. 
20 The connection between "strength" and the ability to concoct nourishment is 
explicit throughout the GA (see, e. g., 725b8-726a16). 
21 In PA 2.2 Aristotle distinguishes several senses of "hotter" and "colder". The 
ordinary sense of being warmer and colder to the touch is only one sense. At 648b25- 
6 "hotter" and "colder" are also defined in terms of the relative capacity to produce a 
certain effect. 
22 e. g. 737a. 25ff. By female "qua female" Aristotle is picking out the creature's sexual 
identity. 
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female qua female is a TtE-rmpcwiEVOV male only in the sense that she lacks this 
ability owing to her deficiency of natural heat. By analogy, if the natural function of 
fire was to produce steel, then an orange flame would be a 'T r TrlpcA vov" white 
flame in this same sense on account of its inability to get the iron hot enough to 
convert it to steel. 
It helps to realise here that Aristotle thinks of concoction as a kind of refining 
process (cf. 728a28: F IrlTTrllEVrl). For example, in several places spermatogenesis is 
compared to the process of refining fruit. 23 The idea is that the process starts from a 
large bulk of material and refines it, removing its impurities (the fluid portion), until 
what results is a pure form of concentrated animal seed (yovi ). From the assumption 
that concoction is a process of refinement Aristotle inferred that menstrual blood must 
be a residue produced at an earlier stage of spermatogenesis than male sperm on 
account of its greater bulk and fluidity (it is a less purified form of 6-rr¬ppa that lacks 
the concentration and potency of pure seed). This seems to be the empirical basis of 
Aristotle's view that the female is colder than the male: we can see from the state of 
her o Mpi.. ta that she lacks the level of natural heat necessary to bring the production 
of QTrEppa to completion. 24 
§5 The mechanism of sex determination 
We are now in a position to understand Aristotle's account of the mechanism 
behind the generation of males and females (functionally defined). According to 
Aristotle's chemistry, undergoing concoction increases a thing's heat (since heat is 
always transferred from agent to patient in the process). And the hotter something is, 
the more it is capable of effecting concoction. 25 Thus, the ability of a thing to effect 
concoction is directly proportional to the level of concoction it has itself undergone 
(assuming it is something whose proper heat derives from being concocted). It 
follows from this that whether or not an animal is able to concoct the residue of blood 
in the final stages of spermatogenesis-and thus whether or not it is male or female- 
23 See. e. g.. 728a26-30,765b15f. (cf. 725a11-18). 
24 The empirical inference from the quantitative differences in male and female 
01TEpµa to their differences in natural heat is explicit at 765b19ff. 
25 Meeeorologica 4.2.380a4-5. 
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ultimately depends on the level of concoction the menstrual blood undergoes when it 
is being formed into an embryo. 
For Aristotle, the father's sperm (or rather the heat which is present in it) is the 
causal agent responsible for making the embryo male or female (functionally 
defined). And it does this by concocting the material supplied by the female which 
increases its level of natural heat. 26 If the embryo is fully concocted by the seminal 
heat, then it will be formed with its own source of natural heat above the threshold for 
being male. If the seminal heat is deficient in any way and only manages to partially 
concoct the matter, the embryo will be formed with a source of natural heat 
somewhere below that threshold. In this case the embryo is female. 27 
This deficiency in seminal heat, however, is in relation to the coldness of the 
material being concocted. Menstrual blood that is excessively cold to begin with will 
be further away from the threshold and thus require a substantially greater amount of 
26 This is a rather simplified version of the theory. More specifically, the sperm 
concocts the embryonic heart in the area where its principle of natural heat is located 
(the centre cavity, according to PA 665b34-666a3). 
27 The threshold in question represents the amount of concoction the embryo must 
undergo in its heart such that it will eventually be able to concoct its oirEpua into 
yovYl. For obviously embryos do not actually have this capacity. In what follows I 
will assume that we are talking about the potential presence of this capacity in the 
embryo and that this is determined by the current level of natural heat in its heart. 
This is where the idea of a threshold comes in. All sexually mature males have the 
right level of natural heat which enables them to convert their o rEpua into yovi . 
Now at GA 766b30-l Aristotle describes the principle of natural heat in an immature 
male as heat that is not yet "perfected" (TEXEiov). This suggests that the creature's 
heart continues to undergo concoction right up to the point of sexual maturity, which 
gradually increases its level of natural heat. Thus we can imagine some starting level 
of natural heat that an embryo must have such that, through the steady concoction of 
its heart, it will eventually reach the level where it is sufficient for producing yovtj. It 
is this threshold that defines male and female embryos. A male embryo is one whose 
starting level of natural heat is above that threshold, a female one whose starting level 
is below that threshold. 
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concoction to turn it into a male embryo than menstrual blood which is warmer (cf. 
GA 775al7-18). What this means is that the ability of the sperm to make the embryo 
male is not an intrinsic property of the sperm itself It is not a function of how hot the 
sperm is in itself but how hot it is in relation to the menstrual blood at the time of 
conception. Hotter sperm may still produce a female if the menstrual blood is 
excessively cold while colder sperm may produce a male embryo if the menstrual 
blood is warmer to begin with. Thus while the father's sperm is the causal agent 
responsible for making the embryo male or female, an adequate account of the 
process must make some reference to the contribution of the individual mother. For 
her menstrual blood will have an intrinsic temperature of its own which effects the 
sperm's ability to concoct it. 
§6 Sexual Morphology 
According to Aristotle, whether the embryo is male or female depends on the 
level of natural heat in its heart. And this ultimately depends on whether or not the 
father's sperm manages to fully concoct the menstrual blood and raise its temperature 
above the threshold for being male. However, unlike Empedocles, Aristotle denies 
that the generation of the sexes can be fully explained by reference to hot and cold 
alone. 28 The problem with this sort of epistemological reduction is that it fails to 
reveal any necessary connection between having a particular sexual identity and 
developing a particular sexual morphology. As a result, the crucial difference in 
sexual morphology is left unexplained: 
Now the opinion that the cause of male and female is hot and cold, or 
that the difference depends on whether the <seminal> discharge comes 
from the right side <of the father> or the left side has some degree of 
truth to it (T1va Xoyov). For hotter seed (orrEpua) is seed that has 
been concocted and the fact that it has been concocted means that it 
28 The same holds for the Anaxagorean account of sex in which the difference 
between males and females is due to the causal history of the seed (males develop 
from seeds that come from the father's right testicle, females from those that come 
from his left testicle). In this way (at least according to Aristotle) Anaxagoras 
believed that the generation of the sexes can be fully explained by reference to right 
and left alone. 
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has been fused together and compacted. And the more compact the 
seed is, the more potent (yovtµcwTEpov) it is. Nevertheless, to state the 
matter this way is attempting to grasp ('=Eo6at) the cause from too 
far away. And we must come as close as we possibly can with the 
primary causes (SET b' ÖTt täXtOTa -nrpoc ayEty Etc Trwv 
EVF)EXO PWV eyyvs TCSV TrpwTc, )v aiTicwv). (GA 4.1,765a34-b6) 
Aristotle's point here is that it is one thing to say that the cause of the difference 
between male and female embryos is the relative temperature of the seed 
(Empedocles) or the side of the father from which it came (Anaxagoras) but quite 
another to then try to explain why males develop one set of parts while females 
develop a completely different set with reference to these causes alone. What is the 
connection between `hot' and developing male parts and `cold' and developing 
female parts? Likewise, what is the connection between `right' and developing male 
parts and `left' and developing female parts? It is this explanatory gap that Aristotle 
thinks Empedocles and Anaxagoras cannot bridge. By reducing the generation of the 
sexes to hot/cold or right/left they "attempt to grasp the cause [sc. of the difference in 
sexual morphology] from too far away". 
Although Aristotle himself thinks the cause of the difference in sexual 
morphology can ultimately be traced back to the relative temperature of the embryo 
and thus to the level of concoction effected by the father's sperm, 29 he is able to 
bridge the explanatory gap by appealing to teleology. The strength of natural heat in 
an animal's heart determines the kind of spermatic residue it produces. And this in 
turn hypothetically necessitates certain structural differences in the parts which are 
present for the sake of receiving that residue: 30 
29 Note however that the cause cannot be traced back any further than this. For the 
ability to bring the temperature of the menstrual blood above the threshold for being 
male is not an intrinsic property of the sperm but depends in part on the initial 
temperature of the menstrual blood itself. 
30 Aristotle isolates the parts whose function is to receive the spermatic residue as the 
characteristic difference in male and female sexual morphology. Therefore it is this 
difference that an account of the generation of males and females (anatomically 
defined) needs to explain. 
1(Y) 
Nature assigns to each of the residues the part capable of receiving it 
(TÖ &KTLKÖv poptov). Now oirE'pua is a residue, but in the hotter of 
the blooded animals, i. e. the males, this is manageable in size and 
amount; for this reason in males the parts which receive this residue 
are small passages (-rropot). In females, however, on account of their 
inability to effect concoction, this residue is a considerable volume of 
bloodlike substance (for it has not been reduced to its final state, 
äKaTEpyaoTOV). Thus, here too there must of necessity be some part 
fitted to receive it, different from the part in the male, and of a 
considerable size. That is why the oviducts have this nature - and that 
is the part wherein the female differs from the male. (766b18-26) 
This passage nicely weaves together teleology and chemistry into a paradigmatic 
example of hypothetical necessity. The teleological principle is expressed in the first 
line of the passage. For each residue produced in an organism its genetic nature 
constructs parts which are adapted to receive those residues. 31 It follows that every 
animal that is capable of producing a-rrEppa will have parts whose function is to 
receive it. These are the seminal channels and oviducts (or their analogues). The 
structural differences between these two functionally identical parts is referred back to 
the quantitative difference in the corresponding spermatic residues produced by males 
and females. And this in turn can be traced back to the relative strength of each sex's 
principle of natural heat and ultimately to the level of concoction effected by the 
father's sperm. 
§7 The four causes of sex 
Of course a complete Aristotelian account of the generation of males and 
females (qua male and female) would require a four-fold explanation. Although this is 
not explicit in GA 4.1,1 think we can offer one based on what has been said here. 
The functional and anatomical accounts of male and female (sexual identity 
and sexual morphology) reflect the formal and material causes of sex, respectively. 
This is grounded in the more basic principle that an organism's genetic nature does 
nothing in vain but always what is best with respect to the possible ways of being that 
kind of organism (IA 2,704b10-1 7). For an excellent discussion of the 
epistemological significance of this principle see Lennox 2001b, 205-223. 
Ins 
The form in this case is the ability to produce sperm. It is the presence and absence of 
this ability (in the heart) that makes one animal male and another female. '' The 
principle of natural heat in the creature's heart is the physiological basis of its sexual 
identity. Males are animals whose natural heat lies above a certain threshold (the level 
necessary for producing sperm) while females are those whose natural heat lies 
somewhere below that threshold. The corresponding sexual morphologies, on the 
other hand, are the material causes of males and females: they are the parts out of 
which males and females are composed. 33 
The efficient cause of an animal's sex will be the causal mechanism 
responsible for producing the properties in question. What this is, however, depends 
on what we mean by "male" and "female". The efficient cause of the offspring's 
sexual identity is the father's sperm, or rather the heat which is present in it. This is 
the agent which is causally responsible for making the embryo male or female 
(functionally defined), which it does by concocting the matter thereby raising its level 
of natural heat. The efficient cause of the development of the offspring's sexual 
morphology, on the other hand, is its genetic nature. 34 
The final cause of sexual morphology is fairly straightforward. As we have 
seen the structural differences between the male's seminal channels and the female's 
oviducts (the parts wherein they differ qua male and female) is explained 
teleologically by referring the cause back to the kind of spermatic residue that animals 
of those sexes produce. This is not circular, however, if the property in virtue of 
which an animal is primarily male or female is distinct from its sexual morphology. 
For Aristotle, the sex of the offspring is ultimately a function of the relative strength 
on the principle of natural heat in its heart. For this determines whether it will be 
capable or incapable of producing sperm (and thus whether it is male or female). The 
sexual identity of the embryo in turn hypothetically necessitates the physical 
32 "Formal cause" is only being used loosely here, since properly speaking there is no 
essence of male and female (since these are not genuine substances). 
33 Compare the use of material cause at GA 1.1.715a9-11. 
'4 The mechanism underlying the inheritance of sexual morphology is set out in GA 
4.3 in terms of spermatic "movements" which are said to be present in the genetic 
material of all sexually reproducing animals (767b35-768a2,768a11-14). See chapter 
five below. 
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dimensions of the parts which come to be for the sake of receiving the spermatic 
material produced by those kinds of animals. 
The question about the final cause of an organisms sexual identity is more 
complicated. We can give a teleological explanation for why animals are 
differentiated into males and females at the level of species. In both GA 2.1 and 4.3 
Aristotle argues that males and females exist for the sake of reproduction. On the 
other hand, we cannot give a teleological explanation for why any particular embryo 
becomes one sex rather than the other. 35 For the final cause of sex determination is 
simply to make the embryo one sex or the other, not one sex as opposed to the other. 
To close this chapter I shall offer a defence of this claim by considering the 
widespread view that Aristotle thinks reproduction is aimed at generating a perfect 
replica of the sire. 
§8 Was Aristotle's biology misogynistic? 
According to Morsink, Aristotle "clearly viewed" an instance where the father 
reproduces a son that looks like himself in every respect as the ideal case. 36 Likewise, 
Furth argues that for Aristotle the process of development is naturally directed 
towards a male resembling the father. 37 For Sober, "reproduction that is completely 
free of interference would result in an offspring which exactly resembles the father" 
and that any resemblance to the mother is "a departure from the natural state" 
produced by "interfering forces (ßiatov) deflecting reproduction from its natural 
pattern". 38 On Balme's interpretation a "correct reproduction" is one in which the 
offspring is a clone of the father while everything else is just a "distortion" of this 
likeness. 39 More recently Katayama has suggested that for Aristotle males of the 
species have "the complete form" and so "are substances most of all" whereas 
3$ As we have just seen, however, we can give a teleological explanation for why any 
particular embryo develops a particular sexual morphology (but only when its sexual 
identity is taken as given). 
36 Morsink 1982,136. 
37 Furth 1988.128. 
38 Sober 1980.361-2. 
39 Balme 1987b, 292. 
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females have "incomplete forms" and "are substances only in a qualified sense". ao 
Freudenthal sums up this standard view of Aristotle's biology when he writes: 
The ideal-type case is that in which the male semen informs the female 
matter into its like: the offspring is then a male closely resembling the 
male parent. The condition for this to happen is that the semen carry 
sufficient vital heat as to enable it to master thoroughly the (relatively 
cold) female matter (cf. GA 4.3,767b21 ff.; 768a22 ff. ): the greatest 
vital heat thus generates in the matter the most perfect form, that of the 
sire. 41 
For the purposes of evaluating this interpretation, we can separate out two 
claims being made here concerning Aristotle's biology: (1) Aristotle thinks 
reproduction is aimed at generating male offspring and that female offspring are a 
teleological failure; (2) Aristotle thinks resemblance to the father is the ideal pattern 
of inheritance and that maternal resemblance is just a distortion of this more perfect 
form caused by interfering forces deflecting reproduction from its natural course . 
42 1 
will examine the second claim when we turn to Aristotle's account of inheritance in 
the next chapter. As we shall see there is no evidence to support this view. In the 
remainder of this chapter I shall concentrate on the evidence for the first claim. 
One piece of evidence that commentators have often cited in support of the 
first claim is Aristotle's notorious statement that a female qua female is a 
" EirrjpcopEvoV male. I have already touched on this. I argued that the standard 
translation of -rrETr-qpc .i vov, which 
has Aristotle claiming that females are 
"deformed" males, is extremely misleading. For it suggests that the female body is in 
some way malformed, which not what Aristotle means at all. Aristotle's claim that a 
female is a 1TETrflpwuevov male is to be taken only in the sense that she lacks a 
certain capacity, namely, the capacity to fully concoct the residue of nutriment and 
turn it into sperm. And this is because she has a lower level of natural heat. To be 
sure, this goes someway towards establishing that Aristotle's biology viewed females 
(qua female) as being somehow inferior to males. However. it is a far cry from 
40 Katayama 1999,3. 
41 Freudenthal 1999,24. See also Gill 1989,33 Pellegrin 1985,110. 
42 For the distinction between female births and maternal resemblance see, e. g., 
769a3-4. 
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suggesting that they are mere physical distortions of a more perfect male body type as 
traditionally understood. 
There are two other passages that have been used to support the view that 
Aristotle's biology takes the goal of reproduction to be a perfect replica of the sire (in 
both respects): GA 767b6-8 and 768a21-2. 
GA 768a21-2 is the most widely misinterpreted text. The text reads: 
"Therefore, the most natural course of events is when [the movements] dominate and 
are dominated both qua male and qua father together. " This text can only be properly 
understood within the context of Aristotle's theory of inheritance in GA 4.3. 
Specifically, it requires a proper understanding of the causal mechanism involved and 
the nature of the spermatic "movements" (KwrI6E15). I will have much more to say 
about both of these in the coming chapters. All we need to know here is that the 
movement corresponding to "male" (äppEv) is the genetic factor that transmits the 
parts of Socrates' sexual morphology while the movement corresponding to "father" 
(n'aTrjp) transmits those features that make him a unique individual (cf. 768a29: "the 
movement coming from Socrates"). 
Commentators have traditionally read this text as suggesting that the most 
ideal outcome is when a male is produced resembling his father in every respect. 43 
However, this is not what the text says at all. Suppose that by "the most natural" 
Aristotle means the most ideal. In that case Aristotle would be saying that the most 
ideal scenario is not only when the sire's movements dominate (KpaTEty) but also 
when they are dominated (KpaTEi66at). In other words, the most ideal outcome 
would not only be a son who looks like his father but also a daughter who looks like 
her mother. For the latter is what results when the movements "male" and "father" are 
both dominated. 44 Thus, at best, GA 768a2 l -2 says that ideally we want sex and 
resemblance to match up, sons looking like their fathers and daughters looking like 
their mothers. 
43 See esp. Morsink, Balme. and Freudenthal. (The reference in Morsink to GA 
769a22 is presumably a misprint. ) 
"This follows from the principle of "displacement" (EKß-raot ), which is one of the 
three "general suppositions" (Ka66Aov r iTo6EoEI5) that make up Aristotle's theory of 
inheritance (see chapter six below). 
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But this is not Aristotle's point here. By saying this is "the most natural" 
course of events Aristotle means that the phenomenon is something that happens for 
the most part ("natural" in the sense of a statistically frequent occurrence). As we 
shall see, the general point of this passage is that the movements for sex and 
resemblance are linked in such a way that the phenotypic characters associated with 
those movements are usually inherited together (d 'pa). And this provides the causal 
mechanism behind one of the phenomena Aristotle's theory of inheritance is meant to 
explain, namely, why sons tend to resemble their fathers and daughters their mothers 
(767b3-4). Aristotle simply uses the movements of the sire here to illustrate the point. 
GA 767b6-8 is more tricky. Aristotle says that when the offspring comes to be 
female (OiiXv) and not male (äppEv) nature "has in a sense departed (-rTapEKPEPr)KE) 
from the y evos". Now whatever Aristotle means here, it is important to recognise that 
the scope of his remark extends only to the offspring's sex and not its resemblance to 
the mother. One reason for suspecting this is that throughout GA 4.3 Aristotle 
consistently distinguishes "female" (OiiXu) from "mother" (j. tfrnip); the former is 
never used for maternal resemblances. For Aristotle's point applies as much to 
daughters who resemble their father as to those who look like their mother (but not to 
sons who look like their mother). Thus, contrary to the standard interpretation, this 
text is not claiming that in a correct reproduction the offspring perfectly resembles the 
father. At best it can be read as saying that reproduction aims at a generating males as 
opposed to females whichever parent the offspring happens to look like. However, I 
think we can offer an interpretation of this text which does not even suggest this 
much. This interpretation is consistent with what I have claimed above, namely that 
the process of sex determination does not have a final cause. 
It is not entirely clear what TrapEK3E13T)KE EK Tob yEvovs is supposed to 
mean. Most commentators translate this as saying that in making the offspring female 
nature has in a sense "departed from the type". "Departed" is probably an appropriate 
translation of napEK(3E(3rIKE. But yEvos has to be interpreted very carefully here. It 
clearly has no strict taxonomical significance: it does not pick out a natural kind with 
species (it is not the technical sense of yEvos which is related to Eibos). In fact, 
Aristotle's denial that males and females are proper substances (Z5,1030b21-8) or 
that maleness and femaleness belong to an animal in virtue of its ovoia (19,1058b21- 
4) tells against reading yEvos in any strong metaphysical sense at all. If this is right, 
IAR 
then Aristotle is not suggesting that males are the prototypical specimen of the kind so 
that in producing a female nature has somehow departed from this masculine ideal 
(e. g. that women are somehow less human than men or mares less horse than 
stallions). 
I want to suggest that in this context a yEvos is "a continuous generation of 
things of the same form" (Metaphysics A28,1024a29-30). 45 The point, then, is that 
whenever the male sperm makes a female embryo there is a departure from a 
continuous generation of things of the same form, namely males producing males. 
The reason why this is only "in a sense" (Tpölrov Tlvä) a departure is that 
technically male Fs and female Fs are the same in form. For example, it is not an 
instance of generating something of a different species. Aristotle explicitly denies that 
male Fs and female Fs constitute different species of F on the grounds that sex is not 
a difference that is included in the account of an F (Metaphysics 19). 46 Nor are we 
talking about the generation of things of a different form where "form" means soul. 
For Aristotle insists that males and females are identical in soul (GA 2.5,741a6-7). A 
male generating a female is a departure from a continuous generation of things of the 
same form only in a very loose sense. 
It is significant that Aristotle does not include maternal resemblance among 
the "departures" in GA 4.3 but only monsters and female births. There is still much 
more that needs to be said before we can appreciate why. Briefly stated, maternal 
resemblance is ultimately traced to a corresponding "movement" coming from the 
mother herself (see, e. g., 768a19: q --Yjs YEvvwor15 <K1V-gG15>). As such, we should 
not expect Aristotle to say that an offspring that looks like its mother and not its father 
is a departure from the yevoc. For it is an instance of like begets like (the mother 
generates a likeness of herself). It would only be a departure of the relevant sort if the 
father was not only responsible for making the offspring female but also for the fact 
that it looked like its mother. This will be taken up in the next chapter. The point here 
45 Pelligrin (1985,111) also takes this reading of yEvos but then falls back on the 
traditional interpretation of the passage, taking the point to be that anything that does 
not perfectly resemble the father has "strayed from the genetic type". What I offer 
here is a completely novel way of reading the text. 
46 See Deslauriers 1998. 
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is that when "yEvos" is defined in terms of a continuous generation of things of the 
same form, then maternal resemblance is not a "departure from the yvos". For there 
is only a departure when cause and effect are different in form (as when the male 
sperm produces a female embryo). 
But does Aristotle think sex determination is aimed at producing males as 
opposed to females? There is a sense in which Aristotle thinks female births result 
from the failure of the mechanism that makes the embryo male. However, the idea 
that this is a "failure" of some kind must be read into the text. Aristotle's Greek only 
says females result when the father's sperm "is not able to concoct" (iuibE swrJ-rat 
-rrEyai, 766a18-19) the menstrual blood and endow it with the level of heat that 
makes it male. And when this happens the offspring is ipso facto female. There is no 
suggestion that this is a failure to achieve some natural goal. 
Aristotle's remarks at 767b6-8 do not suggested this either. On my reading, to 
depart from the "-y vos" is to depart from a continuous generation of things of the 
same form, not from some ideal standard or type. Since the male sperm is the agent 
responsible for determining the embryo's sex, the "yEvos" will be a continuous 
generation of males; female births count as a departure from this. If the sex of the 
embryo was determined by the level of concoction effected by the female's 
contribution instead, then the yEvos would be a continuous generation of females. In 
that case male births would be a departure (it would be an instance of female 
producing male). The point here is that there is nothing overtly normative about the 
idea of "departing from a yEVOc" when yEvos is taken in this way. 
Another reason for thinking that males are not a teleological goal of 
reproduction is that Aristotle goes on to say that females are generated both because 
sometimes the sperm does not fully concoct the menstrual blood and because they are 
necessary for the sake of preserving the species (767b8-11). 47 The fact that the 
existence of females can be given a teleological explanation is inconsistent with the 
idea that reproduction aims at generating males as opposed to females. For in that 
case. female births would only be subject to the first kind of explanation: females 
47 Aristotle contrasts the sense in which females are necessary with the way monsters 
(i. e. birth defects) are necessary: the latter are necessary Ka-rä Qvu(3Eßrlºc0 S (767b13- 
15). 
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exist only because sometimes the father's sperm does not fully concoct the menstrual 
blood. 
If the goal of sex determination was to make the embryo male, that is to say, if 
the process occurred for the sake of producing males, then the fact that females are 
generated would be merely accidental and not for the sake of anything. In that case 
the only thing preventing female births from being a chance outcome would be the 
sheer regularity with which they are produced. 48 Like males, females are a good result 
insofar as they are necessary for reproduction. And (on this reading) they are the 
result of a process which is among those that occur for the sake of something. 
However, in this case the result is accidental and not the end for the sake of which the 
process took place. If this were Aristotle's view, then GA 767b8-11 would imply that 
females are present in the species for the sake of something even though no particular 
offspring comes to be female for the sake of anything but is the accidental result of a 
process that is aimed at making males. 
We can eliminate the tension here by simply denying that the process of sex 
determination is among those ontogenetic events that has a final cause. If offspring do 
not come to be male for the sake of something - if reproduction does not aim at 
producing males - then female births will not count as something that occurs 
accidentally and not for the sake of anything. On this reading, while human beings are 
divided into males and females for the sake of something, no particular human being 
comes to be one sex rather than the other for the sake of anything. The reason why 
one offspring comes to be male and another female is simply the fact that in the one 
case the concoction of the matter was brought to completion while in the other it was 
incomplete. 49 
48 With the following see Physics 2.5,196b19-25: "Hence it is clear that even among 
the things which are outside (Ttapa) what is necessary and what is for the most part, 
there are some in connexion with which the phrase `for the sake of something' is 
applicable. (Things that are for the sake of something include whatever may be done 
as a result of thought or of nature. ) Things of this kind, then, when they come to pass 
accidentally are said to be by chance., ' (Hardie & Gaye transi. in Barnes 1995) 
49 Compare Metaphysics 19.1058b21-5: "And male and female are indeed 
modifications peculiar to animal, not however in virtue of its ovoia but in the matter, 
i. e. the body. This is why the same embryo becomes female or male, by being acted on 
in a certain way. " 
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Chapter Four 
The Problem of Maternal Inheritance 
The second issue that needs to be addressed before moving on to Aristotle's account 
of the mechanisms of inheritance is the nature of the mother's contribution to the 
process. In this chapter I will examine the controversy surrounding the mother's 
contribution that stems from Aristotle's remarks on maternal inheritance in 
Generation of Animals 4.3. 
§1 The charge of inconsistency 
According to the theory set out in GA 4.3 Socrates' ability to generate a new 
individual resembling himself is explained by the fact that his sperm contains a set of 
"KivrjoELS" corresponding to each of his parts (767b35-768a2,768a11-14,768b1-5). ' 
According to the standard reading of the theory, these Kivr)GEt are the actual 
informing movements of Socrates' sperm as it fashions the material supplied by the 
female into an offspring resembling himself in every respect. According to Furth, for 
example, the father's sperm "is active and formative in character, being pre- 
programmed with a variety of highly intricate `motions', which `shape' and `set' the 
catamenia in stages as development advances". 2 Likewise, Cooper identifies the 
father's sperm as "the causal agent active in generation" which possesses "specific 
movements (Ktv1 oEts) that are such as to shape the material that the female provides 
in her womb into a member of the same species". 3 
This interpretation usually goes hand and hand with the analogy of sculpting. 
The father is compared to the sculptor who imposes a certain form on the bronze 
through the motions of his tools while the mother's contribution is compared to the 
bronze which is entirely passive in the reception of that form. By analogy, the father 
is seen as making the only genetically significant contribution to the process of 
reproduction just as the sculptor (not the bronze) determines the eventual shape and 
'I explore the peculiar nature of these spermatic Kw1jCELS in the next chapter. Much 
of the argument in this chapter is dialectic, and so for the most part I shall adopt the 
standard reading (introduced just below). However, part of my solution to the problem 
raised here involves rejecting that reading. 
2 Furth 1988,118 (emphasis Furth). 
Cooper 1988,15. 
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form of his statue. Furth criticises Aristotle's account of reproduction on both of these 
points: 
... much of this account is 
factually incorrect: it is a mistake to suppose 
that only the male parent makes a genetically significant contribution 
to the specific form of the offspring... and Aristotle's idea of the 
causal influence that is exercised by this genetic contribution, literally 
"shaping" and "forming" the matter, is by present-day lights quite 
crude and childlike compared to the actual mechanisms involved, 
which are more complicated and more indirect as between the nature 
of the genetic material itself and the form manifested in the eventual 
offspring. 4 
Yet, as several commentators have recognised, this account is at odds with the 
theory of inheritance set out in GA 4.3. There Aristotle appears to introduce 
movements coming from the mother which are supposed to account for resemblances 
to her side of the family. 5 Apparently Aristotle's idea is that, like the father, the 
mother contributes a set of movements associated with her own features as well as 
those of her various ancestors. This is most explicit in the following passage where 
Aristotle introduces the causal mechanism behind the phenomenon of atavism: 
[Resemblance to ancestors occurs when] the formative movements (ai 
KtvTjaEts ai b-qutovpyovßat) relapse into the ones which stand closest 
4 Furth 1988,119. What Furth refers to as "the form manifested in the eventual 
offspring" is precisely what I mean by "phenotypic nature"; what I call the "genetic 
nature" is the productive source of that form. 
5 Most commentators tend to assume that these "movements" are in the mother's 
menstrual blood to begin with (this will have to remain obscure for the time being). 
One problem for this view is that Aristotle said back at 766b 12-14 that one difference 
between male and female o-rrEpµa is that the former contains motions while the latter 
contains "matter only" (tXTIv i. iövov). However, this is the only text of its kind and 
looks to be corrupt. Even if it is genuine, we could easily accommodate it by taking 
the mother's movements to be present in the nutritive blood that passes into the 
embryo via the umbilical cord rather than in her menstrual blood. I shall not insist on 
this much detail here. 
I 1d 
to them. For example, if the movement of the father (TOO yEvvwvTOr) 
relapses, it passes into that of his father (the least difference) and in the 
second instance into that of his grandfather. Indeed in this way too, on 
the female side just as on the male side: 6 the movement of the mother 
(Tý yEVVC0'0r15) passes into that of her mother, and if not into that 
one, then into that of her grandmother. And in the same way for the 
more distant ancestors. (768a15-21) 
Aristotle starts this text by giving a general explanation for atavism. Atavism occurs 
when "the formative movements relapse into the ones which stand closest to them". 
Paternal-line atavism is then offered as an example (oiov) of this general 
phenomenon. The crucial bit of text for our purposes is the next line. Aristotle says 
that maternal-line atavism occurs in the same way as paternal-line atavism. The latter 
occurs when the movement of the father "relapses" into that of his father (and so on). 
Likewise on the maternal line, atavism occurs when the movement of the mother 
passes into that of her mother (and so on). 
There are several technical concepts being deployed in this account that we 
can largely ignore for the time being. For example, Aristotle speaks of an effect called 
"relapse" (Avots). 7 Although I shall have more to say about this when we turn to the 
details of Aristotle's theory of inheritance, what relapsing is supposed to do is (at least 
in the abstract) sufficiently clear from this passage to allow us to proceed without that 
analysis. We can get a sense of what Aristotle has in mind in this passage by 
considering the example of the woman from Elis from Book 1 (722a8-11). 
6I follow Cooper's suggestion that instead of excising Kai EM TC; W äppEVCwv with 
Lulofs or Kai EIri T(v äppEVCav Kai i rri -rwv OTjXE1 ov with other editors we should 
simply change the second Kai on a18 to woTrEp (Cooper 1988,40 n. 15). However, 
the general point is unchanged whether we accept this or not. For the idea that things 
occur in the same way on the female side is clearly implied by the next sentence. 
I follow Peck in translating Aiiazs as "relapse". Although this is not one of the 
meanings listed in Liddell and Scott. "relapse" most effectively captures the idea 
behind Aristotle's highly-specialised use of Avßts here. It gives the sense of shifting 
backwards down the blood-line (reverting to some past form), which is precisely the 





The story runs as follows: The woman from Elis, who was pale skinned, had a 
daughter with a man from Ethiopia, who was dark skinned. The daughter (F1) was 
pale skinned, but her son (F2) was dark skinned (the assumption being that the boys 
father was also pale skinned). What needs to be explained is the F2 generation. 
specifically, how two pale-skinned parents manage to produce a dark-skinned 
offspring. Aristotle's explanation is supplied by our text. The daughter of the woman 
from Elis (the mother of F2) contributes to the act of reproduction two movements for 
skin colour, one corresponding to her own pale skin and another corresponding to the 
dark skin of her father (a property not displayed in her own phenotype). As we shall 
see, Aristotle's theory of inheritance allowed him to infer on the basis of the F2 
generation that the mother's pale-skin movement had "relapsed" into the dark-skin 
movement of her own father (the man from Ethiopia), which resulted in the 
offspring's coming to have dark skin like his maternal grandfather. 
This is only a brief sketch of what is a very complicated story (one that is not 
"crude and childlike" as Furth suggests). We will have a chance to explore Aristotle's 
theory of inheritance in greater detail in the coming chapters. What is important here 
is that, as the above passage makes clear, maternal movements occupy the central 
explanatory role in Aristotle's account of resemblances to the mother's side of the 
family. The most natural reading of 768al5-21 is to take the movements contributed 
by the mother to be functionally equivalent to those of her male counter-part in the 
process of inheritance! This is the position I shall defend in what follows. The 
advantage of this interpretation is that if we assume the movements from both parents 
are functionally equivalent, Aristotle has a straightforward story to tell for how 
maternal-line atavism works. Resemblance to the mother's ancestors occurs when her 
movements relapse, just as resemblance to the father's ancestors occurs when his do. 
Not surprisingly, many commentators have come to see the introduction of 
maternal movements in GA 4.3 as inconsistent with the hylomorphic theory that 
dominates the earlier books. The charge of inconsistency is seen as arising from three 
premises. According to Aristotle's theory in the GA: 
8 By saying the maternal movements are "functionally equivalent" (or "functionally 
identical") to the paternal movements I mean that the mother supplies her own set of 
spermatic movements which have the same hereditary function as the father's 
movements (whatever that function turns out to be). 
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(1) The father alone supplies the form manifested in the eventual offspring, while 
the mother supplies the matter which receives that form. 
(2) The way the father makes his formal contribution is through the movements of 
his sperm which determine the offspring's form by directly fashioning the 
matter into that new individual. 
(3) The mother contributes a set of movements which are functionally equivalent 
to their paternal counter-parts. 
The first two premises of this triad are supposed to yield the matter-form theory which 
dominates the early books of the GA. According to Cooper, for example, that theory 
says that only the father, working through the formative movements of his sperm, is in 
any way at all capable of fashioning the materials supplied by the female into a new 
animal. 9 Thus by introducing maternal movements into the theory which perform the 
same function as their paternal counter-parts, GA 4.3 appears to suggest that the 
female's matter is not entirely passive after all but is fully capable of supplying its 
own formative movements by means of which it fashions itself into an offspring with 
a determinate shape and form. The problem is how to resolve this apparent 
inconsistency. 
It is important to understand that the controversy surrounding GA 4.3 is not 
about whether or not Aristotle thinks the mother supplies "movements" to the process 
of inheritance; this much is explicit in the text. What is controversial is the role that 
such movements play in Aristotle's theory. The main project of this chapter is to 
defend premise (3), which is the most natural reading of the text. For example, GA 
768a15-21 seems to clearly identify paternal movements and maternal movements as 
being demiurgic in nature (al Kw1IOE(s ai brJuLovpyOßai). 
On my reading, the mother is directly responsible for all of those aspects of 
the offspring's form that make it look like the individuals on her side of the family. 
And the way she does this is by supplying a set of spermatic movements which 
occupy the same causal role in the process of inheritance as those supplied by the 
father (whatever that causal role turns out to be). I shall argue that, when properly 
understood, GA 4.3 provides an intelligible account of maternal inheritance that fits 
perfectly well not only with what Aristotle says in the rest of that chapter but also 
with what he says in the GA as a whole. The apparent inconsistency arises, not from 
9 See Cooper 1988,19; cf. 26. 
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1. Motions of Socrates' sperm in fashioning the parts of the offspring out of 
menstrual blood. 
2. Changes of the menstrual blood initiated by active potentials carried in 
Socrates' sperm. 
3. Changes of the menstrual blood carried directly into the female inside 
Socrates' sperm (as in a vessel) initiated by potentials in Socrates' body. 
Reading I is inconsistent with one of the central tenets of the GA, namely, the offspring is 
responsible for the construction of its own body. The central problem with reading 2 is 
that the KLVT EL in question are supposed to be present in the father's sperm while the 
Swä[ELs from which they are drawn are located in his own body. Nor does it seem 
reasonable to suggest that the father's sperm carries actual changes into the female 
(reading 3) without being the subject of those changes (something Aristotle categorically 
denies). It is fairly certain that whatever the ºcwrj6EI in Socrates' sperm turn out to be, 
they are not motions or changes in the ordinary Aristotelian sense. 
I want to suggest a fourth reading of the text: 
4. The spermatic KtV1 GEt are separate entities carried inside Socrates' 
sperm. 31 
On this interpretation, the spermatic KtV1jOEI are not ordinary changes (they are not 
changes of anything) but the vehicles through which an organism's form is physically 
transmitted to its offspring in the act of reproduction. 32 For lack of a better translation I 
shall simply use "movement" (but not "motion") to refer to these entities. However, it 
should be stressed here that the "movements" in Socrates' sperm are not the eventual 
IA process of change will not count as an "entity" in the sense in which I am using the 
term (see, e. g., Metaphysics Z I). I suspect Aristotle uses "Kivgats" merely as a 
placeholder for these physical entities in the way "gene" functions in Mendelian genetics. 
32 Gotthelf suggests something akin to this (1987,216 n. 20). 
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motions and changes that transform the menstrual blood into the parts corresponding to 
those "movements" (they are not preset changes). 33 
§5 "Movements" as vehicles in Generation of Animals 5 
In using the word "Kivtlois" or "movement" to refer to a physical vehicle for 
conveying biological form Aristotle has clearly extended its meaning well beyond the 
ordinary sense of motion or change. (This is unlike "Sirvacitc" which retains its more 
familiar Aristotelian meaning of an active potential. ) However, this specialised use of the 
word Kivrrols is not confined to the discussion of inheritance in GA 4.3. We also find it 
being used in a similar way in the account of sense-perception in GA 5.34 There Aristotle 
deploys the concept of a KivrIßis which is not an ordinary process of change (it is not a 
motion or change of something) but a vehicle for conveying an object's sensible form 
from the object to the perceiver. 
For example, at 780a27-31 Aristotle says the thickness of the membrane around 
the eye jelly can affect the direction of the KivrIßts "coming into the eye from without" 
(Oüp a OEv) and whether or not it "passes straight through <the membrane>" 
(EV6mTropEiv). Again, at 780b34 Aristotle refers to a ktvrjOts "coming from distant 
objects" (TröppcaGEv) and "arriving at" (aprKVEi(: YOat) the perceiver's sense organs. The 
use of directional terms which ascribe locomotion to a KivrIots suggests that the concept 
is not being used in any ordinary sense: they are not the motion of something travelling 
but things which are themselves in motion. This provides strong evidence that Aristotle is 
33 This idea will become clearer momentarily. Witt also suggests that the spermatic 
"movements" are information-bearing vehicles (1989b, 56 n. 26), though she does not 
expand on this. For the idea of a Kivrivtc bearing informational content see De Mem. (e. g. 
452b23-4: "the Kivrlotc of the fact" and "the KIVflßts of the time"). 
"' I suspect that this use of KIvrI6ts is also at work in De anima and De sensu. It is 
certainly found in other parts of the Parva Naturalia (esp. De mem., On Dreams, and On 
Prophecy in Sleep). 
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not thinking of these KwrjOELS as ordinary changes but vehicles that physically transmit 
the sensible properties of an object. 
The sensory KLVT GELS in GA 5 are not only subjects of locomotion. They are also 
subjects of other sorts of physical changes such as being broken up into pieces. At 
780b13-781a12 Aristotle introduces a mechanism whose function is to collect the sensory 
KIVT 6EtS coming from distant objects and funnel them into the perceiver's eyes. He tells 
us that the concavity of an animal's brow literally shapes a portion of air between its eyes 
and the perceived object into a kind of "tube" (aiXös). The further this tube extends, the 
more accurately the object is seen: 
Things at a distance, then, would be seen best if there were, so to speak, a 
continuous tube extending straight from the eyes to the object seen, for 
then the movements coming from the object would not be dissipated; but, 
if that isn't possible, still the further the tube extends the more accurately 
distant objects must be seen. (781 a8-12) 
Aristotle's idea is this. The sensory KIVT1 YIc coming from a distant object will begin to 
"dissipate" or "break up" (&[EAOETo) almost immediately. How accurately that object is 
seen depends on the concentration of the signal (the tcivrIGI) when it reaches the 
perceiver's eyes. The more of the tcivrIßis that reaches the organ, the more clearly that 
object will be seen. This is where the perceptual tube comes in (the portion of shaped-air 
extending from the eye). The tube functions as a mechanism for collecting the K(urI6E1S 
coming from objects and passing them on to the organ where they produce sensation. 
And only those KIVT OE1s that enter the visual tube will reach the eye (cf. 780b 18-21). 35 In 
this way the ability of an animal to see objects at a distance is a function of the length of 
its visual tube which is in turn determined by the depth and shape of its ocular concavity. 
Thus, Aristotle says, animals with sunken eyes placed in a hollowed recess are able to see 
3' At 780b21-2 Aristotle remarks that this is why people in pits and wells can sometimes 
see the stars (a satirical reference to Thales' reputation for falling in wells perhaps). 
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things at a distance "because the tcivrlots does not get scattered (aKE avvupEvfl; cf. 
781b11: 5taarrc vTat) but goes straight to the mark" (780b35-78la2). 36 
The fact that the sensory tctvý6ELS are themselves subjects of verbs of change 
(EiJOvrroptiv, ixq)tt<vEi66at, &tEXvETo, oKESavvuuEVrl, StaCY r(: )vTat) endows them with 
a special ontological status not enjoyed by ordinary motions and changes. Ordinary 
motions and changes cannot be subjects of change. '? By using the word "KivrIßºS" in this 
way Aristotle has clearly extended its meaning well beyond its ordinary sense. In this 
context a "KivrIaº5" is a vehicle that carries sensory information about the object from 
which it came. 
There is a nontrivial similarity between Aristotle's genetic use of Kivrl615 in GA 
4.3 and the use of KivrIßºS in GA 5.1 as a vehicle for transmitting the sensible properties 
of an object to the perceiver. While at first glance the two may appear to be quite 
36 Aristotle's perceptual "tubes" are not simply confined to vision. In GA 5.2 he discusses 
how the same mechanism accounts for the ability to smell and hear distant objects 
(781b7-16). 
37 Physics 5.2 argues that there cannot be change of (ordinary) change. At 225b20-1 
Aristotle explicitly states that change cannot be a subject (rrroKEiMEvov). (See also 
Metaphysics 1028a20-31. ) Someone might object here that ordinary changes can be the 
subject of verbs of (say) locomotion in the accidental sense, that is, when it is the change 
of something which is itself in locomotion. For example, the decaying of the ship's hull 
moves through the water insofar as the ship is itself moving through it (cf. De anima 1.3). 
In this case the change or Kivfais would be in motion in the accidental sense (only in the 
sense that the thing of which it is a change is in motion). However, this does not seem to 
be what Aristotle has in mind here at all. He is clearly thinking of these sensory KwrlGEL 
as the things which are themselves in motion: not KaTä O\µiEt3rlK65 but Ka8' ai1T6. 
This is most explicit in 780b35-781a2 when he says "the Kivrl6is does not get scattered 
but goes straight to the mark". In this sentence "xivrrßts" is the Ka8' airrö subject of the 
motion: it is the thing which gets scattered and goes straight to the mark (or in this case 
does not get scattered and go straight to the mark). 
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different events, from one perspective inheritance and perception are instances of the 
same general phenomenon. They both involve the transmission of the form without the 
matter. 
It is well-known that Aristotle characterises perception in the De anima as an 
event involving the transmission of an object's sensible form without its matter (DA 
2.12). In Generation of Animals 5 we are given the mechanism that underlies this event. 
There we are told that the formal properties of an object (e. g. its colour) are conveyed 
from the object to the perceiver by means of "movements". Likewise, one of the central 
features of Aristotle's theory of reproduction is the idea that the father transmits his form 
to the offspring without transmitting any of his matter. And just as in the case of 
perception, we find Aristotle appealing to "movements" in Socrates' sperm that transmit 
that form. 
Before moving on I want to make an important point concerning the relation 
between the account of inherited resemblances in GA 4.3 and the account of sex 
determination in GA 4.1-2. Although the account of inherited resemblances is quite 
obviously an extension of the account of sex determination, the causal mechanisms 
responsible for the two phenomena are quite different. I do not think this is sufficiently 
appreciated by commentators. As we have seen, an embryo's sex is determined by the 
level of concoction effected by the sperm during conception. If the sperm is able to fully 
concoct the menstrual fluid, then the resulting embryo is male. If it only manages to 
partially concoct it, the embryo will be female. However seminal concoction simply 
raises the temperature of the matter. Clearly making the offspring look like specific 
individuals requires much more than this. For while the difference between male and 
female (functionally defined) is reducible to a difference in temperature (males are hotter 
than females), differences in, say, facial features are not. This is the reason we find 
Aristotle introducing the concept of a spermatic "Kivr)oLs" in GA 4.3. I am arguing that 
these KºvrjOELs are specialised vehicles of inheritance that transmit those highly-specific 
phenotypic resemblances from one generation to another. 
170 
§6 What happens at the receiving end? 
Up to this point the discussion has focused exclusively on the transmission end of 
inheritance. According to the interpretation developed here, an organism's form is 
transmitted to its offspring by means of "movements" in its seed derived from the 
"potentials" of its genetic nature. Each one of these potentials is the productive source of 
a corresponding phenotypic character. The final question to ask is what happens at the 
receiving end of this transmission. Although Aristotle never actually addresses this 
question directly, I think we can speculate as to a possible answer. 
In order to bridge the gap between Aristotle's account of natural generation and 
his analysis of the mechanisms of inheritance in GA 4.3 we must assume that the 
reception of the spermatic movements derived from potentials in the parent's body, on 
the one hand, and the subsequent development of the offspring's body, on the other, are 
interposed by the formation of a new set of potentials: those that make up the offspring's 
own genetic nature. For the only way that the process of development will count as 
natural is if all of the changes that make up that process originate directly in a set of 
potentials in the embryo itself. 
Assuming Menexenos is a naturally generated organism, the construction of his 
body must have been preceded by the formation of his genetic nature, which functions as 
a source of change in himself qua himself. It follows from this that the movements 
transmitted inside Socrates' sperm cannot be those that make up the process of 
Menexenos' development (reading 3). First, if the movements imported into the 
menstrual blood by Socrates' sperm immediately set to work building it into the parts of 
Menexenos' body, then there would have been no time for the formation of his genetic 
nature. 38 Second, those spermatic movements are derived from the potentials of Socrates' 
This cannot be avoided simply by saying that some of the changes Socrates' sperm 
"imports" into the matter are charged with the responsibility of forming Menexenos' 
genetic nature. For we have just finished saying that in order for Menexenos' generation 
to be "natural" the entire process must be derived from his nature. 
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genetic nature, which is a principle of change in another. In that case it is not clear how 
Aristotle could distinguish Menexenos from a mere artefact. 39 
Morsink's reading (reading 2) would avoid both of these problems. According to 
Morsink the potentials of Socrates' genetic nature (or copies of them) are carried directly 
into the embryo inside his sperm. When these potentials are activated they cause the 
matter to develop into an organism resembling Socrates in every respect. After all they 
are (copies of) potentials of Socrates' genetic nature. However, while these potentials 
would count as sources of change in Menexenos himself qua himself, Aristotle is explicit 
that what is carried into the female inside Socrates' sperm are not the potentials of his 
nature but "movements" derived from those potentials. 
The alternative (arising out of reading 4) is that the function of the spermatic 
"movements" is to directly reproduce the active potentials from which they were drawn. 
On this reading Menexenos will resemble Socrates to the extent that the potentials 
reproduced by the "movements" in Socrates' sperm are copies of those in Socrates' own 
genetic nature. For each of the latter is a distinct potential for the formation of a different 
part of Socrates' body. 
§7 The transmission of biological form: a summary 
In the text with which we began Aristotle set out the basic causal mechanism 
behind the transmission of biological form. According to that text, Socrates' sperm 
contains a set of Kivrj6EiS derived from corresponding burväPEIS in himself. I have argued 
that these Swä. EL are the components of Socrates' genetic nature, each of which is a 
distinct potential for the formation of a given phenotypic character (including potentials 
for the formation of characters which are not part of his observable form). I have also 
argued that the K1V1 GEL which are present in Socrates' sperm are not actual (or even 
potential) processes of change but the vehicles through which his form is transmitted to 
39 This point extends to those developmental changes whose causal history can be traced 
to spermatic Kwrj6ELs derived from potentials of the mother's genetic nature. For at best 
her genetic nature counts as a principle of change in itself qua other (depending on the 
metaphysics behind the mother-embryo relation). 
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his offspring in the act of reproduction. Finally, I have argued that in order to bridge the 
gap between Aristotle's transmission genetics and his account of natural generation we 
must assume that the reception of spermatic movements from the parent and the 
subsequent transformation of the embryo into its adult form are interposed by the 
formation of a new set of potentials in the offspring itself. These new potentials will be 
the components of its own genetic nature, which provide a source of change in the thing 
itself qua itself (thereby satisfying the condition for natural generation). If this is right, 
then the function of the spermatic movements which are carried in Socrates' sperm is not 
to produce the parts of Menexenos' body directly but rather to reproduce the potentials of 
his own genetic nature which are the productive sources of those parts. 40 In this way 
organisms reproduce their phenotypic natures indirectly by directly reproducing their 
genetic natures. 
§8 An evolution of species? 
One interesting implication of this is that it seems to leave room for genetic 
mutations and thus the possibility of an evolution of species. In GA 4.3 Aristotle suggests 
that monstrosities can result when the KIVTJ YE15 become "confused together" 
(auyXEOV-raO). 41 Now Aristotle could just be referring to the motions and changes that 
make up the process of development - the motions initiated by the new potentials of the 
offspring's genetic nature. 42 In that case the deformed phenotype that results will not be 
heritable (it will not be included among those properties that belong to that individual 
40 Recall the difference between this interpretation and formal preformationism. On the 
latter reading the bvvapEis that pre-exist in the embryo are the offspring's potential parts. 
These potentialities are exhausted or used up as they "flower into actuality". On my 
reading the Swä1EiS are potentials for the formation of different parts whose activation 
initiates a series of changes that terminate in those parts. These Swäµuts are not 
exhausted in the course of development but are preserved in the adult organism as active 
potentials of its genetic nature. 
41 GA 768b l0 (cf. 769b9-10). 
42 cf. 772b13-26. 
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"Ka66 yEVV ITIKÖV"). For only the active potentials or bwäIEts of a creature's genetic 
nature are directly reproduced in the act of reproduction. However, 768b 10-12 appears to 
be talking about the spermatic KLV1 cYEIs themselves (the things transmitted in the parents' 
seeds). In that case those confused movements will produce mutated potentials in the 
offspring's genetic nature. And those mutations will be heritable. For in that case there 
will be a movement in the offspring's own seed derived from that mutated potential. 
Of course, even if this is right, Aristotle either does not recognise it or does not 
appreciate the implication. For while his account of the mechanisms of inheritance might 
leave room for a theory of natural selection, this is not something Aristotle entertains. 
However, the current suggestion is compatible with Aristotle's belief in the fixity 
of species. According to Lennox, for example, the view Aristotle defends in the 
Generation of Animals is not that species are eternal but that, through the act of 
reproduction, the individual becomes "eternal in form" (the only sort of immortality 
available to it). 43 On this interpretation, an eternal "species" is simply a continuous 
reproduction of individuals which are one in form, where being "one in form" means 
sharing a particular sort of account in common: 
Among accounts which make clear what a thing is [essence-revealing 
accounts], there is one which relative to the kind being defined is not 
further divisible and which is common to many things. Those things which 
share such an account are one in form. 44 
However, no account is indivisible in itself (1016a33-5). A more detailed account of a 
thing's phenotypic nature is always available which will reveal further features of that 
particular individual, albeit ones which are not essential to its ability to survive and 
flourish within its particular environment. Two or more individuals are thus "one in 
form" if they share an account which specifies their essence but which, were it more 
precise, would not reveal any further features that are essential to its survival. 45 
43 This is the main line of argument presented in Lennox 2001b, 131-59 (cf. 128). 
44 Lennox 2001b, 174. 
45 Lennox 2001 b. 181 n. 35. 
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Lennox's account of the nature of biological kinds is much too complicated for 
me to summarise here. The relevant idea is that species-level features such as "nose". 
"eyes", and "leg" do not pick out actual features of any particular individual but represent 
what Lennox calls "features with range", "possible ways in which human noses, eyes and 
legs may be realized". 46 On this reading, Socrates' snub nose, blue eyes, and short legs 
and Callias' bulbous nose, brown eyes and long legs are two concrete realisations of the 
same generic human features. The key here is that the eternal form - the form which is 
continuously reproduced from one individual to the next - will display a certain amount 
of phenotypic plasticity, a range of possible ways in which the essential structures of the 
kind may be concretely realised in those different individuals. 47 If a mutation occurs 
outside of this allowable range, then the offspring will no longer be suitably adapted to its 
environment and thus will perish. Of course Aristotle never fully articulates this idea. 
However, my point is simply that biological forms can be eternal insofar as they are 
continuously reproduced from one generation to the next whilst admitting of a certain 
amount of variability (produced through mutation) within limits set by the creature's 
particular environment. 
The implication here is that species are fixed, not because individuals possess 
some sort of innate capacity to maintain the species-form against all odds; rather, the 
fixity of the species is parasitic on the fixity of the environment. 48 On my interpretation 
Aristotle's account allows for an evolution of species, then, insofar as individuals would 
eventually be forced to adapt to a changing environment. For as the environment 
changes, the allowable range of possible ways of realising the species-form changes. 41 Of 
course there is good reason to suspect that Aristotle thinks the motions of the heavens, 
which determine the nature of the sublunary environment, are eternal and unchanging. 
46 Lennox 2001b, 175,178. 
47 See Lennox 2001b, 178: "Yet at each level there will be an organization among the 
allowable ranges for each feature of each differentia which is essential to an animal's life, 
particularly its mode of feeding, cooling itself, and rearing its young. " 
48 cf. Charles 1991,123 n. 24-5. 
49 This is also suggested by Lennox 2001b, 178. 
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Thus an evolution of species is ruled out on cosmological (though not biological) 
grounds. So it is Aristotle's cosmology, not his biology, that is incompatible with an 
evolutionary world view. 
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Chapter Six 
Aristotle's Theory of Inheritance 
§1 The three suppositions 
Now that the mechanisms are in place, let us turn to the theory of inheritance 
proper. It consists of three "general suppositions" (KaOöXou vrroO oEis), ' formulated 
succinctly at GA 768b5-10: 
We must grasp the general suppositions, not only the one stated, (1) 
among the movements present in the parents' seeds some are present in 
potentiality while others are present in activity, but also two others: (2) 
being dominated causes displacement into the opposite (KpaToV, jEvov 
iEV ýýioTaTal Eis To ävTtKEitEvov), while (3) relapsing causes a 
change into the movement which stands next to it <on the blood-line> 
(XuöpEvov BE' Eic TiIv EXoµEVrIv KivrIo[v). If it relapses a little, it 
passes into the movement which stands closer; if it relapses a lot, it 
passes into the one farther away. 
Supposition one concerns the existence of movements in the seeds of all sexually 
reproducing animals, some of which are "in activity" while others are "in 
potentiality". The other two supply the principles or `laws' that govern the 
interactions between the maternal and paternal movements. 2 The outcome of those 
interactions determines the pattern of inheritance for the particular offspring. 
Having an account of the general contents of the parent's genetic material will 
make it easier to set out Aristotle's theory of inheritance. GA 768a11-14 is an 
important text in this respect: 
Lennox has suggested to me that the use of vrrroO oii here probably reflects its 
technical meaning from the Analytics (cf. An. Po. 72a15ff. ). A "O at5" (or "posit") is 
an immediate, indemonstrable first principle the grasp of which is not necessary for 
acquiring knowledge. A "vmo6 oEtS" is a posit which assumes one or the other part of 
a proposition, viz. that something does or does not exist. I shall not explore the 
implications of this here. 
2I shall call these latter two UTrOO9GEL5 the principle of displacement (E-KoTacoLs) and 
the principle of relapse (Avoic). respectively. 
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Some of the movements are present in <the father's sperm>3 in activity 
while others are in potentiality: in activity, those of the father and the 
universals (e. g. Human and Animal); in potentiality, those of the 
ancestors. 4 
Here Aristotle divides the paternal movements into three general groups: those of the 
father (Toe yEvvG VTo ); those of the universal (TOO Ka6oXov); and those of the 
ancestors (Twv -rrpoyovcov). Those of the first two groups are said to be "in activity'' 
while those of the third group are "in potentiality". I shall return to this distinction 
later. 
The movements "of the father" include two sets of movements, one for the 
sexual morphology proper to a male and another for those features of Socrates' 
phenotype that make him a unique individual. Both of these movements are derived 
from potentials of Socrates' genetic nature which correspond to those parts of his 
phenotype (see, e. g., 768a28-9: rl rrrö TOO öcppEVOS Kivric is and i x1Tr 
TOO IG)KpäTOUs KIV11G1s). 
In order to explain why some offspring resemble the father while others 
resemble the mother with respect to different parts (phenomenon 2b) Aristotle 
postulates movements in the parents' seeds corresponding to each of their several 
parts (Tcv iop k v, 768b 1-5). 5 Each part-movement is itself a discrete unit of 
inheritance that can undergo displacement and relapse independently of the other 
movements in the set. This raises several difficult part-whole puzzles that would take 
us too far outside of the immediate project. Thus, to avoid unnecessary complications 
I shall simply talk about the movement of "Socrates" (the movement for the whole) as 
being made up of the movements for the parts of Socrates. On this reading, 
3 The subject of EvE(ßw is left unexpressed here; however, it is fairly certain that 
Aristotle is talking about movements present in the father's genetic material (or 
ßßt¬pµa). As I go on to say, Aristotle clearly wants us to generalise this to the genetic 
material of both parents. 
4 Reading SwaIEL bE ai TOM? Trpoyovcwv for SwaMEL FE ai TOO BflXEOS at TO V 
Trpoyövwv. I argued for this emendation in chapter four. 
"Part" should be understood in the broad sense of phenotypic character, including 
such features as eye colour and skin colour. 
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resemblance to Socrates as a whole occurs when all of the several part-movements are 
inherited together (though individually). 6 
The two movements corresponding to the universals Human and Animal do 
not play a central role in Aristotle's account of inheritance in Generation of Animals 
4.3. This is not to say they do not play a central role in reproduction. Rather. GA 4.3 is 
concerned with the eight phenomena set out at the beginning of that chapter, which 
primarily have to do with the inheritance of individual differences below the level of 
? species. The movements of the universals enter into the explanation of phenomena 7 
and 8, which fall outside the immediate scope of the theory of inheritance itself. 8 
These two phenomena have to do with the loss of family resemblance owing to the 
malfunctioning of the mechanisms involved, and so are both teratological in nature. I 
shall postpone the discussion of these until the end of the chapter. Here we can simply 
note that the movement in Socrates' sperm corresponding to "Animal" transmits the 
Ethos of the animal (qua animal) in the strict sense. More specifically, it reproduces a 
potential (or set of potentials) in the offspring's genetic nature that controls the 
6 The same applies for the other movements in Socrates' sperm (e. g. the movement 
"male" is made up of movements for the parts of a male). The question about how the 
movement of the whole is related to the movements of the different parts is not 
essential to Aristotle's theory of inheritance per se. What we would ultimately have to 
answer is whether or not the movement of the whole is reducible to the several 
movements of the parts and, if so, whether this threatens the unity of the phenotypic 
nature as a whole. I do not think so, though I shall not defend that here. 
7 Eventually I shall argue that insofar as reproduction itself is concerned the 
movements of the individual actually play a minor, secondary role. They are 
responsible for the `details' of an organism's phenotype. (For a contrasting view see 
Balme 1987b. ) However, they take the lead role in the inheritance of family 
resemblances, which is the primary target of GA 4.3. 
8 Phenomenon 7: offspring who fail to resemble either its parents or its ancestors may 
still look like a human being at any rate. Phenomenon 8: in the extreme cases the 
offspring's observable form (-ri1v i av) may fail to bear any likeness of a human 
being at which point it is a monstrosity (-rEpa5). 
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development of its sensory system, which is the property in virtue of which it is an 
animal. 9 
Finally, by postulating a set of movements in the parent's seed that convey 
resemblances to other members of its family (the movements of the third group) 
Aristotle was able to account for the fact that offspring who do not resemble their 
parents tend to resemble their ancestors more than any chance individual of the same 
species (phenomenon 4). On the other hand, the fact that these movements are only 
"in potentiality" while those corresponding to the parent's own phenotype are "in 
activity" is supposed to explain why offspring tend to resemble their parents more 
than the ancestors (phenomenon 3). I will have more to say about this later. For it is 
not exactly clear what it means to say that some of the movements in the parent's seed 
are öwäIEL while others are EvEpyEtq. However this distinction is cashed out, the 
way it figures into Aristotle's theory of inheritance is clear. The ancestor movements 
change from being bvvapEt to being EVEpyEtq whenever the parental movements 
undergo "relapse". 
There is one final point to make concerning 768a11-14. It would be a mistake 
to conclude from the fact that Aristotle only enumerates the contents of the father's 
genetic material in that text that the point is limited to his contribution. Even Cooper 
concedes that the general suppositions of Aristotle's theory apply to maternal 
movements as well: "Once movements in the female fluid are introduced into 
Aristotle's account, at 768a18-21, they obviously fall within the scope of the general 
principles about actual and potential movements first set out for the male fluid alone 
at 767b35-7 and 768a11-14, and he simply takes note of this fact at 768a4 and 6. "10 It 
is likely that 768a11-14 simply uses the father to illustrate a more general point about 
the contents of an organism's genetic material but which implicitly extends to the 
mother as well. 
And we do find roughly the same movements coming from the mother 
elsewhere in the text. For example, we have seen at 768a19-21 Aristotle mentions 
both the movement of the mother ("rfj yEvvworIs: compare a16, TO) yEVVC V roc) 
9 cf. 736b1 -5. translated in chapter two above. It follows from Aristotle's reproductive 
hvlomorphism that this movement will only be present in the father's sperm. 
10 Cooper 1988 40 n. 14. 
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and the movements of her various ancestors (Tf c Ur1Tp6S. -nic Trj6-q s: compare a17- 
18, TOO ira-rpös, TOO Tra Tlrov). Presumably the movement of the mother (like the 
movement of the father) includes two sets of movements, one for the sexual 
morphology proper to a female and another for those features of her phenotype that 
make her a unique individual. 11 Moreover, her movements will also be further 
analysable into the movements of her parts in accordance with 768b 1-5. Finally, it is 
implied by 768b13-15 that the mother's spermatic movements include the universal 
"Human" 12 
Now I have argued that the most natural way to read the text is to take the 
mother's spermatic movements to be functionally equivalent to their paternal counter- 
parts. Thus the maternal movements will likewise function as vehicles for transmitting 
the heritable properties of the mother's body including (but not limited to) those that 
make her a unique individual. And like the movements coming from the father, the 
mother's movements will be derived from corresponding 8vvauE15 in her own genetic 
nature. Each buvapus in her nature is a distinct potential for the formation of a 
different phenotypic character, both those that are displayed in her own phenotype as 
well as ones corresponding to features of her ancestors. 
§2 Supposition two and three: "displacement" and "relapse" 
The real meat of Aristotle's theory of inheritance is expressed by suppositions 
two and three. Taking a movement in Socrates' sperm as a reference point, there are 
three things that can happen: that movement can dominate (KpaTEIV); it can be 
11 For convenience I shall use "the movement coming from female" and "the 
movement coming from Xanthippe" as the maternal counter-parts for "the movement 
coming from male" and "the movement coming from Socrates" (cf. 768a28-9). 
Aristotle does not mention the mother by name. 
12 The other universal movement "Animal" will only be present in the father's sperm 
in accordance with Aristotle's reproductive hylomorphism. However, we have seen 
that Aristotle thinks the mother provides the offspring's nutritive soul, which is to say 
that the genetic factor responsible for the organisation of its nutritive system can be 
traced to a corresponding spermatic movement coming from the mother. If this is 
right, then although Aristotle does not explicitly mention it, Xanthippe's contribution 
should also include the universal movement "Plant". 
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dominated (KpaTEioOat); or it can undergo relapse (XvatS). According to supposition 
two, being dominated causes displacement into the opposite, while relapsing causes a 
change into the movement which stands next to it (supposition three). 
We are already familiar with the principle of relapse. If the movement 
corresponding to Socrates' nose relapses, the potential movement in his sperm 
corresponding to his father's nose is activated (becomes EvEpyEig). In this case 
Menexenos inherits his grandfather's nose. Socrates' nose-movement may relapse 
back two generations, in which case Menexenos will inherit his great grandfather's 
nose (and so forth). 
The principle of displacement (E"KoTaoLs) is somewhat more complicated. We 
know that being dominated causes displacement and that this is a change "into the 
opposite". This gives us a general idea of how the principle of displacement affects 
the outcome of inheritance: if displacement occurs with respect to a property on the 
father's side, then the offspring will come to display the maternal version of the trait 
in which displacement occurred. However, the two principles of Aristotle's theory are 
supposed to govern the behaviour of the causal mechanism that underlies the 
phenomena. And how displacement works at this level is extremely vague. 
Specifically, it is not clear what exactly changes to the opposite. 
The text itself seems to be inconsistent on this. On the one hand, 768a2-5 tells 
us that that which is not dominated (µrß KpaTový. tEVOV) changes into the opposite: 
Everything, when it gets displaced, does not change into any chance 
thing but into its own opposite. Therefore, in the case of generation, 
that which is not dominated must of necessity be displaced and become 
the opposite with respect to that potential (bvvaunc) wherein the 
generating and moving cause did not dominate. 13 
The ensuing discussion makes it clear that what Aristotle is referring to here is the 
embryo (or the matter). 14 And this is simply a logical point. The idea is that whenever 
the offspring does not resemble the father, it does not come to resemble any random 
Compare 766al4-16 and 768b25-7. 
' It makes no difference whether we take the thing that "changes over" here to be the 
embryo or the material supplied by the female. For the fertilised menstrual blood is 
the embryo. 
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individual but must of necessity resemble someone on the mother's side of the family 
(since "mother" is in a sense the opposite of "father", 768a5-9). And yet, on the other 
hand, when we turn to the official formulation of the principle of displacement at 
768b7-8 that which is dominated (KpaTovtEVOV) is said to change into the opposite. 
Of course these two texts are only inconsistent if we assume that they are both 
about the embryo changing over. In that case 768a2-5 says the embryo changes into 
the opposite when it is not dominated (presumably by the sperm) while 768b7-8 says 
that it changes into the opposite when it is dominated. The problem can be resolved 
simply by taking the principle of displacement at 768b7-8, which Aristotle includes as 
one of the three general suppositions of the theory of inheritance, to refer to 
something else that changes into its opposite. The best candidate for this is the 
tcivrIßtc (the hereditary unit) which is dominated by the corresponding KIVT1015 from 
the opposite parent. On this reading both suppositions two and three will refer to 
changes between movements: EKo'raots causes inheritance to change from the 
movements of one parent to those of the other (a change between movements on 
opposite blood-lines); Xvßts causes inheritance to change from the movements of the 
parent to those of the ancestor (a change between movements on the same blood-line). 
The suggestion that the principle of displacement (like the principle of relapse) 
refers to a change between the movements coming from the parents can be supported 
by supposing that Aristotle took over the concept of KpaTEIV (at least in one of its 
uses: see below) from Democritus. And in Democritus' theory KpaTEiv, or 
"dominance", expresses a relation between functionally equivalent genetic 
contributions from each parent, which he took to be preformed parts: 
Democritus of Abdera holds that the difference between male and 
female is produced in the womb, indeed, but he denies that it is 
because of heat and cold that one becomes male and another female [as 
Empedocles held]. This, he claims, is determined by whichever of the 
two parents' airEp is (the QTr¬ppa which is drawn from the part 
wherein male and female differ from one another) is dominant over the 
other. (GA 4.1,764a6-11) 
In general, to hold that the superiority of the <a rrEppa which is drawn 
from> one part is dominant <over the a-TrEppa which is drawn from 
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the other> and that this dominance is what makes the embryo female is 
certainly better than saying that heat alone is the cause of this without 
stopping to think about it. (GA 4.1,764b20-4) 
These texts come in the midst of Aristotle's discussion of the causes of sex 
determination. And Generation of Animals 4.1 is a classic Aristotelian opening 
chapter where the theories of his predecessors are examined and evaluated. The 
purpose of the exercise is not only to highlight the problems with their accounts but, 
more importantly, to determine what progress has been made in the investigation of 
the subject in question and how we might build on that progress. In both of the above 
texts the transition from Empedocles to Democritus signals what Aristotle sees as 
progress. Although Aristotle found much of Democritus' theory untenable 
(specifically its preformationist assumptions), he preserved what he took to be 
Democritus' contribution to the subject: the concept of "dominance". Thus, we should 
expect to find a similar use of the concept in Aristotle's theory which expresses a 
relation between the genetic contributions of each parent, which for Aristotle are the 
spermatic "movements". 
If I am right, then supposition two can be read as supplying the causal 
mechanism behind the phenomenon described at 768a2-5. When the movement of the 
father is dominated (alternatively, when the mother's movement dominates), 
inheritance automatically switches over to the opposite movement coming from the 
mother. It will be the dominance of this movement that ultimately explains why the 
embryo develops the opposite maternal trait. 
In this way suppositions two and three both refer to changes between 
movements. The principle of displacement (supposition two) describes a change 
between movements on opposite blood-lines while the principle of relapse 
(supposition three) describes a change between movements lying on the same blood- 
line. Putting all of this together, if Socrates' nose-movement dominates, Menexenos 
will come to have the same nose as his father. However, if this movement is 
dominated, then it gets displaced which causes inheritance to switch over to 
Xanthippe's nose-movement (a change between movements on opposite blood-lines). 
In this case Menexenos' nose will resemble his mother's not his father's. However. if 
Xanthippe's movement relapses, it passes into the movement of her mother (a change 
between movements on the same blood-line). When that happens Menexenos will 
come to have the same nose as his maternal grandmother. 
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It is not obvious from the text how we get resemblance to Socrates' 
grandmother or Xanthippe's grandfather. All we are given is the mechanism for 
resemblance to males on the paternal-line (the father's father, grandfather, great- 
grandfather, etc. ) and females on the maternal line (the mother's mother. 
grandmother, great-grandmother, etc. ). One possibility is suggested by 768a31-2. 
There Aristotle seems to say that resemblance to Socrates' father occurs when the 
movements coming from "male" and "Socrates" relapse while the former "stands 
fast" (. EIvrI). Perhaps the suggestion here is that "standing fast" keeps the process of 
inheritance on the male line while not standing fast causes it to switch tracks from the 
movements of Socrates' male ancestors to those of his female ancestors. And likewise 
on Xanthippe's side of the family. 15 
§3 Mastery versus dominance: two senses of KpaTEiv 
The foregoing makes it clear that the concept of KpaTETV is used in two 
different ways in GA 4. In some cases (e. g. 766a14-16,768a2-5,768b25-7) KpaTEiv 
is used to describe a sort of chemical reaction produced by concoction. ' 6 For 
convenience I shall translate Kp a-rEiv as "master" when used in this physical sense. 
Here we are talking about the father's sperm "mastering", i. e. fully concocting, the 
materials supplied by the female (or the embryo). The connection between 
"mastering" and "concocting" is brought out clearly in Meteorologica 4. For example, 
at 379b33 a thing is said to be properly concocted whenever the matter is mastered by 
the heating agent (compare 768b25-7). In other cases (e. g. 768a21-2,768a28-b1, 
768b7-8) KpaTEiv is used to express a relation between spermatic movements (the 
vehicles of inheritance). When used in this hereditary sense I shall translate KpaTEiv 
as "dominate". According to supposition two, one movement's "being dominated" 
causes the process of inheritance to change over to the opposite movement (e. g. from 
1' Even if this turns out to be correct, it should be stressed that Aristotle's theory does 
not include a KaOoXou 1T ro6EGEts that describes this event. Thus he would need to 
introduce another principle into the theory. 
16 Since the account of sex determination in GA 4.1-2 does not make use of the 
specialised concept of spermatic "movements". we can be sure that KpaTeiv is being 
used exclusively in this physical sense there. 
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the movements of the father to the movements of the mother). Which sense of these 
two senses of KpaTEiv is being used will ultimately depend on the context. 
How do these two ideas fit together? What is the relation between the sperm's 
"mastering" (i. e. concocting) the menstrual fluid and one movement's "dominating" 
over another? Do they describing two different events in the process of inheritance? I 
think we can offer an answer by turning to 768b15ff. 
According to the classic account of theory reduction in modern philosophy of 
science, the first step in incorporating one theory into another is to supply appropriate 
bridge laws. 17 This involves translating the concepts of the one theory into the 
vocabulary of the other theory. For example, the reduction of classical (Mendelian) 
genetics to molecular genetics would begin by providing bridge laws that specify 
which molecular structures correspond to "genes" (a concept from classical genetics) 
and give an account of the "dominance" relation at the molecular level. Now Aristotle 
never specifies which physical structures correspond to the KLVT CEtS and SvväIELS, 
which are the basic units of inheritance postulated by his genetics. However, at 
768b 15ff. he does attempt to provide some sort of bridge laws for translating the two 
principles that govern the interaction between KwtjcE1S (the principles of relapse and 
displacement) into a chemical vocabulary. This suggests that Aristotelian genetics 
can, at least in principle, be reduced to Aristotelian chemistry via these bridge laws. 18 
Now whether or not Aristotle's genetics can in fact be reduced to his 
chemistry is irrelevant here. What is important is that the attempt to provide bridge 
laws gives us a clue as to how "mastery" and "dominance" are related. When 
Aristotle talks about the father's sperm "mastering" the menstrual fluid, and when he 
17 The following comes from Sterelny and Griffiths 1999,137. Sterelny and Griffith 
provide a good summary of the account of theory reduction proposed by Nagel 1961. 
18 Morsink (1982,168-9) argues that Aristotle's theory lacks appropriate "bridge 
principles". However, he is misusing this term. What Morsink refers to as "bridge 
principlesare the necessary principles for "bridging the gap" between the genotype 
level and the phenotype level. In other words, he claims that Aristotle does not 
provide a sufficient account of how the Swä jE[s of the embryo's genetic nature 
produce the phenotypic characters we see. But that is not what philosophers of science 
mean by "bridge principles" or "bridge laws". 
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talks about one movement "dominating" over another, he is not describing two 
different events in the process of inheritance. Rather, talk of seminal concoction and 
mastery, on the one hand, and talk of spermatic movements dominating and being 
dominated, on the other, describe the same event (displacement) at two different 
levels. One is a description of the event at the chemical level, the other a description 
of it at the abstract theoretical level. 19 
This is consistent with the account of displacement at 768b25-7. Aristotle 
must be describing the phenomenon at the chemical level here. For it is associated 
with "ov Kpa-rEi-ra(", whereas in the second supposition of Aristotle's theory (which 
describes events at the abstract genetic level) displacement is associated with 
"KpaTOt gEVOV". These two accounts can be made consistent simply by taking "ov 
Kpa-rET-rat" at 768b25-7 to mean "is not mastered" (an event at the chemical level) 
and "KpaToVtEvov" at 768b7-8 to mean "is dominated" (an event at the genetic 
level). Thus, when giving an account of displacement at the chemical level we talk 
about the sperm failing to concoct or "master" the material supplied by the female 
owing to a deficiency in its concocting heat (768b25-7), whereas at the more abstract 
genetic level we would talk about the father's spermatic movements "being 
dominated" (768b7-8). 
The picture that emerges thus looks like this. If the movement in the father's 
sperm corresponding to his nose dominates over the opposite movement coming from 
the mother, then the offspring will come to have the same nose as its father. However, 
if the paternal movement is dominated, then inheritance switches over to the opposite 
movement coming from the mother according to the principle of displacement. In this 
case the offspring inherits its mother's nose. I want to suggest that this dominance 
relation is determined at the chemical level by whether or not the father's sperm 
manages to fully concoct or "master" the menstrual fluid. If the sperm "masters" the 
matter, then his movement dominates. However, if the menstrual fluid is not mastered 
by it (if the sperm fails to fully concoct it), then his movement is dominated. 
19 The difference I am after here is analogous to molecular genetics versus Mendelian 
genetics. 
187 
§4 Simultaneous displacement 
I have already touched on Aristotle's account of phenomenon 5 in chapter four 
(why males tend to resemble their fathers and females their mothers). At 768a21-8 
Aristotle says that "the most natural" course of events is when the movements 
corresponding to sex and resemblance dominate and are dominated together (äua): 
Therefore, the most natural course of events is when <the movement> 
dominates and is dominated both qua male and qua father together (for 
the difference is slight so that it is not difficult for both <properties> to 
occur together <in one individual>; for Socrates is a particular sort of 
male). This is why males tend to resemble their fathers and females 
their mothers: displacement occurs into both opposites together, and 
"female" is the opposite of "male" and "mother" of "father" 
(displacement being a change into opposites). 
Now if by saying that this is the "most natural" Aristotle means it is the most ideal 
scenario (as most commentators read the text), then his point is that ideally we want 
sex and resemblance to match up, sons looking like their fathers and daughters 
looking like their mothers. But obviously this is not Aristotle's point. What Aristotle 
provides here is the causal mechanism which explains the fact that offspring tend to 
resemble the same sex parent (son/father, daughter/mother). By calling this the "most 
natural" he clearly means it is the usual outcome ("nature" as what happens for the 
most part). 
The idea here is that the movements corresponding to sex and resemblance are 
linked in such a way that the properties associated with those movements tend to be 
inherited together as a set (the fate of the one normally determines the fate of the 
other). We can call this the principle of simultaneous displacement. Simultaneous 
displacement is not afforded the status of a KaOoXov J r00EOEis in the official theory 
of inheritance. However, it clearly has the status of a theoretical principle that governs 
the behaviour of the mechanism. The reason why this is not included in the KaOOXov 
v-rroOEoELs of Aristotle's theory is probably because he thinks it is deducible from 
those principles. More than likely Aristotle wants to cash this out in terms of some 
sort of physical bond between the entities corresponding to the KwrloEts, so that 
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simultaneous displacement may just be a special case of the principle of displacement 
together with this bond. 20 
The fact that the movements for sex and resemblance are themselves discrete 
units of inheritance that can dominate and be dominated independently of one another 
explains why offspring sometimes resemble the parent of the opposite sex 
(son/mother, daughter/father). 21 This supplies the explanation for phenomenon 6, as 
set out in the following passage: 
But if the movement coming from "male" is dominated while the one 
coming from "Socrates" does not dominate, or the latter dominates but 
the former does not, in that case both a male resembling its mother and 
a female resembling its father are generated [respectively]. But if the 
movements relapse, and the movement stands fast qua male while the 
movement coming from "Socrates" relapses into that of his father, the 
result is that the offspring will be a male that resembles its grandfather 
(or some other ancestor according to the same account). However, if it 
is dominated qua male, then the offspring will be female and usually 
resemble its mother. But if this movement also relapses, then 
resemblance will be to the mother's mother (or some other ancestor 
according to the same account). (768a28-bl) 
This passage is extremely rich. For it gives us a relatively complete picture of the 
causal mechanisms behind the phenomena and the principles that govern their 
behaviour. It is interesting to note how the explanation proceeds. By applying the 
principles of the theory Aristotle is able to go from a son who resembles his father all 
the way to a daughter who resembles her maternal ancestors. 
The text runs through the following scenarios (again taking the movements in 
Socrates' sperm as a starting point): 
20 Something like the principle of simultaneous displacement (cashed out in terms of a 
physical bond between movements) may lie behind Aristotle's account of 
resemblance to the whole. On this model the movements for the parts, although they 
remain (functionally and physically) discrete units of inheritance, are linked in such a 
way that they tend to be inherited together as a single unit. 
21 See 769a3-4. b5-6. 
189 
(1) If the movement coming from "male" dominates while the movement 
coming from "Socrates" is dominated, the offspring will be male and look 
like Xanthippe. 
(2) If the reverse happens, the offspring will be female resembling Socrates. 
(3) If "male" stands fast and "Socrates" relapses into the movement of Socrates' 
father, the offspring will be a male resembling its paternal grandfather. 
(4) However, if "male" is dominated, the offspring will be female and usually 
resemble its mother. 22 
(5) But if "this" movement relapses, then the offspring will resemble its 
maternal grandmother. 
The first three scenarios are relatively straightforward. However, (4) and (5) require a 
bit more work. The problem is identifying "this" movement in (5). Just looking at the 
Greek, av-rrl XuOf ij KivrIßtc (768a35-6) would seem to refer back to the KivrIßis in 
Socrates' sperm corresponding to "male" (the implied subject of Kpari6EVTo5 Tj 
äppEV at 768a34). However, Aristotle has just told us at 768a19-21 that resemblance 
to the mother's mother occurs when her own movement (i Tf s yEvvwCTJS 
<KivfloLs>) undergoes relapse. So we should expect "this" movement at 768a35 to 
refer to the movement of the mother and not to any of Socrates' movements - 
certainly not the movement coming from "male" (which transmits the parts proper to 
males). 
This reading is consistent with what has just been said in 768a21-8 about 
simultaneous displacement. In (4) Aristotle says that if "male" is dominated, the 
offspring will be a female and usually resemble its mother. We can account for this by 
recalling the principle of simultaneous displacement, which says that the movements 
for sex and resemblance - in this case "male" and "Socrates" - are linked in such a 
way that they tend to dominate and be dominated together. Thus it is implied in (4) 
that when "male" is dominated "Socrates" will usually be dominated along with it. 
But how do we get an offspring that resembles its mother from this? For this we need 
to recall the second supposition of Aristotle's theory, that being dominated causes 
22 This suggests that perhaps "standing fast" is not a special principle after all but is 
merely another way of saying the movement dominates and does not get displaced 
into its opposite. 
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displacement into the opposite. I have argued that this supposition refers to a change 
between opposite movements. Thus, when the movement '`male" is dominated the 
movement "Socrates" is also dominated which causes both movements to be displaced 
into their opposites together. So (4) is actually describing a change in two movements. 
one of which is only implicit in the text. There is a change from "male" to "female- 
and a change from "Socrates" to "Xanthippe". (5) can then be understood as saying 
that if this movement, namely the movement coming from "Xanthippe", relapses, 
their daughter will resemble her maternal grandmother. And this is precisely what we 
have already been told at 768al9-21 (maternal-line atavism occurs when the mother's 
movement undergoes relapse). 
§5 Supposition one: actual versus potential movements 
I now want to look closer at the first supposition of Aristotle's theory. 
According to this supposition, some of the movements are present in the parent's 
genetic material "in activity" (those of the parent and the universals) while others are 
only "in potentiality" (those of the ancestors). 23 I shall ignore the universals here and 
concentrate on the active parental movements, on the one hand, and the potential 
ancestor movements, on the other. 
By postulating a set of movements in an organism's seed corresponding to its 
ancestors Aristotle was able to account for the fact that offspring who do not resemble 
their parents nevertheless resemble one of their ancestors rather than any chance 
individual (phenomenon 4). However, the fact that the ancestor movements are only 
"in potentiality" while those of the parent are "in activity" is supposed to explain why 
offspring tend to resemble their parents more than their ancestors (phenomenon 3). 
While this may seem straightforward on the face of it, supposition one is actually 
quite puzzling. For one thing it places constraints on how we understand the idea that 
there are "movements" present in Socrates' sperm. For we have to understand this in 
such a way that it makes sense for some of those movements to be "bvväpet" and 
others "EvEpyEIq". I think a lot of commentators fail to consider this. 
23 1 shall talk about the movements being present "in activity" and "in actuality" 
interchangeably (though "in activity" is slightly better suited for the reading I shall 
eventually propose). 
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For example, according to Furth, Socrates' sperm is "pre-programmed with a 
variety of highly intricate `motions' which `shape' and `set' the catamenia in stages as 
development advances". 24 On this reading, the movements that shape the embryo are 
"present in" Socrates' sperm (while in transit) only in the sense of being programmed 
into it. Let us grant for the sake of argument that Aristotle thinks the father's sperm 
literally constructs the parts of the offspring out of menstrual blood (something I have 
already rejected). In order to be consistent, the sperm will have to be pre-programmed 
with movements that not only impose on the offspring features that make it look like 
Socrates but also those that make it look like the various ancestors. It is not clear how 
Furth intends to map the actual/potential distinction onto this. The distinction cannot 
be between actual movements programmed into the sperm and potential movements 
programmed into the sperm. For any movement which is programmed into the sperm 
is a potential movement of the sperm almost by definition. It makes even less sense to 
draw the distinction between movements which are actually programmed into the 
sperm and those which are only potentially programmed into it. 
On a weaker reading of SvvapE , the ancestor movements will be present in 
the parent's seed potentially only in the sense that I am potentially (though not 
actually) in Manchester. Here the distinction is between movements that are actually 
present in the sperm and those which are potentially (but not actually) present. There 
are different ways that one could cash this out depending on what one takes the 
"movements" in Socrates' sperm to be. 
Again suppose we take the KIVT GELS in Socrates' sperm to be literal 
movements of his sperm as it fashions the parts of the offspring out of menstrual 
blood. The movements which are present "in actuality" are, straightforwardly, the 
actual movements of his sperm as it is actually attempting to fashion the parts of the 
offspring into parts like his own. On the other hand, Socrates' sperm has ancestor 
movements "in potentiality" only in the weaker sense that it has the potential to 
execute movements that will impose resemblances to his ancestors. 25 An analogy 
might help. The actual movements in (of) the sperm are analogous to the actual 
movements of the sculptor as he is currently attempting to form the bronze into a 
24 Furth 1988,118. 
25 This is Cooper's reading. See esp. 1988,32 which makes use of the following 
analo ;y (discussed in chapter four above). 
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statue of Hermes. However, in addition to those movements he is actually making, the 
sculptor can potentially make other movements, say, those that would shape the 
matter into a statue of Zeus. It is in this latter sense that the ancestor movements are 
(on the current reading) in Socrates' sperm "in potentiality", namely as the potential 
of his sperm to execute movements that will form the matter into a likeness of his 
ancestors. 
The problem with this reading of the actual/potential distinction is that it 
leaves the sperm's potential to generate resemblances to remote ancestors 
unexplained. It is obvious that the sperm has this potentiality, since offspring do 
resemble their remote ancestors. What needs to be explained is how the sperm is able 
to do this. In virtue of what does the sperm have the potential to execute movements 
which cause the offspring to look like those other individuals? Simply drawing a 
distinction between the movements the sperm is actually (currently) making and those 
that it has the potential to make does nothing to explain this phenomenon. To say that 
the ancestor movements, which are said to be present in Socrates' sperm in 
potentiality", are just those movements it has the potential to make simply repeats the 
fact to be explained. 
What we are attempting to do here is make sense of the idea that some of the 
sperm's movements are "svvapEI" while others are "EvEp-Eia". On the reading I am 
defending, the K VTj6Ets in question are separate entities (vehicles of inheritance) 
carried inside Socrates' sperm. For Aristotle, it is the possession of these KtVT GEts that 
gives Socrates' sperm the capacity to generate formal resemblances. A weaker 
reading of bvväuEl thus entails that Socrates' sperm actually contains movements that 
transmit resemblances to his own phenotype and potentially (but not actually) 
contains movements that transmit resemblances to his ancestors. However, in this 
case it is hard to imagine Aristotle having any story to tell for how those ancestor 
movements come to be present in Socrates' sperm. As we have seen, the ancestor 
movements change from Suvä1EL to EvEpyEIQx when the sperm is inside the female 
doing its thing: they become EVEpyElq( when Socrates' own movements relapse. On 
the weaker reading Socrates' sperm thus comes to acquire a brand new set of 
movements that it only potentially had before just as the city of Manchester would 
acquire a brand new resident if I were to go there. But how could movements 
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corresponding to features of Socrates' relatives come to be present in his sperm when 
it is inside the female? 
Whatever Aristotle means by saying among the movements present in the 
parents' seeds some are "in potentiality" while others are "in activity", it seems fairly 
certain that both sets of movements really are present in the robust sense. On my 
reading these movements are the vehicles through which formal resemblances are 
physically transmitted to the offspring in the act of reproduction. And it is in virtue of 
actually possessing those movements (some of which are nevertheless "in 
potentiality") that Socrates' sperm is able to generate just those resemblances in his 
offspring (in whatever way sperm generates resemblances). 26 
Although Cooper takes the KMIGEEs in the sperm to be literal informing 
movements of the sperm (which I have rejected), he does offer a way to make sense of 
the idea that the ancestor KtVTICEts really are present in Socrates' sperm in the robust 
sense whilst preserving the idea that they are nevertheless "in potentiality". In one 
place Cooper characterises the potential ancestor KLVT CEtS in Socrates' sperm as 
"underlying movements that become active when... the normally active ones give 
way". 27 This suggests that the ancestor movements are present in some sort of de- 
activated state. I think something like this is what Aristotle has in mind. On this 
reading there will be a KivrI6is in Socrates' sperm corresponding to his father's nose 
which is present in a de-activated state (buväiEt). It gets activated (becomes 
iVEpYElq) only in those cases where the Kivrlßls corresponding to Socrates' own nose 
undergoes relapse. 
Whether or not this is the proper way to understand supposition one, any 
interpretation of Aristotle's theory must allow that there really are movements in 
Socrates' sperm corresponding to the features of his ancestors. For he not only needs 
26 I shall speak of the spermatic movements generating features only in the loose 
sense. It makes no difference whether we speak in terms of the KLV1 GE(s producing the 
features or whether we speak of them producing bwä1EiS in Menexenos' genetic 
nature. For a teleological account of the KIVT OEls and the bwä1EIs will make 
reference to the same phenotypic characters (although properly speaking the latter are 
the productive sources of those characters). 
27 Cooper 1988,233. 
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to explain why Socrates' sperm doesn't actually have the ability to generate features 
that make the offspring look like Coriscus (a non-familial relation), but also why it 
doesn't even potentially have that ability. The fact that Socrates' sperm really does 
possess ancestor movements (they refer to actual entities inside Socrates' sperm) 
grounds its potential to generate the features of those individuals who are, after all. 
just as removed from the current act of reproduction as any chance individual. 
§6 The facts explained 
It will be useful to summarise the account of inheritance in GA 4.3 by listing 
which of the eight phenomena we now have explanations for. 
Phenomenon 1. The reason offspring tend to resemble their parents more than 
other members of the same species is that there are KIVTIGE15 present in each parent's 
genetic material that transmit the features that make them unique individuals. 
Phenomenon 2. The reason why some offspring resemble the father while 
others resemble the mother with respect to different parts (phenomenon 2b) is that 
there are KIV-'G ; ts present in each parent's genetic material corresponding to those 
parts, each of which is itself a discrete unit of inheritance that can dominate and be 
dominated independently of the others. Resemblance to the parent as a whole 
(phenomenon 2a) occurs when all of those KtvrjßEts dominate together. 28 
Phenomenon 4. The reason why offspring who do not resemble their parents 
nevertheless resemble their ancestors rather than any chance individual is that there 
are also KtvrjGEts present in each parent's genetic material corresponding to the 
features of those ancestors. 
Phenomenon 3. The reason offspring tend to resemble their parents more than 
their ancestors is that the parental KLV1 OEts are present in activity while the ancestor 
tctvrjCEts are only in potentiality (they are present in a deactivated state). 
Phenomenon 5. The reason males usually resemble their fathers and females 
their mothers is that the KtVTIGYcts for sex and resemblance are linked in such a way 
that the properties carried by those KIVTJCEºS tend to be inherited together 
(simultaneous displacement). 
28 Both 2a and 2b will apply to resemblance to ancestors as well. 
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Phenomenon 6. The reason why females sometimes resemble their fathers and 
males their mothers is that the ) UV1 OELs for sex and resemblance are themselves 
discrete units of inheritance that can dominate and be dominated independently of one 
another. 
The two remaining phenomena-cases where the offspring fails to resemble 
the members of its family but nevertheless resembles a member of its own species 
(phenomenon 7) and cases where the offspring is so deformed that even this species 
resemblance is lost (phenomenon 8}-fall outside the immediate scope of the theory 
of inheritance. For they both have to do with the loss of familial resemblance owing to 
the malfunctioning of the mechanisms involved and so are teratological in nature. I 
shall attempt to give a brief sketch of this below. However, first let me summarise the 
interpretation developed over the last few chapters and draw out some of the more 
immediate implications. 
§7 The transmission of biological form: some concluding remarks 
In chapter four I defended the view that Aristotle's theory of inheritance 
postulates KLV1 YEL or "movements" coming from both parents which are functionally 
equivalent to one another: they are both vehicles of inheritance. It follows from this 
that Menexenos will receive two sets of movements for each part of his phenotype 
(including potential ancestor movements), one from Socrates and one from 
Xanthippe. 29 In chapter five I argued that in order to bridge the gap between 
Aristotle's transmission genetics and his account of natural generation we must 
assume that the reception of spermatic movements from the parent and the subsequent 
transformation of the embryo into its adult form are interposed by the formation of 
new potentials (like those from which the movements were drawn) which together 
make up the offspring's own genetic nature. This new generative principle will be the 
source of growth and development in the offspring itself qua itself. 
29 This does not apply to all parts of the phenotype but only those in which the 
offspring can resemble one member of its family more than another (those for which 
the offspring is, as we would say, heterozygous). For example, it follows from 
Aristotle's reproductive hylomorphism that an offspring will receive only one 
movement for the parts of its sensory system (the movement "Animal", which comes 
from the father). 
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It follows that for each part of the offspring's phenotypic nature its genetic 
nature will contain two potentials (or two versions of the same generic potential), one 
from each parent's spermatic movement. Since these will be potentials for the 
formation of contrary properties (e. g. snub nose versus straight nose). only one of 
them can be expressed in the offspring's phenotype at any given time. 3° What I want 
to suggest here is that which version of a given potential gets activated at the 
appropriate stage of the embryo's development, and thus which version is expressed 
in its phenotype, is determined by whichever parent's movement corresponding to 
that potential was dominant over the other according to the principles of displacement 
and relapse. 
This interpretation of the events in GA 4.3 can be supported by appealing once 
again the case of the woman from Elis. Recall the example. The woman from Elis, 
who is pale-skinned, has a pale-skinned daughter with a dark-skinned man from 
Ethiopia. Their daughter (Hypatia) then has a dark-skinned child with another pale- 
skinned man. According to Aristotle's theory of inheritance, we first explain why 
Hypatia has pale skin rather than dark skin by pointing to the dominance of the pale- 
skin movement coming from her mother over the dark-skin movement coming from 
her father. The explanation for why her own son has dark skin is two-fold. First, the 
paternal pale-skin movement coming from Hypatia's husband is dominated, which 
causes inheritance to switch over to Hypatia's own pale-skin movement according to 
the principle of displacement. This movement then relapses into her father's dark-skin 
movement, which was present in her seed in a state of potentiality. The implication of 
this is that (looking back to the first generation) the defeated dark-skin movement 
coming from Hypatia's father must have still produced a corresponding potential in 
30 This actually depends on what level we are talking about. Aristotle defines 
"contrary" or "opposite" properties as properties that cannot belong to the same 
subject at the same time (Metaphysics A10). Snub nose and straight nose are 
contraries if we are talking about properties at the phenotypic level. For they cannot 
both be present in Menexenos' phenotypic nature at the same time. His nose must be 
one shape or the other. However, they are not contraries at the genetic level: both 
properties can belong to the same subject "Ka66 YEVVT1T(KÖV". In other words, snub 
nose and straight nose can both be present in Menexenos at the same time as 
potentials of his genetic nature. 
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her genetic nature. For each movement in Hypatia's genetic material is said to be 
derived from corresponding potentials in herself (767b35-768a2). Thus Hypatia's 
genetic nature must contain two potentials for skin colour, one for pale skin (the 
S vaµts produced by the KivnaLS coming from her mother) and one for dark skin (the 
S vauts produced by the Kiv-qß(s coming from her father). However, since her 
phenotypic nature cannot display both versions of that trait simultaneously, only one 
of the potentials will have been activated during her development; the other must be 
preserved in her genetic nature in a de-activated state. 
If this is right, then one spermatic movement dominating over another does 
not determine which potential corresponding to those movements makes it into the 
offspring's genetic nature: atavism requires that both spermatic movements produce 
potentials in its nature. What the dominance relation must determine is which of those 
two potentials gets activated at the appropriate stage of development and thus which 
version of the trait is expressed in the offspring's phenotypic nature. 31 
§8 The inheritance of the species-form 
To close this chapter I want to say a word about the last two phenomena, both 
of which concern the loss of family resemblance. In some cases Aristotle says that the 
offspring who fails to resemble a member of its own family will still be recognisable 
as a member of its species (phenomenon 7). However, in the more extreme cases the 
offspring's observable form will not bear any species-likeness at all at which point it 
is a "monster" (phenomenon 8). 1 already touched on this latter phenomenon in the 
last chapter. Here I want to focus on the former, which concerns the inheritance of the 
species-form. 
Although it is not explicit from the text, phenomena 7 and 8 appear to share a 
common cause: the "confusion" of spermatic Ktvrj6Ets. Aristotle says that sometimes 
the Ktvrj6Ets become so confused together that familial resemblance is lost 
31 Above I argued that dominance itself is determined at the chemical level by 
whether or not the father's sperm manages to fully concoct or "master" the menstrual 
blood (cf. 767b15-20). If the sperm fully concocts the matter, then his movement 
dominates. If it fails to fully concoct it, then it is dominated in which case inheritance 
switches over the movement coming from the female according to the principle of 
displacement. 
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completely. In the less severe cases the offspring will still resemble a member of its 
own species (768b 10-12). This is phenomenon 7: "Some offspring resemble none of 
their family, although they resemble some human being at least" (767b4-5: cf. 769b8- 
9). Aristotle does not mean here that Socrates and Xanthippe have a child that 
resembles Callias. For that would still be a case of family resemblance; Callias would 
be the father in this case. 32 Rather, Aristotle is describing a situation where two 
individuals have a child together who resembles a human being though not any 
particular human being. I suspect that what Aristotle has in mind are children with 
Down's syndrome. These offspring do not resemble any members of their own family 
yet all look like a human being (indeed the same human being). However, they do not 
look like any specific human being: they all share a sort of generic or common human 
form. 
The explanation for this is set out in the passage just after Aristotle has 
presented the three general suppositions of his theory of inheritance: 
In the end the movements become so confused together that there is no 
resemblance to family or kindred at all, but what remains is what is 
common only, namely the human character. The reason is that this 
accompanies all the particulars (rräGty äKOAov6Et TOJTO -roil Ka8' 
EKa6TOV): for Human is universal, while Socrates (the father) and the 
mother (whoever she may be) are particulars. (768b 10-15) 
Further on we are told that in the more extreme cases even this species-likeness is lost 
so that the only thing remaining is what is common to all animals (769b 11-16). In 
these extreme cases, although the offspring is still a sentient being, its observable 
form (TfIv IbEav, 767b5) is badly deformed to the point where it is no longer 
recognisable as a member of its own species. At this point it has become a "monster" 
(TEpaS)" 
Although I shall focus exclusively on phenomenon 7 here, which concerns the 
inheritance of the species-form, much of what I have to say will also apply to 
phenomenon 8 (assuming the two phenomena share a common cause). 
It is possible, I suppose, that phenomenon 7 is just Aristotle mistaking cases of 
adultery for some strange phenomenon where two people have a child that happens to 
look like some other person. However, that is unlikely. 
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What needs to be explained here is why, when the movements coming from 
the parents and ancestors get "confused together". the offspring still develops 
recognisably human features. I think there are two possible answers to this question 
depending on how one reads the statement that the species movements "accompany" 
those of the individual. 33 For this is supposed to account for the fact that when 
familial resemblance is lost the offspring still resembles a member of its species. 
On one interpretation the human features are produced by the movements of 
the individual themselves. 34 On this reading there is no independent set of movements 
in Socrates' sperm that transmit the species-form; rather, there are only those 
movements that transmit Socrates' distinctive form. 35 The idea behind this reading 
would be that Socrates' human features merely supervene on those that make him a 
unique individual so that the human form is reproduced simply as a consequence of 
reproducing Socrates' own particular version of that form (which is qualitatively 
different from other versions). For example, Menexenos comes to have a human nose 
insofar he comes to have Socrates' distinctive snub-nose. It would follow from this 
that only the distinctive forms of individuals would be directly reproduced in the act 
of reproduction. 
The metaphysical underpinnings for such a view could be supplied by 
Lennox's account of the relation between kinds (yEvfl) and forms of kinds (Eisre) 
(traditionally, "genus" and "species"). Again, the relevant idea is that species-level 
33 By the movements "of the individual" I mean, for example, "the movement coming 
from Socrates" (768a28-9). The idea, then, is that the movements in Socrates' sperm 
corresponding to the species "accompany" those that correspond to the features that 
make Socrates a unique individual. The same applies for each individual represented 
in the act of reproduction, for example, the movements coming from Socrates' father 
are also accompanied by a set of species movements. 
34 Again I speak of the spermatic movements "producing" features only in the loose 
sense. As I have said, it makes no difference whether we speak of the movements in 
the parent's seed or the potentials produced by those movements (the bwä1ElS that 
make up the offspring's genetic nature). For a teleological account of both will make 
reference to the same phenotypic characters (though properly speaking the latter are 
the productive sources of those characters in the offspring). 
'S Something like this is held by Coles 1995,76-81. 
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features such as "nose", "eyes", and "leg" do not pick out actual features of any 
individual but simply represent what Lennox calls "features with range", -possible 
ways in which human noses, eyes and legs may be realized". 36 Thus Socrates' snub 
nose, blue eyes, and short legs, and Xanthippe's straight nose, green eyes and long 
legs are two concrete realisations of the same generic human features. 
This first reading of 768b10-15 faces two problems. First, when enumerating 
the contents of Socrates' sperm Aristotle explicitly identifies a second set of active 
movements corresponding to the species-form (768a13). Second, we are told that both 
the kind (-ro'yEvos) and the particular (TO Ka6' Kac rov) are at work in the act of 
reproduction (767b30-5). 37 So not only does Aristotle posit an independent set of 
movements corresponding to the kind Human, he assigns them an active role in 
generation, even if those corresponding to "what is peculiar and individual" exert the 
stronger influence (b29-30). 
On the alternative reading of 768b 10-15 (the reading I shall adopt) Aristotle 
thinks the offspring's human features are the product of a distinct set of movements 
corresponding to the species form. Here the movement in Socrates' sperm 
corresponding to "Human" is not reducible to the movement corresponding to 
"Socrates"; it is a separate movement that merely accompanies it. 38 
There are two ways to cash this second reading out. The first is to take the 
human movements as a redundant set that normally have no effect but function as a 
sort of back-up that produce default human features whenever the movements of the 
individual fail. However, what is more likely is that the movements of the individual 
(the parental and ancestral movements) are simply responsible for the details of the 
offspring's form, the colour of its eyes, the shape of its nose, and so forth (cf. 743b20- 
5). The accompanying species movements, on the other hand, would be responsible 
for the basic organisation of the body, the production of its species-specific tissues 
and organs, and any other features that are characteristic of that particular kind of 
36 Lennox 2001b, 178 
37 The contrast with TO Ka8' 'Ka6Tov suggests that TO y vos has taxonomical 
reference to the kind Human here. 
38 This reading is also held by Balme 1987b, 294-3. 
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animal. 39 On this reading, when the movements of the individual become "confused" 
the characteristics corresponding to those movements will be distorted and any 
resemblance lost. However, if the species movements remain unaffected, they will 
ensure that the offspring is still at least recognisable as a member of its kind. 40 
Although the species movements have a role to play in the generation of 
offspring that look like their parents (at least insofar as they resemble them in 
species), Aristotle suggests that the movements corresponding to what is distinctive 
and particular always exerts the stronger influence (66 S' kßX1Et Trpös 'n v'EVEGIV 
uäXAov T0 ''1'810V Kai TO Ka6' EKaGTov). The reason, Aristotle says, is that this is the 
ovßia (767b35). Some have concluded from this that the Generation of Animals 
advances a radically new theory of substance in which individual-forms (as opposed 
to species-forms) are primary. 4' Of course in both the Metaphysics and the Categories 
Aristotle is quite forthcoming in suggesting that particulars (Ka6' EKaOTa) like 
Socrates and Callias are ontologically prior to universals like Human and Animal. 
However, the reference to TO istov appears to suggest something more than this. 
One way to respond to this is to argue that Aristotle is not making any claims 
about what the real entities are: he is not talking about the oüoia which is the primary 
subject of Metaphysics Z. Rather, by saying what is distinctive (TO istov) about a 
particular individual is the ovoia he is simply making a statement about the proper 
object of the science of inheritance. 42 When studying inheritance the geneticist will 
39 This differs from Balme's view, which takes the movements of the individual to be 
primary throughout. 
40 If these KIV1 OEL also become "confused", then only the accompanying animal 
movements will do their job. In this case the species likeness is lost so that the only 
thing remaining is what is common to all animals (769b 11-16). Although this 
offspring will still be a sentient being, its observable form will be badly deformed and 
will no longer resemble the same kind of animal as its generating parents 
(phenomenon 8). 
41 Individual-forms are discussed in chapter seven. 
42 That Aristotle thinks we can have scientific knowledge of genetic variation within a 
species is clear from the fact that it can be described in terms of Ka6oXov vTr06EGE(s. 
See note 1 above. 
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take as her object the form that displays variation (the individual-form) not the form 
that includes only what is common to all members of the same kind (the species- 
form). Simply put, from the perspective of genetics it is the unique individual that is 
the real thing (the ovoia). I shall have more to say about this in my final chapter. 
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Chapter Seven 
Particular Forms and Teleological Explanation 
To end this study I want to briefly consider two issues related to the transmission of 
biological forms. The first is the on-going debate concerning whether or not Aristotle 
believed in so-called particular forms. The second has to do with the nature of 
teleological explanation. The relevance of these two issues will become clear as we 
proceed. 
§1 Did Aristotle believe in particular forms? 
I speak of "particular" forms rather loosely here because the literature is quite 
muddled on this. For different people tend to mean different things by "particular" 
forms. ' However, first let me say a word about the opponents of particular forms. 2 
They argue that there is only one form for each species and that each particular 
member of the species has qualitatively and numerically the same form. Some in this 
camp argue that the species-form is a universal insofar as it belongs to many 
individuals at the same time. 3 Others deny this on the grounds that a species-form is 
predicated of matter which, prior to that form's being predicated of it, is not a 
countable thing (it is not an individual `this'). And since it is predicated of no 
individual, it follows that it is not predicated of many individuals. 4 
According to Gill, a "particular" form is a form which is proper to a single 
composite alone. 5 Whiting characterises this position by the commitment to the view 
1 Unless otherwise stated, the current discussion will take place at the level of 
phenotypic natures (taken in the broad sense). Although there may be interesting new 
variations on the issue that arise when we distinguish between phenotypic natures and 
genetic natures, I shall not explore them here. 
2 The following comes from Whiting 1990,35-34. 
3 Aristotle definition of a universal is that whose nature it is to be predicated of a 
number of different individuals. A particular (Ka6' EKaaTov) is that whose nature is 
not to be predicated of a number of different individuals, i. e. a non-repeatable instance 
(De interp. 7). 
4 Code 1976; Woods 1967. 
5 Gill 1989.31-33. (Gill does not endorse particular forms. ) 
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that there are a plurality of numerically distinct forms for each species. 6 Put sirnplýy. 
the idea is that Socrates and Callias each have their own personal forms which are 
numerically distinct from one another. On this reading, Socrates' form and Callias' 
form are two particular instances of a form. This is the view held by Frede and 
Patzig.? 
However, sometimes what commentators mean when they ask whether 
Aristotle believes in "particular" forms is whether he thinks (biological) forms include 
features below the level of species. For example, does Socrates' form include only 
those features which he shares with other human beings or does it also include 
features that make him a unique individual, such as his particular nose shape and eye 
colour? David Balme argues that Aristotle believes in particular forms in this sense. 8 
§2 Individual and particular forms 
These two versions of particular forms are very often confused with one 
another; however, they are distinct positions-9 For convenience I shall refer to 
Balme's version as "individual-forms" and reserve "particular" forms for the Frede- 
Patzig thesis. Individual-forms are forms which include properties below the level of 
species, while particular forms are numerically distinct, non-repeatable instances of a 
form. The reason these two theses must be kept distinct is that those who accept 
particular forms can deny individual-forms. For example, one could argue that 
Socrates and Callias have numerically distinct forms which are nevertheless 
qualitatively identical. On this reading Socrates has his own human form while 
Callias has his own human form (they are two non-repeatable instances of a generic 
human form). '0 
6 Whiting 1990,34. (Whiting endorses particular forms. ) 
7 Frede and Patzig 1988; Frede 1985. For other references see Whiting 1990. 
8 Balme 1987b. For other references see Whiting 1990. 
9 For a good discussion of this see Sharples 1985,119. 
10 This is how Frede-Patzig takes it. C£ Cooper 1988,36: "... some have thought from 
reading just the Metaphysics that an Aristotelian form is a non-repeatable instance of 
some general specific type, differing from other instances not internally (by reference 
to the Xoyoc of its being) but only by the accidental historical facts about the 
individual object whose form it is by which we mark that individual off from others of 
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The difference between particular forms and individual-forms ultimately 
comes down to whether we are talking about the form itself or its content. Thus we 
have two separate questions: 
(1) Are forms universals or particulars? 
(2) Are the contents of forms species- or individual-specific? 
I shall assume without argument that each organism's form is a particular. " l The 
universal species-form is simply an abstraction from these. Thus particular forms are 
ontologically prior to species-forms, although species-forms are prior both in account 
and in knowledge. As I see it (2) is by far the more interesting question. The only way 
to cash this out, I think, is in terms of reproduction. If Socrates' form is whatever it is 
about him that gets itself reproduced, then (ontologically speaking) his form will 
include all of those features that belong to him insofar as he is capable of reproduction 
(Ka06 yEvvrITtKÖV). And according to the GA at least, this includes those features 
that make him a unique individual. 
A commitment to the reality of individual-forms raises an important 
epistemological issue. In the Metaphysics Aristotle argues that only what is universal 
counts as a proper object of definition and scientific knowledge. 
Now I have argued that Socrates' individual-form includes features which are 
not common to all human beings. However, it is still knowable insofar as it is the 
the same species. " Gill (1989,33) argues that one can accept individual-forms without 
having to accept particular forms. For example, one could argue there is a single form 
that is passed from Sophronicus to Socrates to Menexenos through reproduction. This 
form would be universal insofar as it is predicated of a number of things and 
individual-specific insofar as it includes features not found in every human being (e. g. 
it includes a distinctive family nose). However, this kind of family-form would be 
universal only in the trivial sense of belonging to more than one individual. It is not 
universal in the sense that each member of the same species has qualitatively and 
numerically the same form. Moreover, a form that only belongs in common to every 
member of a single family could not do the work required of universals in Aristotle's 
biology. 
11 Aristotle's position in Metaphysics A3 at least seems to favour particular forms. 
There we are told that the principles of particulars are themselves particulars not 
universals (1071a17-24). 
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object of a universal account. By universal account I mean one that does not pick out 
Socrates' form uniquely (it is not an account of his form per se) but applies 
universally to all individuals of the same kind. Such an account would abstract away 
from the peculiarity of Socrates' form - it would exclude those features that make him 
a unique individual - so that the content of that account is universal. On this reading, 
Socrates and Callias are one in form in virtue of sharing an account in common, not in 
virtue of sharing the form specified by that account (which is an abstraction from the 
forms of individuals). 12 
However, we can still give a more detailed account of Socrates' form that 
would reveal features peculiar to him and which mark him off as a unique individual. 
Something like this is suggested by Cooper: 
The GA makes it clear that... each form has in principle a full Xoyo5 
of its being as the form that it is that includes the specification of all 
those distinctive characteristics of structure and organization for which 
in the individual whose form it is it is directly responsible. ... Thus 
Aristotelian forms are individual in that each form contains within 
itself the basis for its differentiation from (as well as, of course, its 
affiliation with) other forms of the same specific type. 13 
So a definitional account of Socrates' form would include only information about him 
that is also contained in a definitional account of Callias' form. This is the account 
that reveals his essence. However, a more precise account of his form is available 
which would reveal further facts about Socrates that distinguish him from Callias as a 
unique individual. This is not incompatible with the Metaphysics, since this will not 
be a definitional account of Socrates' substantial being. 
12 A similar interpretation of "being one in form" is defended by Lennox 2001 b, 174. 
13 Cooper 1988,37. I have changed "Aristotelian forms are particular" to 
"Aristotelian forms are individual" to reflect the distinction made above. What I am 
calling "particular" forms (Frede-Patzig) do not require a form to contain within itself 
the basis for its differentiation from other forms of the same specific type. "Particular" 
forms are only required to be numerically distinct from one another. 
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§3 Individual-forms and teleological explanations 
One might object here that there is a tension between Aristotle's theory of 
inheritance, on the one hand, and his view that form includes only what is common to 
all members of the species, on the other, which I have glossed over. 14 For example, at 
the outset of GA 5 we are told that a definitional account of an animal's substantial 
being (Töv Xöyov TöV T5 ovßias) excludes such individual differences as eye 
colour in humans (778a29-35). These features do not come to be for the sake of 
anything but only from necessity, and their causes must be traced back to "the matter 
and the moving principle" (a35-bl). 
I am not disputing that the species-form is the proper object of definition and 
that this includes only what is common to all members of the species. On my reading 
the species-form is an abstraction from the particular forms of individual members of 
that species and is prior both in account and in knowledge. Rather, I am disputing the 
standard reading of Aristotle according to which everything below the level of species 
is merely a by-product of the species-form being realised in different quantities of 
matter. This faulty view is even endorsed by Balme. Balme held that individual 
differences such as eye colour are material accidents "that arise necessarily from the 
matter". 15 Such features (according to Balme) are not part of the form taken by itself 
but "are due to the matter in the composite form-in-matter". On this reading we get 
individual differences when the species-form is realised in different parcels of 
matter. 16 
The tension that commentators have generally found between Aristotle's 
views in the biology and his views in the Metaphysics is due in large part to a false 
dichotomy. Traditionally commentators have divided the properties of organisms into 
two exhaustive categories: those which are included in its essence, and those which 
are accidental and due to the matter (so-called material accidents). Now according to 
GA 5.1, biological essences include two types of properties (TraOrjuaTa): those 
14 See Sharples 1985. 
15 Balme 1987b, 294. 
16 Cooper makes the generalisation that all of those features of the offspring discussed 
in GA 5 are "determined by accidental features of the matter that the mother happens 
to provide for its formation on the occasion of the conception" (1988,36). 
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which are the common products of animal natures (rfij w6Ew5 Epya KOtvrj) and 
those which are distinctive of each particular kind of animal (iota TOO y¬vovs 
EKaGTOu). ' 7 Hearts (and their analogues) are among the common products of animal 
genetic natures while hands are among the distinctive products of human genetic 
natures. Aristotle tells us that any property which is not common in either of these two 
ways is excluded from a definitional account of an animal's substantial being. ' 8 If we 
accept the standard dichotomy, then all common properties are essential and due to 
the form while all individual differences are accidental and due to the matter. 
Now at 778a35-bl Aristotle says that the cause of individual differences must 
be referred back to the matter and the moving principle alone (-n v tXrJv Kai -d) v 
Ktvrjßaaav apXTIv). However, I disagree with Balme in taking this to mean that all 
the properties in question are material accidents (that they are due to "the matter and 
the movements of matter" and "arise necessarily from the matter"). 19 GA 5.1 is about 
explanation. Aristotle's point is that the individual differences in question are only 
subject to explanations in terms of material and efficient causes while common traits 
that come to be for the sake of something are subject to explanations in terms of all 
four causes (including "the matter and the moving principle"). I want to suggest that 
for some (though not all) individual differences the moving principle is the creature's 
genetic nature. This introduces a further classification outside the standard dichotomy. 
For example, GA 5.1 excludes eye colour from a definitional account of a human's 
substantial being on the grounds that it is not something that is common to all 
17 778a29-32. 
18 The account in question is relative to that particular kind of animal. Thus, we are 
talking about the definition of a thing qua horse or qua human (not qua animal). 
19 It is true that Aristotle says these individual differences come to be "from 
necessity". However, in the biological works every part of the organism is generated 
from necessity"; the difference is that its functional structures are generated both 
from necessity and for the sake of something (see 743a36-b5, translated above). 
These types of explanations are prevalent throughout the PA. For a good example in 
the context of development see Aristotle's account of the formation of 
extraembryonic membranes around the embryo at 739b28-33. 
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humans. 20 However, it does not follow that eye colour is therefore a material accident. 
For Aristotle goes on to tell us that the colour of an individual's eyes is due to the 
activity of its genetic nature (780b6-12, translated below). 
So there are some intraspecific differences which are directly programmed 
into a creature's genetic nature and thus are not material accidents. The standard 
dichotomy, which divides the properties of organisms into those which are included in 
the essence and those which are accidental and due to its matter, cannot accommodate 
this. 21 
One of the important lessons from GA 4.3 is that a fair amount of phenotypic 
variation within a species is part of its heritable form. Moreover, this variation can 
even be described as "essential". Of course nothing is "essential and "accidental" (or 
"inessential") to an organism simpliciter but always relative to this or that description. 
While having a particular eye colour and being someone's next-door neighbour are 
both accidental to Socrates insofar as he is a human being, the former is essential to 
him insofar as he is capable of generation: it belongs to him "KaOö YEvvT1TLK6V". 
What this means is that Socrates' eye colour is included in the form that is directly 
transmitted to his offspring in the act of reproduction. 
Where Balme went wrong in arguing for this was classifying inherited 
likenesses, such as eye colour in human beings, as material accidents. 22 Thus what 
many commentators were objecting to was not the idea that Socrates' form might 
include such properties as his eye colour and nose shape per se but that it should 
20 Note however that eye colour is included in a definitional account of, say, a cow. 
For having black eyes is distinctive (ibLov) of that kind of animal (778a33-4). 
21 Sharples (1985) makes a distinction between "form" and "formal". The suggestion 
is that individual differences such as eye colour in humans are not part of the "form" 
but are nevertheless "formal" properties (rather than material accidents). But Aristotle 
does not make that distinction. Instead we find Aristotle using the concept of "form" 
(Eibor) in different ways. When "form" is taken in the narrow sense of intellectual (or 
even sensory) soul, then Socrates' eye colour is not included in his form. But when 
"form" is taken in a broader sense (as it generally is in the biology), then it is 
considered part of his form. 
22 Coles makes the same mistake (see 1995,76-81). 
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include material accidents. " I agree that form (in any sense of Ei os) cannot include 
material accidents. I simply deny that inherited likenesses such as eye colour and nose 
shape are material accidents insofar as they are directly programmed into an 
individual's genetic nature. 
Although biological form in the strict and narrow sense is simply the set of 
functions characteristic of the organism in question (its "soul"), I have emphasised 
that in the biology Aristotle typically employs a much broader sense of form as "the 
differentiae in the matter" (PA 643a24). This concept of biological form includes, in 
addition to functions like swimming and flight, functional structures such as webbed- 
feet and wings. The current point is that this form will not only include those features 
of an organism that it shares with other individuals of the same kind but also certain 
heritable differences that fall below the level of species. This is consistent with 
Aristotle's position in GA 5.1. For what he tells us there is that these heritable 
differences will not be included in a definitional account of the substantial being. The 
definable part of an animal is the part of its phenotype that includes those features 
which are the common products of all animal natures as well as those which are 
distinctive of that particular kind of animal (i. e. the form reached by abstracting away 
from the properties which are unique to particular individuals). 
However, Aristotle's point in GA 5.1 is ultimately about explanation not 
definition. Definitions are only one of the four causes in a proper explanatory account 
of biological phenomena. What needs to be explained is why a given trait comes to be 
present in the offspring's phenotypic nature. Those common properties which come to 
be for the sake of something are subject to explanations in terms of all four causes. 
For example, a complete explanation for why an animal develops eyes will make 
reference to (1) the account of its being (the definition), which tells us what the 
developing thing is, (2) the function of eyes in the adult organism, (3) the matter out 
of which those parts are formed, and (3) the activation of the corresponding potential 
of its genetic nature (the moving principle). However, a complete explanation is not 
always available. In some cases we cannot explain why a particular individual has a 
certain trait by pointing to the kind of thing it is (the account of its being) nor by 
pointing to any functional value (it may not exist for the sake of anything). In these 
23 This is not universally true. however, since some commentators objected to the idea 
that form (on any reading of ET&o)should include features below the level of species. 
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cases the explanation will only make reference to material and efficient causes ("the 
matter and the moving principle"). For example, we explain why Socrates' eves are 
blue in part by the volume of fluid material in the eye and in part by the activity of his 
genetic nature: 
Therefore, those eyes which contain a large amount of fluid are dark, 
because large volumes of fluid are not transparent; those which contain 
a small amount are blue... Eyes intermediate between these two 
extremes differ only by the more and the less. (GA 5.1.779b28-34, 
translated after Peck) 
Greyness [in hair colour] is a certain kind of weakness of the fluid in 
the brain, namely a lack of concoction. So is blueness of the eyes, since 
unduly thin fluid and unduly thick fluid are the equivalent of a small 
amount and large amount of fluid, respectively. For this reason, when 
the nature <of the animal> is not able to make both eyes correspond 
exactly by concocting the fluid in both eyes or not concocting them in 
both but rather concocts it in one and not in the other, the result is that 
odd-coloured eyes are produced. (780b6-12, translated after Peck) 
The colour of an animal's eyes is determined by the amount of fluid in them, which is 
determined by the amount of concoction that fluid undergoes. And the level of 
concoction that the fluid in each eye undergoes is in turn controlled by its genetic 
nature. 
It is important to recognise why explanations in terms of material causes alone 
are not sufficient in this case. When attempting to understand why Socrates' eyes are 
blue it is not enough to know the amount of fluid contained in them. For the amount 
of fluid in each eye is itself a function of the level of concoction the fluid undergoes 
during the process of the eyes' formation. Thus we could further inquire as to why the 
fluid in Socrates' eyes underwent precisely that amount of concoction (and indeed the 
same amount in each) rather than some other amount. Here we would make reference 
to the primary moving cause, namely, the genetic nature. And so a complete 
explanation for why Socrates' eyes are blue (rather than, say, green) would not only 
refer to certain properties of what the eyes are made out of (such as the quantity of 
fluid in them) but also to the activation of a corresponding potential in his genetic 
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nature whose function is to regulate the level of concoction in each eye. It will be this 
potential that ultimately explains why Socrates' eyes are blue. 
Finally some differences between individual members of a population can 
only be explained by reference to the matter. These features are not directly 
programmed into the individual's genetic nature. Some may be due to the material 
nature of the organism alone, which makes it vulnerable to certain kinds of affections. 
For example, grey hair is said to result from insufficient concoction of the hair owing 
to a weakening source of natural heat (GA 5.4). Other peculiar features may simply be 
the consequence of an accident that occurred during the process of its development. 
However, Aristotle also allows for various material features which are not accidental 
in this way but are simply due to environmental causes (785b12-15) or the quality of 
the food the animal eats (786a34-b5). 
What we are talking about here are ultimately `differentiae'. And whether or 
not the differences in question are included in the definition of the thing (and thus 
whether or not their development is subject to explanation in terms of formal causes) 
ultimately comes down to a question about natural kinds. For example, beaks are a 
common product of bird natures, while long, skinny beaks are distinctive of curlews. 
Curlews constitute a natural kind (they are a species of bird). As such, we can explain 
why this particular bird develops a long, skinny beak by referring that trait to a 
universal account of its substantial being (though insofar as it is a curlew not insofar 
as it is a bird). On the other hand, while the genetic nature of every normal human 
being includes a potential for the formation of eyes of a certain shape and structure, 
they do not all include a potential for blue eye colouring. As such, we cannot explain 
why one human develops blue eyes (rather than, say, green eyes) by referring the 
colour to an account of its substantial being either qua human or qua animal. 
But suppose blue-eyed humans were a distinct species of human. In that case 
having blue eyes would be included in a definitional account of my form. And we 
could explain why I developed blue eyes rather than green eyes in part by referring to 
the kind of human being I am (a blue-eyed human) just as we explain why one bird 
develops a certain beak shape in part by referring to the kind of bird it is. 
However Aristotle denies that blue-eyed humans actually constitute a new 
species of human being. For genuine speciation is dependent on functional 
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difference. 24 If the division of humans into blue-eyed humans and green-eyed humans 
were due to functional-fine tuning to a specific environment (as differences in beak 
shape are in birds), then these two sub-groups of human would constitute natural 
kinds. 25 As it is, differences in eye colour are not something that exist in humans for 
the sake of anything. In this case the fact that I have blue eyes rather than green eyes 
is explained strictly in terms of efficient (and material) causality and ultimately by the 
facts surrounding inheritance. In other words, the only reason I have blue eyes is that 
my genetic nature contains a specific potential for that eye colour. And this is in turn 
explained by the dominance (KpaTEIV) of the spermatic movement coming from my 
father over the corresponding movement coming from my mother. 
Where there is a functional value on a particular trait, the presence of the 
corresponding potential in the creature's genetic nature is subject to teleological 
explanation in terms of the good. This is what ultimately grounds teleological 
explanations of the parts of organisms. For example, we can explain why a duck's 
genetic nature contains a potential for the formation of webbed-feet by pointing to the 
fact that it produces an effect on a duck's phenotype which increases its ability to 
survive and flourish in its particular environment. The same is not true for a person's 
eye colour. The presence of a potential for blue eye colour in the genetic natures of 
some human beings cannot be explained teleologically by reference to any functional 
value of that trait (since it has no functional value). In other words, individual human 
genetic natures do not contain potentials for blue eye colour or green eye colour 
because those potentials generate something that contributes positively to the 
individual's ability to survive and flourish. The reason why the genetic nature of any 
particular human being contains a potential for one eye colour as opposed to another 
is explained solely by the general suppositions of Aristotle's theory of inheritance. 26 
24 I have been greatly influenced here by Lennox's exceptional study of this issue in 
Lennox 2001b, 160-81. 
'`s Sex differentiation provides an especially difficult speciation problem for precisely 
this reason. For Aristotle's explanation of why male Fs and female Fs do not 
constitute two species of F see Metaphysics 19. 
26 The presence of a potential for webbed-feet. on the other hand, need not be 
explained by inheritance. Since all ducks have webbed-feet, we do not need to have 
recourse to the general suppositions of Aristotle's theory of inheritance to explain 
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§4 The nature of final causality 
The idea that the species-specific potentials of an organisms genetic nature 
(unlike the individual-specific potentials) are subject to teleological explanations can 
be contrasted with Allan Gotthelfs account of final causation. 27 
According to Gotthelf, some part (trait, characteristic, etc. ) X is present in an 
organism for the sake of something only if the changes that produced X occurred for 
the sake of that end, that is, only if X is the natural goal of the process leading up to it. 
And a process P is for the sake of its end X only if P is the actualisation of a potential 
which is irreducibly for that outcome. 28 Since the actualisation of a potential for form 
provides the teleological grounds for the presence of the parts of organisms, Gotthelf 
argues that the presence of that potential itself must be explanatorily basic. Otherwise 
"whatever explains the presence of such a potential will be more basic, and will be in 
fact what grounds teleological explanation". 29 This is where my account improves on 
Gotthelf's analysis. 30 1 am suggesting that we can explain why a human being's 
why any particular duck comes to have webbed-feet rather than feet of some other 
kind. 
27 The following is taken primarily from Gotthelf 1987. See also Gotthelf 1997 (esp. 
74-5) and 1989b. 
28 I have condensed a lot of argument here. According to Gotthelf the actualisation of 
a potential for form is irreducible (or irreducibly for its outcome) just in case it is not 
merely the sum of actualisations of material or element potentials the account of 
which makes no (necessary) reference to the form of the thing produced. As I go on to 
say, Gotthelf thinks that Aristotelian teleological explanations are grounded in the 
activity of these special kinds of efficient cause and, in particular, in their irreducibilty 
to element-potentials. 
29 Gotthelf 1987,232. 
30 Charles (1991,106) criticises the reduction of all (indeed any) forms of teleological 
explanation to the operation of a special kind of efficient cause. Sorabji (1980,171 ff. ) 
also charges that Gotthelf s thesis gets things the wrong way round and that. 
especially in the biological works, Aristotle insists that 'being for the sake of is prior 
to `coming to be for the sake of, not vice versa (cf. Charles 1991,106 n. 4). (For 
Gotthelfs response to Sorabji see the postscript to Gotthelf 1987. ) My account goes 
some way towards reconciling Gotthelf's interpretation with these two criticisms. 
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genetic nature contains a potential for eyes in teleological terms by referring to the 
contribution that having eyes makes to a human being's ability to survive and flourish 
in its particular environment. On this reading, it will be the contribution to the 
organisms overall good (understood as biological flourishing), not the activity of a 
special kind of efficient cause, that ultimately grounds teleological explanations for 
parts. 31 
A caveat is necessary here. According to Gotthelf, the presence of a potential 
for form is epistemologically basic in the sense that it cannot be further explained 
teleologically by reference to some other end. 32 For Gotthelf would agree that we can 
explain the presence of that potential by reference to the corresponding spermatic 
movement coming from the parent. However, this would not be a teleological 
explanation. Rather, the inheritance of a spermatic movement will count as the 
efficient cause of the corresponding potential. That is not to say a teleological 
explanation for the presence of that potential would be incompatible with an 
explanation in terms of spermatic movements. For Aristotle insists that, wherever 
possible, explanations should include four causes. 
My interpretation is intended to build on Gotthelf' s reading while avoiding 
one of its critical weaknesses. By taking the actualisation of a potential for form as 
basic (teleologically speaking), Gotthelf's account cannot differentiate between those 
heritable properties of an organism's form which are present for the sake of 
something and those which are not. Gotthelf holds that some part (trait, characteristic, 
etc. ) X is present in an organism for the sake of doing cp if and only if (a) X does cp and 
(b) the presence of X can be traced to an irreducible potential for X in the organism's 
genetic nature. 33 As we have seen, Aristotle thinks the colour of Socrates' eyes is not 
a material accident but (to use Gotthelf's terminology) due to the actualisation of a 
31 This is consistent with the view I argued for earlier concerning the priority of the 
phenotypic nature over the genetic nature (the genetic nature is present for the sake of 
the phenotypic nature rather than vice versa). 
32 Gotthelf 1987,232-3. 
33 Gotthelf 1987.238. I have (superficially) adjusted Gotthelfs analysis here to make 
it more compatible with my own analysis. Gotthelf s condition (b) actually says that X 
must come to be for the sake of doing cp, which he cashes out in terms of the 
actualisation of an irreducible potential for X 
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corresponding potential in his genetic nature which is irreducibly for that specific 
colour. 34 According to Gotthelf's account, this means that Socrates' eyes are blue for 
the sake of something (indeed, for the sake of whatever effects it happens to produce), 
which is something Aristotle denies. 
Gotthelf might object to this by denying that Socrates' genetic nature contains 
a potential for eye colour. However, the current point applies generally to all those 
individual differences for which there are "movements" in Socrates' sperm, whatever 
those particular traits turn out to be. For each of those spermatic movements will have 
been derived from a corresponding potential in Socrates' genetic nature (which I take 
to be the same potentials that Gotthelf has in mind). This alone should be enough to 
guarantee my argument. For the individual phenotypic differences that the mechanism 
of inheritance in GA 4.3 is primarily meant to explain will be among some of those 
very same properties that GA 5.1 tells us do not come to be for the sake of anything. 
So there will be properties of an organism which are the direct result of the activation 
of a corresponding potential (thus satisfying Gotthelf' s conditions (a) and (b)) but 
which are not present in that organism for the sake of anything. I have simply chosen 
to focus on eye colour since there is explicit textual evidence that this feature is 
among those directly produced by the activity of an animal's genetic nature. 
I agree with Gotthelf that we can identify which parts of an organism are 
natural goals of its development and which are not by pointing to corresponding 
potentials in its genetic nature. 35 And I also agree that being the goal of the process 
leading up to it is a necessary condition for a part's being present in the organism for 
34 It should be stressed that this is not the fulfilment of the matter's potential to be an 
eye of a certain colour (compare the potential of wood to be a ship). Even less is it 
meant to refer to a process where some kind of latent or not-yet-actualised form 
"flowers into actuality". Rather, we are talking about the activation of a SvvauiS 
which initiates a series of changes in the matter that terminates in eyes of a certain 
colour. This SvvauuS is an active potential that is preserved in the adult as a 
component of its genetic nature. 
35 Moreover. I agree that identifying which parts are the objects of irreducible 
potentials for form allows us to identify which parts are developmental goals without 
reference to the good (see Gotthelf 1997). 
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the sake of something. 36 However, this cannot be a sufficient condition. For we have 
seen that some properties of an organism can be traced to a corresponding potential in 
its genetic nature but which are not present in the phenotype for the sake of anything 
(they do not serve any biological function). My interpretation avoids this problem. On 
my reading, some part X is present in an organism for the sake of doing cp if and only, 
if (1) the presence of X can be traced to the activity of a corresponding potential in its 
genetic nature, 37 (2) doing cp makes a positive contribution to the organism's ability to 
survive and flourish in its particular environment (its good), and (3) that contribution 
explains the presence of the corresponding potential in the organism" s genetic 
nature. 38 According to this analysis, even if having blue eyes produced some effect cp, 
that trait will not be present for the sake of doing cp, since it fails conditions (2) and 
(3). 39 
36 For a convincing argument in favour of this see Gotthelf 1987,238-9 (esp. the 
example of Empedocles). 
37 Following Gotthelf I take (1) (Gotthelf' s (b)) to be equivalent to saying X is the 
goal of the process leading up to it (that the coming-to-be of X occurred for the sake 
of that end). I have left out of my analysis Gotthelf' s condition (a) that X actually do 
cp, which seems to be rather superfluous. For if X did not do cp, we wouldn't be asking 
whether X was present in the organism for the sake of doing cp. 
38 This third condition is emphasised by Lennox 1992 (esp. 327). Lennox sees 
Aristotle as offering an account of teleological explanations for the parts of organisms 
"that sound remarkably like modern `adaptional explanations"'. 
39 Although Aristotle clearly wants to say that the contribution that some part makes 
to an organism's ability to survive and flourish explains why the genetic nature of that 
particular kind of animal contains a bwa jitS for that part, he does not have a story to 
tell for how this might be cashed out. In what way does that contribution actually 
explain the presence of that Svvauts? This is a very complicated issue which I shall 
pass over here. In one sense no story will be forthcoming, since Aristotle thinks there 
have always been animal's with those kinds of parts and so the question of how a 
bvvaILS for those parts came to be present in the species simply will not arise for 
him. However, condition (3) could easily be cashed out in terms of natural selection. 
If a part makes a positive contribution to an organism's ability to survive and flourish. 
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This reading is compatible with Gotthelf s account insofar as one can explain 
why human beings have eyes (in part) by referring the process of their development to 
the activation of a corresponding potential in its genetic nature. Where my account of 
teleological explanation differs is in the role it assigns to the good (biological 
flourishing). While condition (1) ensures that the part in question is the goal of its 
development, condition (3) ensures that the fact of the goal's goodness will be 
causally relevant to the explanation. 40 It is this added dimension that ultimately allows 
Aristotle to say meaningfully that the reason an organism has eyes is that eyes are 
useful for seeing and that they exist in part because they are good for the organism. 
This brings us back to the paradox of teleology with which we began. The 
problem, recall, was how to understand Aristotle's claim that an organism's "nature" 
is both the source and the end of its development. This seemed to imply a sort of 
finalism in which the form at the end of development acts as an efficient cause 
guiding the process so that it terminates in that end. I have argued that the key to 
resolving this seemingly paradoxical statement is to recognise the distinction Aristotle 
makes between an organism's phenotypic nature (nature c ; )S TEXos) and its genetic 
nature (nature &S i Kivovoa). The phenotypic nature is the form towards which the 
process of development is directed while the genetic nature is the efficient cause that 
directs the process towards that goal. There is no finalism here, since these two 
natures pick out two numerically distinct "parts" of the organism. However, we can 
now see that there is in fact a very robust sense in which the goal of development 
(nature ws Ta TEAos) is responsible for the process leading up to it, namely, insofar 
as it explains the presence of the source of that process (nature cis rl Klvo0ßa). 41 In 
then it will increase the likelihood of its corresponding bvvaµns being passed on in 
the act of reproduction. 
40 See Lennox 1992,326-7. 
41 More specifically, it is that goal's goodness (e. g. the contribution that having 
webbed-feet makes to a duck's ability to survive and flourish) that is causally relevant 
to the explanation. The idea of the goal's goodness being causally relevant and the 
idea of its being responsible for the process leading up to it are two essential features 
of Aristotle's natural teleology emphasised by Lennox (1992,326-7 and 200lb, 230, 
respectively). 
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Aristotle's part to save that theory from flying in the face of the observed facts. " In 
the end, however, that theory "inevitably crashes". '2 
Like Furth, Morsink accepts that GA 4.3 introduces maternal movements 
which are capable of imposing on the offspring resemblances to the mother's side of 
the family. 13 However, he denies that this "overthrows" the matter-form hypothesis of 
the earlier books. Rather, Morsink argues that the introduction of maternal 
movements is "an important qualification" of that earlier theory, an "admission" that 
the mother does indeed "put her stamp on the offspring" in many cases. 14 However, 
like any theory, he claims that Aristotle's matter-form theory is only meant to apply to 
the normal cases of development where everything goes according to plan. According 
to Morsink this is when the father's formative movements successfully "master" the 
matter supplied by the female. When this happens the offspring will resemble its 
father in every respect. In this ideal scenario, Morsink argues, the father alone 
supplies the offspring's form (a perfect reproduction of his own) while the mother 
supplies only matter. However, sometimes the paternal movements fail. In these 
deviant cases a second, set of movements coming from the mother will take over and 
impose on the offspring resemblances to her side of the family. So maternal 
movements are only brought in later to explain what happens when the process 
deviates from the ideal scenario. 15 
11 Furth 1988,141 (cf. Morsink 1982,171). 
12 Furth 1988,132 n. 22; cf. 133. Furth also refers to GA 4.3 as a "rout", a "retreat", 
and an "embarrassing denouement". 
13 Morsink 1982,138. 
14 Morsink 1982,138. A similar response might be to take Aristotle's "admission" 
that the mother does indeed "put her stamp on the offspring" as a concession to the 
endoxa. On this reading, it is the endoxa that is inconsistent with Aristotle's official 
theory (represented by premises (1) and (2)). However, Aristotle does not treat 
maternal inheritance as a commonly held opinion that requires saving but as an 
empirical regularity that any adequate scientific account of inheritance must explain. 
(This is true for all eight phenomena that GA 4.3 examines. ) So we cannot simply 
explain away the inconsistency as an artefact of Aristotle's methodology. 
1' Morsink 1982.171. 
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Morsink's strategy is an interesting approach to the problem. The idea is that 
although Aristotle's theory should be able to account for abnormal developments, the 
theory itself is only intended to apply to the normal cases when everything works the 
way it is supposed to. The crucial step in Morsink's argument is the claim that 
Aristotle views offspring that look like their mothers as deviations from the ideal 
paternal form. In this way Morsink attempts to avoid the inconsistency by bringing 
the phenomenon of maternal inheritance under the scope of teratology (the study of 
abnormal developments). 
This again reflects the common interpretation that Aristotle's biology was 
chauvinistic. Recall the two parts of that interpretation. First it is claimed that 
Aristotle thinks reproduction is aimed at generating male offspring and that female 
births result when nature fails to achieve that goal. Second, it is claimed that Aristotle 
thinks resemblance to the father is the ideal pattern of inheritance and that maternal 
resemblance is just a distortion of this more perfect form caused by interfering forces 
deflecting reproduction from its natural course. I dealt with the first claim in the 
previous chapter. Here I want to address the second claim. If Aristotle did view 
resemblance to the mother as a kind of monstrosity (something which is critical to 
Morsink's strategy), then we should expect the account of maternal inheritance in GA 
4.3 to exhibit the structure of a teratological explanation. The fact that it does not 
exhibit that structure (or so I shall argue) means that Aristotle did not treat maternal 
inheritance as a distortion of the paternal form. 
A teratological explanation is characterised by two important features. First, it 
does not introduce any new mechanisms into the theory whose proper functioning 
produce the monstrous form; rather, the abnormal result is produced by the same 
mechanisms which are responsible for producing the normal one. The abnormal result 
is simply produced by the malfunctioning of those mechanisms (mechanisms that 
would have produced the intended result had they been functioning properly). Second, 
although the normal and abnormal outcomes are both produced by the same 
mechanisms, the latter is explained by the external factors that caused the 
malfunctioning in the first place rather than directly by those mechanisms themselves. 
For Aristotle, these external factors primarily arise from the embryo's material nature 
(770a4-7,778a4-9). 
According to Morsink, when the mechanism of inheritance is functioning 
properly (i. e. when the paternal movements successfully master the matter), a replica 
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of the sire is produced. Now if Aristotle really did consider maternal resemblance to 
be a deviation from this ideal scenario, then we should expect to find that resemblance 
to the mother results when this same causal mechanism malfunctions (i. e. when the 
paternal movements fail to master the matter). Moreover, in this case the external 
conditions which cause that malfunction should occupy the central explanatory role in 
the account. For it would be these external conditions. and not the operation of the 
mechanism per se, that would explain why the offspring looks like its mother instead 
of its father (insofar as maternal resemblance is a deviation from the ideal). 
This account of maternal resemblance is an extremely popular interpretation of 
the Generation of Animals. According to Sober, for example, Aristotle's account of 
maternal inheritance employs what he calls a "natural state" model, which is supposed 
to be the same model that underwrites Aristotle's teratology: 
According to Aristotle's theory of sexual reproduction, the male semen 
provides a set of instructions which dictates how the female matter is 
to be shaped into an organism. Interference may arise when the form 
fails to completely master the matter. ... 
Such interferences are 
anything but rare, according to Aristotle. Mules-sterile hybrids- 
count as deviations from the natural state (Generation of Animals, ii, 
8). In fact, the females of a species do too, even though they are 
necessary for the species to reproduce itself (Generation of Animals, ii, 
732a [sic]; ii, 3,737a27; iv, 3,767b8; iv, 6,775a15). In fact, 
reproduction that is completely free of interference would result in an 
offspring which exactly resembles the father. So failure to exactly 
resemble the male parent counts as a departure from the natural state. 
Deviations from type, whether mild or extreme, Aristotle labels 
"TEpaTa"--monsters. They are the result of interfering forces 
((3iaLov) deflecting reproduction from its natural pattern. 16 
Like Morsink, Sober argues that Aristotle treats maternal inheritance as a deviation 
from the natural state (a male that resembles its father in every respect) caused by 
interference with the normal activity of the reproductive mechanisms. Here the 
external interferences explain the aspects of the offspring's form that make it look like 
16 Sober 1992.361-2. Note that the word "ßiatov" (or "TEpaTa" for that matter) 
never occurs in connection with maternal inheritance. 
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its mother insofar as they are responsible for the malfunctioning that produced those 
deviant results. 
The problem with this interpretation is that when we turn to Aristotle's actual 
account of maternal resemblance in GA 4.3 we find that it does not exhibit the 
structure of a teratological explanation at all. First, maternal movements are 
introduced into the theory as an independent source of inheritance whose proper 
functioning is responsible for those features of the offspring's form that make it look 
like its mother and/or her various ancestors. This is not true for monstrosities. 
According to Aristotle, genuine monstrosities are not produced by an independent set 
of movements; there are no "movements of the monster" as it were that take over 
when those of the generating parent fail. Rather, they are produced by the very same 
movements that would have produced a likeness of the parent under normal 
conditions. A monster results when these normal parental movements get distorted so 
that what they produce is something deformed. Second, as we have already seen, 
Aristotle thinks the inheritance of maternal traits is explained by movements coming 
from the mother in the same way that paternal movements explain resemblances to 
the father's side of the family. 
More to the point, the account of maternal inheritance that Morsink himself 
defends lacks the necessary teratological structure to make his response to the 
inconsistency charge work. Morsink argues that the normal course of events is when 
the movements of the father prevail over the matter. The claim being made is that 
Aristotle's matter-form hypothesis (specifically the idea that the father alone provides 
the form while the mother provides only matter) is meant to describe this ideal 
scenario where everything goes according to plan. When things don't go according to 
plan and the paternal movements fail, Morsink argues that a separate set of 
movements coming from the mother take over and impose on the offspring formal 
resemblances to her side of the family. But this is not a teratological explanation. For 
maternal movements are introduced here as an independent source of inheritance that 
produce (and explain) the outcome when the paternal movements fail. This is not 
consistent with a view of maternal inheritances as deviations from some ideal (i. e. 
monstrosities). 
It seems clear to me that if one accepts the terms of the inconsistency charge 
set out above. then one is forced to accept Furth's conclusion. At best Aristotle's 
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theory of reproduction in the Generation of Animals is internally inconsistent and at 
worst it all comes crashing down in GA 4.3 under the weight of empirical evidence. 
§3 Cooper's interpretation 
The alternative to Furth's conclusion is to reject the terms of the inconsistency 
charge by denying one or more of its premises. This is Cooper's strategy. Cooper 
accepts the first two premises; however, in contrast to Furth and Morsink, he denies 
that the movements contributed by the female are functionally equivalent to their male 
counter-parts (premise (3)): 
So when Aristotle says the male's fluid fails to master, or is defeated... 
in its efforts to master these materials, and so the materials are shaped 
into a female, he does not mean that some independent active, 
generative activity of the female materials takes over. The movements 
in the female materials are not a new, second set of movements parallel 
to the movements in the male's fluid, that directly shape the foetus' 
bodily parts, as it were by default. Both before and after his discussion 
in [GA] IV of female births and inherited resemblances to ancestors 
Aristotle repeatedly emphasizes that only the male, through the 
movements in his semen, is capable in any way at all of fashioning 
(brjutovpyEiv) the material provided by the female into a new 
17 animal.... 
If one accepts the first two premises of the inconsistency charge, then one of two 
conclusions follows. If we take the movements coming from the mother to be 
functionally equivalent to those of the father (premise (3)), then we must concede, 
along with Furth, that the GA does not contain an internally coherent theory. 
However, if we begin from the assumption that the GA theory is internally consistent, 
as Cooper does, then whatever role those maternal movements turn out to play in that 
theory it cannot be the same as the paternal movements. The role of directly shaping 
the matter into an organism of some determinate form is reserved for the father 
(premises (1) and (2)). 
It is important to see how Cooper's response to the inconsistency charge 
differs from Morsink's. Recall the three inconsistent premises: 
17 Cooper 1988,18-19. 
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(1) The father alone supplies the form manifested in the eventual offspring-, while 
the mother supplies the matter which receives that form. 
(2) The way the father makes his formal contribution is through the movements of 
his sperm which determine the offspring's form by directly fashioning the 
matter into that new individual. 
(3) The mother contributes a set of movements which are functionally equivalent 
to their paternal counter-parts. 
Both Cooper and Morsink agree that GA 4.3 is consistent with the rest of the treatise. 
However, they pursue different strategies. Morsink accepts all three premises and 
simply denies that they constitute an inconsistent set. In particular, he argues that (1) 
and (2) only apply in situations where everything works the way it is supposed to (i. e. 
when the father's movements are successful), whereas (3) applies in those other cases 
where the process deviates from this ideal. Cooper attempts to show that GA 4.3 is 
consistent with Aristotle's official theory by denying premise (3): the mother's 
movements do not play the same formative role assigned to the father's movements. 18 
This negative conclusion drives Cooper's positive account of the role played 
by maternal movements in Aristotle's theory of inheritance. His argument is this: 
Assume Aristotle is still committed to his hylomorphic theory in GA 4.3. In that case, 
Aristotle must have thought the movements of the father's sperm were somehow 
responsible for directly imposing on the offspring those features that make it look like 
individuals on the mother's side of the family. So any contribution the mother's 
movements might appear to be making to the offspring's form in GA 4.3 must be the 
work of movements in the father's sperm instead. Cooper identifies one text where 
Aristotle suggests a possible mechanism for this. At 768a14 we appear to be told that 
the father's sperm contains, in potentiality, movements "of the female" (Tov 6rjXEOs). 
18 Cooper and Morsink superficially disagree over premise (2) insofar as Morsink 
identifies the paternal movements, not with actual motions of the father's sperm as 
they mould the parts, but with the motions and changes that make up the development 
of those parts. However, premise (2) could be rewritten more generally as saying the 
way the father determines the offspring's form is by supplying KLVTjOE1s which 
directly fashion the matter into that new individual, whether these are taken to be 
developmental motions initiated by the sperm (Morsink) or informative motions of 
the sperm itself (Cooper). 
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Cooper takes this to be an explicit reference to movements in the father's sperm 
corresponding to the distinctive characteristics of the mother as well those of her 
various ancestors. 19 These movements (which Cooper takes the sperm to have 
independently of the mother) give the father the power to make the offspring look like 
those individuals. As strange as this may sound, Cooper argues that Aristotle is saying 
exactly what he must say in order to bring the phenomenon of maternal inheritance in 
line with the theory developed in the earlier books. 20 
Since the primary objective of this chapter is to defend the claim that the 
"movements" coming from the mother are functionally equivalent to their paternal 
counter-parts, my main concern will be Cooper's negative thesis (the idea that 
whatever role maternal movements turn out to play in that theory it cannot be that of 
directly shaping the offspring into a likeness of the mother). However, it will be 
instructive to look at Cooper's positive account of the role played by those maternal 
movements. 
§3.1 Cooper's positive account of maternal inheritance 
The success of Cooper's positive thesis ultimately comes down to his ability to 
show that the father is directly responsible for the parts of the offspring's form that 
make it look like individuals on the mother's side of the family while at the same time 
showing how maternal movements are central to this process. For Aristotle obviously 
thinks those movements have some important role to play in the theory. Moreover, 
Cooper's ability to show that the father is directly responsible for maternal 
resemblances crucially depends on his reading of 768a14 (the father's sperm contains 
movements corresponding to the distinctive features of the mother and her ancestors). 
I do not think he succeeds on either front. 
Let us grant for the moment that 768a14 does identify a set of movements in 
Socrates' sperm corresponding to the distinctive features of Xanthippe's form as well 
as those of her various ancestors. 21 Cooper takes these (potential) female movements 
19 Cooper 1988,21-2. 
20 Cooper 1988,30. 
21 Xanthippe was Socrates' wife (Menexenos was one of their three sons). Aristotle 
never actually mentions the mother by name (see 768b14-15: "... the particular 
mother. whoever she may be"). 
125 
in Socrates' sperm to be distinct from the (actual) maternal movements coming from 
Xanthippe herself (those mentioned at 768al9-21). Thus, on Cooper's reading there 
will be not one but two sets of movements for every maternal trait: one set in 
Xanthippe's menstrual fluid and a second, parallel set in Socrates' sperm. According 
to Cooper, the latter alone are directly responsible for those features of the offspring's 
form that make it look like individuals on Xanthippe's side of the family. 
So where do the movements coming from Xanthippe come in? The first thing 
to mention is that Cooper does not think her movements have any role to play in 
explaining how the offspring comes to resemble herself. According to Cooper. it is 
only when Aristotle comes to explain resemblance to her ancestors that he "opens up 
the theoretical space into which movements in the female's matter might be placed" . 
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As such, we can divide Cooper's positive account into two parts: how resemblances to 
the mother are produced; how resemblances to her ancestors are produced. I shall 
begin with the former. 
§3.1.1 Resemblance to the mother 
Cooper attempts to reduce the tension between Aristotle's hylomorphic 
analysis of reproduction and the appearance of maternal movements in GA 4.3 by 
denying that these movements play any role (formative or otherwise) in explaining 
resemblance to the mother herself. According to Cooper, Aristotle explains this solely 
in terms of movements in the father's sperm. He points to the following passage as 
evidence for this reading: 
So that if it [sc. the motion of the sire] masters it [sc. the matter], it will 
make a male and not a female, and like the father but not the mother. 
But if it fails, then it makes a defect (EXXEtypts) with respect to 
whichever potential (bvvapt5) it fails to gain the mastery. (767b20-3) 
Aristotle goes on to associate the "potentials" in question with different characteristics 
of the generator's body (e. g. those that make it a particular individual). The precise 
relation between a Svvapic and the corresponding phenotypic trait is not important at 
this point. For now it is enough to know that Aristotle envisions some kind of 
correspondence between the success of a "movement" and the inheritance of a given 
phenotypic trait. 
22 Cooper 1988,25. 
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Whatever else this text says, it at least provides an account of how the 
offspring comes to resemble its father. Suppose the movement at work here is the one 
associated with the construction of Socrates' snub nose. If this movement is 
successful, Menexenos will have a nose shaped like his father's. The question is what 
happens when this movement fails. According to Cooper this is how resemblances to 
the mother are produced: "... when the semen fails to master the female fluid it is 
nonetheless the semen that makes the embryo have a `defect' in precisely the respect 
that is controlled by the `capacity' in which it failed to master it - the semen fashions 
the offspring so that it is a female, or resembles its mother". 23 On this reading of 
767b20-3, the "defect" left behind in the matter when the sperm's movement fails is 
the opposite maternal trait (e. g. it makes a nose shaped like the mother's). In this way 
Aristotle is supposed to have held that the father is directly responsible for making the 
offspring look like both parents. When the seminal movements succeed they make the 
offspring look like the father and when they fail they make it look like the mother. 
The maternal movements mentioned at 768a19-21 (on this reading) do not play any 
role in this process whatsoever. 24 
23 Cooper 1988,25 (emphasis Cooper). 
24 There is a problem here concerning exactly what Cooper takes the maternal 
movements to be. Elsewhere Cooper claims that the movements in the mother's fluid 
are a kind of "programme" (16) that carry "instructions for the formation of her own 
bodily parts" (27). Yet the current account of maternal resemblance renders those 
instructions superfluous, since Cooper has just insisted that the mother's movements 
do not play any role whatsoever in the actual formation of the offspring's parts. 
Cooper could find a role for these KIVT GE1S to play by suggesting that the instructions 
they carry direct the sperm's behaviour as it fashions the parts of the embryo, so that 
the sperm fashions parts like her own. This would allow Cooper to preserve the idea 
that the mother's movements have no direct formative role to play in constructing the 
offspring (she is not a `sculptor'), but only at the cost of overturning Aristotle's 
matter-form hypothesis (as Cooper understands it). For the instructions carried by her 
KLVT CEts will count as a formal cause of maternal inheritance: they determine the 
particular pattern of inheritance for the offspring insofar as they supply the principle 
that directs the father's sperm. I will ignore this inconsistency in Cooper's account. 
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Cooper appeals to the sculpting analogy in order to show how the mother's 
material can still be said to be a cause of those resemblances produced by the father 
without making any direct, active contribution to the outcome: 
Consider a sculptor working on some soft stone. It turns out that his 
skills are not adequate to make this particular piece of stone have 
exactly the degree of surface finish that the statuary's art demands: he 
does not possess the lightness of touch necessary to achieve a greater 
degree of finish without chipping stone. He might of course abandon 
the effort once the inadequacy of his skills becomes clear to him. But 
suppose he doesn't. Then whatever features of shape, surface texture 
etc. the resulting statue has will have been produced by his art: his art 
will have been the originating source, and the only originating source, 
of these outcomes (assuming nothing pushes his hand or falls on the 
statue while he is working on it that affects these features). The stone 
itself contributes only as matter, not as a source of any of the changes 
it undergoes while these outcomes are being achieved. It is not as if 
there is a nisus in the stone for this kind of surface texture, etc. Yet the 
principles of the artisan's art, as they actually exist in him in whatever 
way principles of art do exist actually in the artisan, do not themselves 
explain these deviant features of the outcome. Still, even these features 
are not due, even in part, to any accident: the agent is the non- 
accidental moving cause of them, just as much as he is of the others. 
He at least settles for these outcomes, even though he does not set out 
to achieve them or intend them; on the contrary, he is aiming at as 
perfect a realization of the sculptor's art as he can achieve, not this 
defective one that he actually achieves. 25 
This same analogy shows up again in Kathleen Cook's treatment of Aristotle: 
I think that all the traits that are inherited from the female on this 
model are seen by Aristotle from a metaphysical standpoint as the 
absence, or privation, of the male traits-including not only the trait of 
being female itself, but also. e. g., the mother's nose shape (cf. 767b22- 
24,768a2-15). Now, this may seem easier to make sense of in the case 
,s Cooper 1988,321. 
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of being female... but how are we to make sense of the fact that the 
shape of my (alas! ) snub-nose inherited from my mother is to be 
described as the absence of the shape of my father's Jimmy Stewart 
nose? My suggestion is this: that Aristotle thinks that all this is 
analogous to what we (playing Aristotle) might say in the case of a 
sculptor who has in mind to form the arms of his statue in a certain 
way. Insofar as he starts out with a particular shape of arm in his mind 
but fails to impose it because he, as moving cause, is not able to fully 
or in this way fully prevail over the matter, the product with regard to 
this feature the arm-is characterized by the absence of his idea: his 
idea fails to be imposed, but it does have an arm, and an arm of a 
certain sort. 26 
The first thing to point out here is that this use of the sculpting analogy is at least not 
consistent with Cook's interpretation of maternal resemblance. 27 The suggestion is 
that maternal resemblances are analogous to the deviant features of the statue which 
result when the sculptor fails to impose his idea on the bronze. On this reading, the 
parts of the offspring's form that make it look like its mother are the by-products of 
the sperm's botched attempts to impose the father's likeness on the matter. However, 
Cook has just finished arguing that the mother supplies her own set of movements that 
take over whenever the father's movements fail. 28 These two accounts are 
incompatible. The whole point of the sculpting analogy is to say that maternal 
resemblances are what are left behind in the matter when the sperm's movements fail 
26 Cook 1996,60. Cook has clearly borrowed this analogy from Cooper. However, her 
interpretation of how maternal inheritance actually works (59) is much closer to 
Morsink's reading than Cooper's (see below). 
27 Whether or not Cooper's reading is vulnerable to this objection depends on what he 
takes the potential female movements in Socrates' sperm to be. If they are a separate 
set of movements over-and-above the movements corresponding to his own features, 
then he is open to this objection. If, on the other hand, he treats the actual movements 
of the sperm as it fashions the matter into a likeness of Socrates as potential female 
movements (insofar as they have the potential to fail), then he is immune to this first 
criticism. 
28 Cook 1996,59. 
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to produce a likeness of the father and so are reducible to those unsuccessful attempts. 
So the sculpting analogy only works if one denies that maternal resemblance involves 
movements over-and-above those responsible for the paternal traits. 
More importantly, the sculpting analogy is itself defective. 29 Both Cooper and 
Cook compare the sperm's making the offspring look like the mother to the sculptor 
who sets out to form a statue of Hermes but fails to impose that form on the matter 
because he, as the sole moving cause, is unable to fully prevail over it. But this is not 
analogous to maternal inheritance at all. The proper analogy would be the case where 
the sculptor sets out to form a statue of Hermes but what results is a perfectly formed 
statue of Athena. And no one, including Aristotle, would think that this result is a by- 
product of the sculptor's abortive efforts to fashion the matter into a statue of Hermes. 
When the sculptor sets out to form a statue of Hermes and fails, the result is not a 
perfect likeness of Athena (except by coincidence) but a distorted likeness of Hermes. 
By analogy, then, if the sperm sets out to impose Socrates' form on the matter and 
fails, the result will not be a perfect likeness of Xanthippe but a distorted likeness of 
Socrates. And there is no evidence to suggest that Aristotle thinks the features that 
make Menexenos look like Xanthippe are reducible to distorted copies of Socrates' 
features any more than he would characterise a statue of Athena as a malformed statue 
of Hermes. 
29 This objection applies to both Cooper and Cook alike. It is important to note that 
the analogy between sculpting and maternal resemblance presented in these two 
passages is not Aristotle 's analogy (neither Cooper nor Cook claim that it is). What 
Cooper at least has in mind is the vague reference to tools being blunted at 768b l 5- 
25. However, that text is simply an attempt to translate the principle of "relapse" - the 
principle underlying the phenomenon of atavism - into the language of Aristotle's 
chemistry. And we have already seen that maternal-line atavism involves a set of 
formative movements coming from the mother herself. So any sculpting analogy 
suggested by this text would cast the mother's movements in the role of sculptor as 
well. 
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I agree that the sculpting analogy set out in the above two quotations 
effectively captures Aristotle's point at 767b20-3. However I disagree that that text is 
an account of how resemblances to the mother are produced. 30 
As mentioned, it is at least clear that 767b20-3 provides an account of how 
resemblances to Socrates are produced. When the movements responsible for the 
formation of Socrates' features succeed, Menexenos comes to have features just like 
his father. The question is what happens when Socrates' movements fail. According 
to Cooper, those botched movements end up producing Xanthippe's features instead, 
although not intentionally of course but only as a by-product of their failure to make 
the matter into a likeness of Socrates. But that is not what 767b20-3 actually says. The 
only thing that text says is that the failed movements produce a "defect" (E'XAE1Yt5). It 
is certainly a leap to suggest that this defect left behind in the matter by the sperm's 
failure to impose Socrates' features on it refers to a perfect likeness of one of 
Xanthippe's distinctive features. In order to read the text in that way one would have 
to assume that Aristotle thought Xanthippe's features (and only hers! ) are reducible to 
poorly formed versions of Socrates' features (and only his! ). 
The central assumption behind Cooper's (and Cook's) interpretation of 
767b20-3 is the idea that maternal resemblances were viewed by Aristotle as the 
absence or privation of paternal traits. While this is certainly true in the case of female 
births, it does not hold for the distinctive features that make the offspring a spitting 
image of its mother. For the nature of the properties involved in each case are 
radically different. 31 
When it comes the generation of the sexes, there are only two possible 
outcomes: male and female. And these two outcomes are characterised by the 
presence and absence of a single property, namely, the ability to produce sperm. 
32 A 
female (qua female) is defined by the absence of that ability. As such, it only makes 
30 For the remainder of the discussion I shall focus strictly on Cooper's reading, 
though much of what I have to say applies to Cook as well. 
31 In what follows "male" and "female" will be understood in the functional sense 
(sexual identity). 
32 Moreover. this is reducible to a quantitative difference: hotter embryos are male; 
colder embryos are female (coldness being a privation of heat). This is also important 
since concocting the matter simply raises its temperature. 
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sense to characterise the production of a female embryo in terms of the sperm's 
failure to make it male. For not endowing it with the property that makes it a male 
automatically makes it a female. An analogy with modern biology will help make this 
point clear. 
Aristotle's functional definition of male and female is analogous to the 
modern genetic account of sex which defines male and female in terms of sex 
chromosomes. In the case of certain insects such as grasshoppers there is only one sex 
chromosome: the X. Female grasshoppers are XX while male grasshoppers are X0, 
where 0 represents the absence or privation of an X chromosome. 33 This is analogous 
to Aristotle's account insofar as the sex of a grasshopper is determined by the 
presence and absence of a single property. According to modern biology, a male 
grasshopper is produced whenever the sperm fails to endow the embryo with the 
second X chromosome (the property that makes grasshoppers female). For Aristotle a 
female is characterised by the absence of the property that makes an animal male (the 
ability to produce sperm) just as a male grasshopper is characterised by the absence of 
the property that makes a grasshopper female (the second X chromosome). 
Things are radically different in the case of inherited resemblances. Those 
features that make the offspring look like its mother cannot be reduced to privations 
of the father's features. Unlike the property of being male or female (functionally 
defined), having a nose shaped like Socrates and having a nose shaped like Xanthippe 
cannot be understood in terms of the presence and absence of a single nose shape 
(Socrates' snub nose). Imagine Xanthippe's nose is long and convex while Socrates' 
nose is short and concave. Xanthippe's nose is quite obviously not the privation of 
Socrates nose (if anything it is the reverse! ). Since the two nose shapes are not related 
by privation, the failure to impose Socrates' nose shape on the matter does not ipso 
facto make a nose exactly like Xanthippe's. 
Eye colour might be taken as an exception to this. For example, in GA 5.1 
Aristotle tells us that eye colour is due to the relative level of concoction of the fluid 
in the eye (780b6-12). The more concocted the fluid is. the darker the colour. One 
might argue that in this case the maternal resemblance can be reduced to a failure of 
33 Campbell and Reece 2002,276. 
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the father's sperm to fully concoct the fluid in the offspring's eyes. 34 However, first, 
this would only work in cases where the father's eye colour is darker than the 
mothers' eye colour. And it is not universally true that males have darker eyes than 
females. (Contrast sex: all females have lower levels of natural heat than all males by 
definition. ) Second, unlike sex, there are more than two types of eye colour in the 
population. So again failing to make Menexenos' eyes blue like Socrates' does not 
ipso facto make them green like Xanthippe's. 
The general point here is that the features that make the offspring look like its 
mother are not related to those that make it look like its father by privation in the way 
that the property that makes it female (= the inability to produce sperm) is related to 
the property that makes it male (= the ability to produce sperm). Unlike the property 
of being female, maternal resemblances are properties in their own right. And it is the 
presence of those properties that makes the offspring look like its mother. As such, 
there must be some additional genetic factor that produces maternal traits over-and- 
above the factor responsible for producing the paternal ones. This is why we find 
Aristotle introducing "movements" coming from the mother herself in GA 4.3 
3s (something not found in GA 4.1-2). 
34 The agent in this case is actually the offspring's genetic nature, which regulates the 
level of concoction in the eye (780b6-12, translated and discussed in chapter seven 
below). However, for the sake of argument (and convenience) I shall assume that 
Cooper is right that it is the father's sperm that does the concocting. The point does 
not turn on this. 
35 This equally applies to the inheritance of sexual morphology. I have argued that 
Aristotle treats this as a special case of resemblance and so will be governed by the 
same causal mechanisms responsible for producing familial resemblances, namely the 
inheritance of spermatic KivrlOLS. If this is right, then when Aristotle refers to (e. g. ) 
i ä-rrö TOO äppEVOS KIVT1015 (as at 768a28), "TOO äppEVOS" should be understood, 
not functionally in terms of the ability to concoct the residue of nutritive blood into 
sperm (sexual identity), but anatomically in terms of the parts proper to animals of 
that sex (sexual morphology). As we shall see. the KivrjßLS in question is a vehicle for 
transmitting the morphological. physiological, and behavioural properties which 
belong to Socrates qua male. 
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A caveat is necessary here. At GA 768a5-9 "female" is said to be the opposite 
of "male" and "mother" the opposite of "father". However, although Aristotle does 
think "female", is a privation of "male" (insofar as these are functionally defined), this 
is not something that follows from their being opposites of one another; being 
opposites does not entail one term being the privation of the other. In Metaphysics 
A 10 Aristotle defines opposites as things which cannot be present simultaneously in a 
single subject. The mother's nose shape and the father's nose shape would be 
opposites, then, insofar as both shapes cannot be present in the offspring's nose at the 
same time (it must be one shape or the other). However, it does not follow from this 
that the one shape is the privation of the other such that both properties can be 
reduced to the presence and absence of a single nose shape (that of the father). Both 
nose shapes are properties in their own right. 
Let me return now to 767b20-3. The main problem with Cooper's reading of 
this passage is that he takes it entirely out of context. When read in the context of the 
surrounding argument, it becomes clear that what the father's failed movements 
produce is not a perfect likeness of the mother but a distorted likeness of the father (a 
physical deformity). To appreciate this we need to start back at 767b4. 
One of the phenomena that Aristotle thinks an adequate theory of inheritance 
must explain is the fact that in some cases the offspring may not bear any likeness to 
its family at all but might still be recognisable as a member of its species. 36 In extreme 
cases, however, even this species-likeness is lost and the resulting offspring has a 
"monstrous" bodily form (a deformity). When this happens, Aristotle says, the 
offspring has "departed from the YEvoc". On my interpretation, this refers to a 
departure from a continuous generation of things of the same form ('y voS in the 
sense given at Metaphysics 1024a29-30). 37 The first, albeit minor, instance of this 
occurs when the male sperm makes the embryo female and not male. However, 
Aristotle says that the production of females is still "necessary", and this in two ways. 
First, it is necessitated by the fact that sometimes the sperm fails to make the embryo 
male because it does not properly concoct the menstrual blood. And any embryo that 
36 I take this up at the end of chapter six. 
37 The current point does not depend on this particular interpretation of "yEvos". 
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is not male is ipso facto female. Second, females are necessary for the sake of 
something, namely, reproduction. 
Although most of the attention surrounding this passage has been focused on 
Aristotle's remarks about female births, the statement that nature has "departed from 
the yEvos" is really meant to apply to the production of physically deformed 
offspring, those whose observable form (TT)v IbEav) does not even resemble that of 
its own species. These monstrosities are quite obviously departures from a continuous 
generation of things of the same form. Again, this occurrence is said to be the product 
of necessity. However, in this case it is not teleological (they are not necessary for the 
sake of anything) but merely accidental: they are necessary "KaTQ QUu(3E13rIK65". 38 
The discussion that immediately follows this statement (which includes 767b20-3) 
must be an explanation for this. For the very next sentence begins with an explanatory 
41yapýý: 
As for monstrosities, they are not necessary with respect to the final 
cause and the goal; rather, they are necessary with respect to an 
accident, since the origin <of deformity> at any rate must be assumed 
to lie in this. For (yap) when the spermatic residue in the menstrual 
fluid is thoroughly concocted, the motion of the male will produce the 
shape in accordance with himself. 39 (It makes no difference whether 
38 This idea has fairly important historical significance. Beginning around the 17th 
century attempts were made to show how monstrosities were not accidents at all but 
in fact part of God's divine plan (or at least expressions of His omnipotence). For a 
discussion of these theories of teratology see Monti 2000. 
39 Since I am arguing from within the framework of the received interpretation, I shall 
assume that i TOO äppEVOS Kivr1615 ("the motion of the male") refers to the physical 
motion of the father's sperm in fashioning the menstrual blood into a male like 
himself. Eventually I shall show that the sperm's formative role in reproduction is 
limited to the organisation of the embryonic heart. On my reading of this text, T TOO 
äppEVOS Kivrlßts refers to the process of development initiated by the sperm (in a 
way to be specified below). Aristotle refers to this as the KiVTIßts "of the male" either 
because the causal history of that change can be traced to the father's genetic 
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we speak of `the sperm' or `the motion which makes each of the 
[newly constructed] parts grow' or whether we say 'makes them grow' 
or `constructs them in the beginning'; for the account of the motion is 
the same. ) 40 So that if it masters it [sc. the matter], it will make a male 
and not a female, and like the father but not the mother. But if it fails, 
then it makes a defect with respect to whichever potential it fails to 
gain the mastery. (767b 13 -23) 
When read in the context of Aristotle's statement about birth defects it becomes 
immediately clear that (pace Cooper) 767b20-3 is not telling us how maternal 
resemblances are produced but in what sense such physical deformities are necessary 
"KQTQ QU[1ßEt11K05" 
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Aristotle only uses the movements of the father to illustrate the point about 
birth defects. This is similar to what we find in the account of atavism: paternal-line 
atavism is only offered as an example (oiov) of the mechanism. The only difference is 
that there Aristotle says explicitly that resemblance to the mother's ancestors occurs 
in the same way as resemblance to the father's ancestors. Resemblance to the 
mother's ancestors occurs when her maternal movements relapse into those of her 
ancestors, just as resemblance to the father's ancestors occurs when his movements 
do. Thus it is reasonable to expect that Aristotle's account of resemblance to the 
mother herself will parallel his account of resemblance to the father at 767b20-3 in 
this same way. So it is implicit in 767b20-3 that resemblance to the mother occurs 
contribution, or, what is more likely, because a teleological account of that change 
will make reference to the father's shape and form (see note 40). 
40 Aristotle is not saying here that the sperm, the process of growth, and the 
construction of the offspring are all one and the same thing (which would be absurd 
since the sperm is not what develops into the offspring). Rather, the idea is that a 
teleological account of each will make reference to the same form: the form being 
transmitted by the sperm is the same form as that towards which the processes of 
growth and development are directed (in this case). As such it makes no difference 
which of these we refer to insofar as the explanation of why Menexenos resembles 
Socrates is concerned. 
41 Compare 743a26-30. 
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when her movements succeed just as resemblance to the father is said to occur when 
his do (and likewise that birth defects occur when her movements fail). 
§3.1.2 Resemblance to the mother's ancestors 
Maternal-line atavism presents the biggest challenge to Cooper's argument. 
For he must find a non-demiurgic role for the mother's movements to play in that 
account. It will be useful to have the relevant text in front of us here: 
[Resemblance to ancestors occurs when] the formative movements 
relapse into the ones which stand closest to them. For example, if the 
movement of the father relapses, it passes into that of his father (the 
least difference) and in the second instance into that of his grandfather. 
Indeed in this way too, on the female side just as on the male side: the 
movement of the mother passes into that of her mother, and if not into 
that one, then into that of her grandmother. And in the same way for 
the more distant ancestors. (768a15-21) 
Here is how Cooper understands the process. It is necessary to quote Cooper in full, 
for it would be extremely easy to misrepresent his views given the complexity of his 
account: 
As being the material from which the offspring is constructed the 
catamenia cannot initiate any of the movements that fashion the 
offspring, or determine directly the course which any of these 
movements take. Aristotle points out two ways in which the catamenia 
can nonetheless affect these processes by affecting the semen itself, 
which is the source of them. First (see 768b25-7) it can be too cold or 
too great in amount for the semen to work it up fully according to its 
natural tendencies (i. e. it can cause the semen to fail to master it). One 
way this can happen is for the semen to be unable to make the 
offspring resemble the male whose semen it is, and then, as Aristotle 
has already explained [at 768a15-21], it [sc. the sperm] makes the 
material go over to resembling the mother's side of the family. And 
here the second way Aristotle distinguishes in which the catamenia can 
affect the semen and its operations comes into play. Since any agent in 
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acting on materials is itself reciprocally affected by them, 42 the semen 
can be brought, in working on the catamenia, to be affected by them in 
such a way that its [the semen's] movements slacken, 43 from being 
ones that would produce a resemblance to the mother to being ones 
that produce a resemblance to her mother or another of her ancestors. 
The catamenia do this when their own movements [those which 
correspond to features that characterise the mother qua individual] 
slacken into movements of the forebear in question; that alters the 
character of the catamenia as they reciprocally affect the semen, so that 
they induce its [the semen's] movements to slacken in just the way 
required. That is to say that one gets here a combination of both the 
two processes Aristotle postulates. The semen first fails to master the 
female fluid, which therefore departs from its nature and is made to 
resemble not the father (as would be more natural) but the mother. But 
secondly (and this is where movements in the female fluid enter the 
theory explicitly) the movements of the female fluid themselves 
slacken, reciprocally affecting the semen as it acts on it, so that its [the 
semen's] potentiality to produce in the embryo movements for the 
mother's ancestors (instead for [sic] the mother herself) comes into 
play. 44 
Cooper's interpretation dramatically over-complicates what appears to be an 
otherwise straightforward account of maternal-line atavism by introducing an extra 
step in the process. Cooper suggests that the process by which the offspring comes to 
resemble its maternal ancestors actually proceeds in two distinct stages (though 
Aristotle only mentions one). First the mother's movement relapses (Cooper's 
"slacken") into the movement of her mother. This then reciprocally affects the 
father's sperm in such a way that its female movements relapse "from being ones that 
would produce a resemblance to the mother to being ones that produce a resemblance 
to her mother or another of her ancestors". In this way the movements in the father's 
42 Cooper is thinking of 768b 15-25 here. 
43 This is Cooper's translation of Aristotle's technical term XtOLS, which I have 
translated as "relapse" (following Peck). 
44 Cooper 1988,26-7. 
138 
sperm are supposed to be directly responsible for imposing on the offspring those 
features that make it look like the ancestors on the mother's side of the family. 
The trouble with this reading is that we do not find this second stage anywhere 
in the text. There is no mention of any further process where the relapsing maternal 
movements in turn cause a parallel set of movements in the father's sperm to relapse 
in tandem. Nor should we expect to find this extra step. For Aristotle prefaces the 
explanation of maternal-line atavism by emphasising that the process works in the 
same way as paternal-line atavism: it occurs when the mother's movement relapses 
into those of her ancestors. Aristotle clearly takes this single process of relapse as 
necessary and sufficient for explaining resemblances to the mother's ancestors. And 
yet on Cooper's reading he has only given us a partial explanation. 
Up to this point I have taken Cooper's reading of GA 768a14 for granted. 
According to Cooper Aristotle here identifies a set of movements in Socrates' sperm 
corresponding to the distinctive features of Xanthippe's form as well as those of her 
various ancestors. This reading is vital for securing both parts of Cooper's positive 
thesis. On Aristotle's theory it is in virtue of supplying "movements" that the parent's 
genetic material is able to transmit resemblances to the offspring. Thus, if the father's 
sperm is responsible for transmitting all formal resemblances (as Cooper claims), then 
it better come equipped not only with movements for himself and his ancestors but for 
all the individuals on the mother's side of the family as well. The trouble is that GA 
768a14 is an extremely weak foundation upon which to rest such a controversial 
interpretation. As Cooper acknowledges, this is really the only text in the entire 
treatise to indicate that Aristotle thinks there are movements in the father's sperm 
capable of transmitting to the offspring bodily resemblances to the mother's side of 
the family. 45 More importantly, Cooper's positive account ultimately comes down to 
his assumption that "-roe 8rjXEO5" is a reference to the distinctive features of the 
mother and her various ancestors. 
There are several ways to respond to Cooper's reading of 768a14. First of all, 
the reference to female movements in the father's sperm is an anomaly. For example, 
there is no mention of any such movements among the potential movements listed at 
767b35-768a2. which is the first place we are told about the presence of movements 
in the oirEpuaTa of animals. This suggests that TOO OTIXEOc might be an 
45 Cooper 1988,27. 
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interpolation and should be deleted. Deleting Tov 6TIXEO5 from 768al4 would leave 
buv E[ BE ail Twv -rrpoyövcov, echoing almost exactly the earlier passage at 
767b37 (SvväpEt BE Kai [ai? ] TC V lrpoyövcwv). 
However, even if this is not an interpolation, the text still does not say what it 
must say in order to secure Cooper's positive thesis. Cooper needs TOO 6rjXEO5 to 
refer to movements in Socrates' sperm which impose on the offspring features that 
make it look like Xanthippe and her relatives. However, throughout GA 4.3 PTIT-qp is 
used to signal resemblance to the mother whereas 6ýAv is used exclusively in 
connection with the sex of the animal. This is explicit at GA 768a5-9. There Aristotle 
contrasts "female" (9f w) with "male" (äppEV), on the one hand, and "mother" 
(. uj-t-rlp) with "Socrates" and "Coriscus", on the other. This contrast makes it clear 
that the properties corresponding to "female" (6ýXv) are associated with those sexual 
characteristics which are common to all females and not with those peculiar features 
that make the offspring look like specific individuals on the mother's side of the 
family. This would make the idea of a potential "female" movement in the father's 
genetic material less strange. For the morphology transmitted by that movement is not 
distinctive of any particular female in the way that the individual mother's facial 
features would be. So at best 768a14 says that the father's sperm carries somehow in a 
state of potentiality a Kivr1oL5 that transmits the offspring's female form. 
As much as I would like to be able to say that Aristotle brilliantly anticipated 
the modem genetic account of sex, 46 given the anomalous nature of TOO OT XEos at 
768al4, it is more likely that this is an interpolation and should be deleted. In what 
follows I shall take Aristotle to hold that the father supplies the movement 
corresponding to "male" while the mother supplies the opposite movement 
46 If the second reading reflected Aristotle's view, it would be a remarkable insight in 
light of recent discoveries in modern genetics. For we now know that all normally 
developed males have both an X (female) and Y (male) chromosome, even though the 
characteristics carried on the former are not actually displayed in the male's 
phenotype: they are present only in potentiality. (This is only true for mammals, 
which are of course Aristotle's model organisms. Moreover, the sex cells of a male 
only carry one or the other chromosome, so the parallel here would not be exact., ) 
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corresponding to "female". 47 Whether or not this is right, it is at least certain that the 
movements transmitting the peculiar characteristics of the mother and her ancestors 
are supplied directly by the mother herself and that these movements occupy the 
central explanatory role in Aristotle's account of maternal resemblances. And that is 
sufficient for us to worry about the charge of inconsistency. 
X3.2 Cooper's negative account 
Let me return to Cooper's negative thesis. Cooper's strategy in avoiding the 
charge of inconsistency is to remove premise (3): whatever role maternal movements 
end up playing in Aristotle's theory, they are not functionally equivalent to the 
father's movements. It is important to appreciate that the force of Cooper's argument 
does not depend on the success of his positive account of the role that maternal 
movements actually do play in Aristotle's theory. If one assumes (as Cooper does) 
that the GA contains an internally coherent theory, then the first two premises imply 
that maternal movements cannot be functionally equivalent to their paternal counter- 
parts whatever their role. 
Cooper's response to the charge of inconsistency ultimately fails. For I cannot 
see how one can explain away the unambiguous reference to demiurgic maternal 
movements in 768a15-21. The text opens with the general statement that atavism 
occurs when "the formative movements" (ai KtV1 GELS at BrJutovpyoÜGat) relapse. 
What Cooper must argue is that the reference to formative movements is only meant 
to apply to the movements coming from the father in that text. But this seems 
unlikely. The reference to formative movements relapsing is clearly meant to cover 
both the movements supplied by the father (Tov yEVVÖVTOS, TOO 1raTpöS, TOO 
1rä-rrlrov) and those supplied by the mother (T js YEVVwor1S, T'1S ur1TpOS, T'1S 
TT Or1S). First, paternal-line atavism is only said to be an example (otov) of the more 
general phenomenon of formative movements relapsing. Second, and more 
importantly, maternal-line atavism is said to work in the same way as paternal-line 
atavism: "Indeed in this way too, on the female side just as on the male side: the 
movement of the mother passes into that of her mother, and if not into that one, then 
into that of her grandmother. " 
47 Here we are talking about the KLV1 CJEL which transmit the sexual morphology 
common to all males and females, respectively. 
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§4 A final solution to the charge of inconsistency 
There is one other way to resolve the apparent inconsistency that allows us to 
accept functionally equivalent maternal movements without having to concede 
Furth's drastic conclusion that their introduction in GA 4.3 represents a total collapse 
of the tidy matter-form theory developed in the earlier books. This solution targets the 
first two premises of the argument as being the source of the inconsistency. I shall 
argue that the inconsistency arises from the standard interpretation of Aristotle's 
`official' account. In particular, it arises from the way commentators have 
traditionally understood the nature of the demiurgic "movements" in GA 4.3 and, 
more importantly, Aristotle's hylomorphism itself. I shall begin with the former 
(premise (2)). 
In GA 1.21 Aristotle argues that the offspring is formed from the father and 
the mother in the way that a bed is formed from the carpenter and the wood: the 
father's contribution is the productive agent (i YrotoOoa) while the mother's 
contribution is the thing that gets formed and shaped by that agent (TO' ßuvtOTä1EVOv 
Kai Aa 43ävov Tnjv µopcprjv). 48 The standard way of reading this is to take Aristotle 
as saying that the movements of the father's sperm literally construct the offspring's 
body out of the materials supplied by the female just as the carpenter fashions the 
wood into a bed. The suggestion that the mother's movements in GA 4.3 are 
functionally equivalent to these thus implies that the matter is not entirely passive 
after all but is fully capable of fashioning itself into an offspring with a determinate 
shape and form. And that would certainly be a change in policy. 
Of course the introduction of functionally equivalent maternal movements in 
GA 4.3 is really only inconsistent with the division of labour set out in GA 1.21 if the 
function of the paternal movements was to literally fashion the parts of the offspring 
out of menstrual blood. While it is certainly tempting to read the text in this way. this 
is not Aristotle's settled view. To see why we need to turn to an important argument 
from GA 2.1. 
In the closing argument of GA 2.1 Aristotle announces that "nothing generates 
itself but once it has been generated it makes itself grow" (735a12-14: cf. MA 700a31- 
b4). It is supposed to follow from this that an animal's heart must contain the source 
48 GA 729b6-8. 
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of growth and development of necessity. And the reason is that the heart is 
differentiated before any of the other parts. An important question to ask is at what 
point in the creature's ontogenetic history does it become responsible for its own 
growth. 
By itself Aristotle's statement that nothing generates itself but once it has been 
generated makes itself grow is unhelpful. For the distinction between generation and 
growth is ambiguous here. For example, what I have been calling morphogenesis is 
the first major stage of embryonic development during which the offspring's primary 
structures are first differentiated. 49 When used in its technical sense "growth" 
(avýrlots) refers to the period immediately following this when the newly formed 
structures are augmented (a strictly quantitative change). 5° However, quite often 
Aristotle will use "growth" in the broad sense to cover both morphogenesis and 
growth-proper (e. g. 740a1). This is how I think it is being used in the present text. 
Indeed, this is the only reading that makes sense of Aristotle's claim that the heart 
must contain the principle of growth because it is the first part of the offspring to be 
formed. For at that point the embryo becomes responsible for generating the rest of its 
body and so must of necessity contain the generative principle inside it. 51 
In contrast to this Cooper argues that the father is directly responsible for the 
shape and form of the offspring's entire body; his sperm is "the instrument he uses to 
move, fashion and shape the matter so as to have that form". 52 On this reading the 
offspring grows itself only in the sense of augmenting parts that have already been 
fashioned by the sperm. However, in that case it would not be necessary for the first 
49 Morphogenesis and growth-proper (avýrlats) are distinguished at 776a31-b3. 
When Aristotle is concerned to distinguish morphogenesis from growth he generally 
refers to the former as ýý äpxr15 ouvi rrlßt (e. g. 740b33) or Ev -rrj rrpc; )-rrj 
wGTäßEL (e. g. 744b28). 
50 Growth-proper (aÜýrjßts) is further distinguished from the act of nourishing 
(TpE pEty) in that the former refers to the quantitative increase of structures while the 
latter refers to their general maintenance in the adult. See GC 322a19-27. GA 744b33- 
745a4. 
$t This is confirmed later at 740b25-741 a3 (translated in chapter two above). 
52 Cooper 1988.. 30; cf. Furth 1988.118-19. 
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part to contain the principle of growth, as long as one of the parts fashioned by the 
sperm contained that principle before the foetus has to begin growing itself. 
The fact that Aristotle thinks the heart must contain the principle of growth 
because it is the first part to be formed only makes sense if the idea is that once this 
part has been formed the embryo immediately takes over the construction of the 
remaining parts. In that case what Aristotle is saying is that the parent (the external 
agent) generates the heart while the embryo (which at this point is a one-part 
organism) builds the rest of its body through the agency of its own genetic nature. 53 
Thus, trivially, I agree with Cooper that the movements coming from the 
mother are not a second set of movements that directly shape the offspring's bodily 
parts by default. However, this is not because her movements are not functionally 
equivalent to those of the father. Rather, it is because Aristotle denies that either 
parent contributes to generation in this way. Since the paternal KivrjGEts do not refer 
to the motions of the sperm as it fashions the materials into a likeness of the father, 
the suggestion that the maternal KLVT YEts are functionally equivalent to them does not 
imply that the matter is capable of fashioning itself into a likeness of the mother. 
I shall investigate the nature of the spermatic KLVT)GE1 in the next chapter. 
Aristotle most likely refers to these as "formative" or "demiurgic" movements (at 
KtvTlGEts at brlutovpyovoat) simply because they are in some sense associated with 
the construction of the offspring's body. Eventually I shall argue that they are only 
indirectly responsible for this. What the argument in GA 2.1 makes perfectly clear, 
however, is that Aristotle does not subscribe to what Furth calls the "crude and 
childlike" view according to which the causal influence exercised by the father's (or 
indeed the mother's) genetic contribution is that of physically shaping the matter into 
a new individual. 
My denial that the father makes his formal contribution by physically shaping 
the matter into a likeness of himself is not inconsistent with Aristotle's claim in GA 
1.21 that the offspring is formed from male and female in the sense in which a bed is 
formed from the carpenter and the wood. For Aristotle's point there is not that the 
father literally fashions the parts of the offspring out of menstrual blood but that just 
53 Recall that according to the conditions for potential-being laid down in 07, it is at 
this point that we now have a potential F. 
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as no part of the carpenter's body is used as matter for building the bed, so too no part 
of the sperm is used as matter for building the offspring. 54 
One might respond to this by saying that even if the maternal movements in 
GA 4.3 do not refer to the movements of the menstrual blood as it fashions itself into a 
likeness of the mother (as traditionally assumed), their introduction in GA 4.3 is still 
inconsistent with Aristotle's reproductive hylomorphism. For according to that 
analysis (the objection goes) the father alone makes a genetically significant 
contribution to the offspring's shape and form; the female's contribution is simply the 
matter which receives that shape and form. The introduction of maternal movements 
into the theory still implies that Aristotle changed his mind and came to see the 
mother as making her own formal contribution to the process. For whatever those 
maternal movements turn out to be, GA 4.3 clearly takes them to be somehow 
responsible for the parts of the offspring's form that make it look like the individuals 
on her side of the family-even if the way they do this is not by literally shaping the 
matter in the way the sculptor shapes the bronze (since neither parent's "movements" 
function in that way). 
Now it is certainly true that the GA advocates a hylomorphic theory of 
reproduction in which the father provides the form (-rö Erbos) and the mother 
provides the matter (i vArI). However, commentators rarely stop to consider exactly 
what Aristotle means by form here. Form is a notoriously slippery concept in 
Aristotle. The charge of inconsistency arises from the assumption that Aristotle's 
reproductive hylomorphism claims that the father is responsible for determining all 
aspects of the offspring's bodily form just as the sculptor (and not the bronze) is 
responsible for the statue's entire shape. However, a careful reading of the GA reveals 
two versions of the hylomorphic analysis at work, two ways in which the father can 
54 cf. 730b8ff. In that text Aristotle does compare the movements of the sperm to the 
movements of the craftsman's tools in building the house. This is consistent with GA 
2.1 as long as we take those formative movements to be limited to the sperm's 
behaviour in fashioning (what we would call) the zygote and the embryonic heart. 
These cannot be the K1VTIGEL mentioned in GA 4.3. though, which are associated with 
all the parts of the body (, rwv . Opicov. 768bl-5). For the sperm does not fashion all 
of the parts. 
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be said to provide "form". And neither of these is inconsistent with the introduction of 
maternal movements. 
On the hylomorphic model that dominates Book 1 of the GA providing "form" 
does not involve the formation of the offspring's complex adult structures. Rather, the 
sperm is said to provide form to the menstrual fluid in virtually the same way 
(1Tapa-rrXrjßiov) that rennet and fig juice form curds out of milk (729a9-14,739b20- 
7). The heat in the father's sperm acts on the menstrual fluid by drawing together the 
various bits of spermatic material contained in it and then fuses them together into one 
solid mass (739b20-7). 55 The product of this event is not a fully formed organism but 
an amorphous seed, which is the entity implanted in the uterine wall after fertilisation 
(our zygote). 56 The claim that the male sperm provides form to the menstrual fluid in 
the way that rennet provides form to milk (forms it into curds) is certainly not 
inconsistent with the idea that the mother provides, in addition to that material, a set 
of "movements" which are (somehow) capable of transmitting resemblances to the 
offspring that eventually develops from that seed. 
It is interesting to note here that Aristotle's hylomorphic analysis of 
conception in GA 1.21 has been largely vindicated by modern biology, at least in the 
abstract. Of course the act of fertilisation is nothing like curdling milk. However, 
Aristotle was certainly right to insist that the mother alone provides the material out 
of which the offspring's body comes to be (she supplies the material cause). For we 
now know that it is her ovum that becomes the adult at the end of the process by 
undergoing a process of cell division and reorganisation. Moreover, he was right to 
insist that the father's sperm is the efficient cause and not a material cause. For we 
also know that the sperm does not contribute to generation by supplying matter for the 
process: the new individual does not develop out of the sperm nor is any part of the 
55 See Peck 1990, lxi-lxii (§54-5), lxii-lxiii (§56). 
56 This is ultimately what Aristotle means at GA 1.21.729b6-8: the idea that the 
father's contribution is the productive agent while the mother's contribution is "the 
thing that gets formed and shaped by that agent" (TO' ßw«-räuEVOV Kai Xaußävov 
TV popq) {v) refers to conception. Here we are talking about the sperm's forming the 
menstrual blood into an undifferentiated Ktiflpa. 
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sperm used as material for making the offspring. '? Rather (in one of its roles at least) 
the sperm functions to catalyse or activate the mother's egg triggering its 
development: it is the äpXrj -rljs KLV1 oEws. 5s 
The second formulation of Aristotle's matter-form hypothesis comes in G. A 
2.4. This is the more important model. Here the "form" the father is said to provide is 
the offspring's soul (738b25-6). In this context "form" is being used in the very 
narrow sense of Eiöos. 59 Now the maternal movements in GA 4.3 are supposed to 
explain those features of the offspring's phenotype that make it look like individuals 
on the mother's side of the family more than those on the father's side. And it is 
extremely unlikely that any of these phenotypic resemblances count as soul - 
60 As 
such, the introduction of maternal movements that transmit such resemblances to her 
57 This is the force of Aristotle's argument in GA 1.21 (cf. 730b8ff. ) that the sperm 
contributes to generation in the way the carpenter contributes to the production of the 
bed (the bed is not built out of the carpenter as out of matter). 
58 Even according to modern biology, although the father supplies genetic material to 
the process (DNA), this does not function in reproduction as a material cause. The 
offspring's body is not made out of the father's (or mother's) DNA in the way a bed is 
made out of wood or a statue out of bronze. Although Aristotle never backs away 
from his insistence that the father does not supply the material cause, he is willing to 
relax the claim that the sperm alone supplies the äpß} S KtvT}aEwS. This is 
because he found empirical evidence of parthenogenesis, cases in which females are 
able to fertilise their own eggs (see esp. GA 2.5). Finally, Aristotle thinks both parents 
make a genetic contribution (the "K1v1 oEIS") over-and-above these two functions. 
59 However, Eilos does not always mean "soul" in the biological works. The most 
common use of ETSos in the biology is the sense in which it means "'the differentiae in 
1*5 the matter" (648a24). This is a much richer conception of El os and is meant to 
include not only functions (e. g. the capacity to swim) but functional structures (e. g. 
webbed-feet). I have been using "form" throughout in this richer sense. 
60 For one thing a creatures "soul" is the set of functions that belong to its body. And 
GA 5.1 tells us that none of those features in which the members of a species differ 
are functional differences (778a31 ff. ). (Yet, neither are they so-called material 
accidents: see chapter seven below. ) 
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side of the family is not inconsistent with the idea that the father alone provides the 
offspring's "form" (taken in the narrow sense of soul). 
More interestingly, however, when we turn to GA 2.5 we discover that this 
body/soul hylomorphism does not even apply to the offspring's entire soul. In the 
final analysis, what the male alone is said to provide is simply the offspring's sensory 
soul. This is what Aristotle ultimately means when he says that the father's exclusive 
contribution to the generation of an animal is the "form". For the sensory soul is the 
form of an animal in the most strict sense: it is the property that makes that creature 
an animal (its essence). More importantly, Aristotle also reveals in that chapter that 
the mother's contribution is not confined to providing the offspring's body; she also 
provides a portion of its soul. In some species the female will often produce embryos 
which are capable of minimal growth without being fertilised by the male. Aristotle 
thinks this shows that the nutritive soul comes from the mother (741 a16ff. ). 
§5 The mother's contribution to inheritance 
In addition to providing the material out of which the new organism comes to 
be (GA 1.21), it turns out the mother also provides a set of spermatic movements 
which are somehow responsible for the offsprings nutritive soul (GA 2.5) as well as 
those aspects of its phenotypic nature that make it look like individuals on her side of 
the family (GA 4.3). What the father alone provides is the offspring's sensory soul, 
which is the form of an animal qua animal. 
Although I shall continue to refer primarily to the movements in the father's 
sperm in the discussion that follows, most of what I have to say equally applies to the 
movements supplied by the mother. The reason for speaking in terms of the paternal 
movements is this. I suspect that Aristotle uses the father as his stock example of how 
the mechanisms of inheritance work for the very same reason he employs the standard 
analogies of sculpting and house building throughout the GA. It is simply easier to 
keep the different contributions to the process straight because in these cases agent 
and patient are physically distinct. 
61 The conceptual snags that arise when talking 
about maternal inheritance are analogous to those presented by the doctor healing 
herself. In both cases things become much less easy to distinguish since agent and 
patient are numerically one and the same individual. In the case of maternal 
61 cf. Balme 1972.95. 
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inheritance, we would have to distinguish between the changes of Xanthippe's 
menstrual blood as it is developing into the offspring and the spermatic KLvrj6EL5 in 
her menstrual blood (assuming her KtvTIGEt5 are supplied through her menstrual 
blood) which I shall argue are distinct vehicles of inheritance for transmitting 
resemblances to her side of the family. 
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Chapter Five 
Mechanisms of Inheritance 
§1 The facts to be explained 
At the outset of Generation of Animals 4.3 Aristotle argues that an adequate 
theory of reproduction must explain (at least) eight different phenomena connected with 
inheritance: ' 
1. Offspring tend to resemble their parents more than other members of the same 
species. (767a36-7) 
2. Some offspring resemble the father while others resemble the mother, both (a) 
as a whole and (b) with respect to different parts (e. g. an offspring can have its 
father's eyes and its mother's nose). (767a3 7-b 1) 
3. Offspring tend to resemble their parents more than their ancestors. (767b2) 
4. Offspring tend to resemble their ancestors more than any chance individual of 
the same species. (767b2-3) 
5. Usually males resemble their fathers and females their mothers. (767b3-4) 
6. Nevertheless, sometimes males resemble their mothers while females 
resemble their fathers. (769a3-4, b5-6) 
7. Offspring who fail to resemble either its parents or its ancestors may still look 
like a human being at any rate. (767b4-5) 
8. In the extreme cases the offspring's observable form (-M 'v i8Eav) may fail to 
bear any likeness of a human being at which point it is a monstrosity (-r9pas). 
(767b5) 
Aristotle's own account of these phenomena will be explored in detail in the next chapter. 
In this chapter I want to provide a clearer picture of the causal mechanism behind them. 
However, the first thing we need to determine is which features of an organism Aristotle 
thinks are explained by reference to that mechanism. 
2 
I These phenomenon do not seem to be taken as mere endoxa (as some of the phenomena 
in GA 1.17-18 are) but as empirical regularities. 
2 Here we are talking about explanations in terms of efficient causality. Of course 
Aristotle thinks that, wherever possible, a given phenomenon should be explained by 
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The primary application of the mechanism in GA 4.3 is to explain the inheritance 
of features that make the offspring look like certain members of its own family more than 
other individuals of the same species. Thus we can be sure that Aristotle thinks some 
features below the level of species are included in the form that is transmitted in the act 
of reproduction. And given that family resemblances are most obvious in the face, it is 
quite reasonable to expect that Aristotle has such features in mind as nose shape and eye 
colour. 3 However, Aristotle does not confine the account of inheritance to these 
individual differences. At GA 768al3 the mechanism is extended to include the 
properties which are common to all humans and animals (the universals). So the causal 
mechanism at work in GA 4.3 actually underwrites the transmission of all aspects of 
biological form (including the species-form). 
§2 The basic mechanism 
My aim in this chapter is to set out clearly the causal mechanism underlying 
Aristotle's theory of inheritance in Generation of Animals 4.3. My hope is that by 
grasping the details of this mechanism we will not only be in a better position to 
understand Aristotle's theory of inheritance itself but also, more generally, how he thinks 
reference to all four causes. For more on this see chapter seven. Whatever else we might 
say about the spermatic KLVT OEtS in GA 4.3, they are clearly responsible for transmitting 
formal properties; they are not motions and changes arising necessarily from the matter. 
In other words, the features which are associated with these spermatic KLV1 YELS are not 
so-called material accidents. 
3 Skin colour is the phenotypic character in the example of the woman from Elis, which 
we can also use here. Cooper is certainly wrong to suggest that the differences explained 
by inheritance are not differences in, say, eye colour and nose shape but in the way "the 
tissues. organs and limbs essential to a human being... are found constituted and arranged 
in that particular animal" (1988,37). Surely when Aristotle says offspring tend to 
resemble the members of their own family more than other members of the same species 
he is not referring to the way their basic internal organs are constituted and arranged. For 
normally members of the same species do not differ in these ways (at least not to the 
extent that such differences require an elaborate scientific theory to account for them). 
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biological forms are transmitted from one generation to another in the act of 
reproduction. 
The basic mechanism is introduced to us in the following passage from GJ 
767b35-768a2 (cf. 768a1 1-14): 
Therefore, there are tcwrlßELS present in the seeds <of animals> derived 
from the bwäpEL of all of these sorts of things [e. g. male, Socrates, 
Human, 767b24-6; Animal, 768a13], and in potentiality even those of its 
ancestors, although those of the individual are always closer. 
The two central components of the mechanism identified in this text are the "KtvrjcEis", 
which are said to be present in the parents' seeds (rTrapXovoty at KivrjOEL Ev To-Is 
o-rr¬uaoi), 4 and the "buv6 Eis" from which those K1VTI6Els are drawn (ä rrö -rcov 
8wäIEwV). (By "all these sorts of things" Aristotle means those phenotypic characters 
that belong to the organism insofar as it is capable of reproduction (Ka60 yEVVT1TIKÖV. 
767b23-9). ) The main interpretive difficulty that arises in connection with GA 4.3 is how 
to understand this mechanism. More specifically, what are the "KLVT'GUUS" and 
"buväµELs" supposed to be? 5 
I begin by entertaining (and subsequently rejecting) two possible interpretations 
of what Aristotle means by "&ivauns" in this passage. On the first reading bvvauns 
simply refers to a property which is predicated of Socrates qua generator (it is a logical 
concept). The second reading also identifies aS ams with a property that belongs to the 
generator; however, it takes Aristotle to be identifying actual bodily characteristics rather 
than mere logical predicates. Against these two readings I take the concept to retain its 
more familiar sense of active potential or causal power from Metaphysics O. On the 
reading I shall defend these SwäIELc refer to the components of an organism's genetic 
nature, each of which is an active potential for the formation of a different part of its 
4 Later i1TräpXovatV... iv -TOTS oirEpuacIt ("present in the seeds") gets shortened to 
simply Evriaiv, as at 768a 11-14. 
5 Until this question has been answered for each term I shall continue to employ the 
Greek as placeholders. 
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phenotypic nature. In this way each 8v'va Js is associated with its specific characteristic 
in the teleological sense: it is a potential for that property. 6 
After identifying the nature of the 8vvä1Ei5 I turn to the KwrjGEIs which are said 
to be derived from those bwä1Eis. Previous attempts to understand Aristotle's use of the 
concept of a "Kivrlßts" in connection with inheritance can be roughly divided into three 
main readings, each of which are rejected here. What is common to each of these is that 
they all identify the K1vr}ß is with ordinary motions or changes in some sense. The first 
reading (which is the standard interpretation from the previous chapter) identifies the 
KwrjcEI with the informative motions of Socrates' sperm as it literally shapes the matter 
into parts of the offspring. On the second reading the KLvrj6ELs in question are not 
informative motions of the sperm itself but the changes initiated in the menstrual blood 
by the sperm (those that make up the embryo's development into its adult form). A third 
reading takes the Kivrj6ELs to be the same motions and changes that make up the process 
of development; however, it identifies them with things carried into the female inside the 
sperm. On this reading the father's sperm "imports" changes into the menstrual blood 
which immediately set to work building that material into a new organism of the same 
shape and form. 
On the reading I shall propose, the KwrjYEL are not ordinary motions and changes 
in any sense but specialised vehicles of inheritance carried inside Socrates' sperm: they 
are the vehicles through which his heritable form is physically transmitted to the 
offspring in the act of reproduction. Although I shall argue that in using the word 
"KivrlßtS" to refer to a vehicle of inheritance Aristotle extends its meaning well beyond 
any familiar sense of motion or change, it is not peculiar to the theory of inheritance. We 
also find the concept being used in this way in the account of sense perception in GA 5. 
6 By saying these are potentials for specific characters I mean that their activation during 
development initiates a change (or set of changes) that terminates in those characters. 
They are not the potential of matter to become those characters. 
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§3 The "&IVv 
. tELS" 
Just prior to 767b35-768a2 Aristotle remarks on his use of birvapis: "I speak of 
each `Svvai. u ' in the following sense. The generator is not only a male but also a 
particular sort of male (T6-10V cxppEV), for example a Coriscus or a Socrates, and it is not 
only a Coriscus but also a human being" (767b23-6). While this certainly provides a clue 
as to the reproductive significance of a BU' Vapis, Aristotle appears to be offering nothing 
more than a logical analysis of the concept. If we take "the generator" (Tr yEVV(; -3v) as 
the subject, Aristotle's point in this passage is that the predicates "male", "Socrates '7 , and 
"human being" all belong to the generator insofar as it is capable of reproduction 
(%rrräpXEt T( yEVV(ý)v-n Ka60 yEvvrl-r1K0V) and not accidentally (KaTä ouu4EPrlKÖs). 
The examples of genetically accidental properties here are being a good scholar and 
being someone's neighbour (b26-9). Such properties are accidental to Socrates qua 
generator in the sense that they are not part of his heritable form: they are not features 
which are capable of being passed on in the act of reproduction. What GA 767b23-9 
makes perfectly clear, however, is that those properties that make Socrates a unique 
individual (e. g. his distinctive snub nose) are part of his heritable form: they are among 
those formal properties that belong to him "ica6ö YEVVIJTLKÖV". ß 
But how does this help us understand what as vaµuc is in this context? One of 
the meanings of "bvvapis" that Peck lists in the introduction to his translation of the GA 
7 "Socrates" stands for the set of characteristics that make Socrates a unique individual, 
those that would make Menexenos look like him more than other human beings. 
8 We should be careful here not to take the current point too far and say that it is possible 
to give a definitional account of Socrates which includes all of his peculiar features such 
as his having a snub nose. It may be possible to give a 
fully detailed account of Socrates 
all the way down to his unique features. But a proper 
definition of Socrates will only take 
into account those features that belong to him qua 
human. I shall return to all of this in 
the final chapter. 
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is "distinctive characteristic". 9 This suggests that perhaps Aristotle is simply using 
S vaµis in a logical sense to refer to properties which are predicated of Socrates qua 
generator. On this first reading, GA 767b35-768a2 is simply pointing to the presence of 
KtVT OEt in Socrates' sperm corresponding to those properties without making any claims 
about the actual presence of Svvc pEis in Socrates himself. 
A quick glance at the text shows that Aristotle is quite clearly thinking of things 
which have some sort of physical (as opposed to logical) significance, things which are 
actually present in Socrates' body. For the bwäpEts are supposed to be the sources of the 
KLvrIGEL in his sperm: the KLV1 YEis are "derived from" (ärrö) those bwäJE1s. Moreover, 
the current reading takes "male", "Socrates", and "human being" in 767b23-6 to be the 
SuvapEtc; however, 767b35-768a2 refers to the SwäµE1S of these sorts of things. This 
suggests some sort of ontological distinction between the phenotypic characters and the 
Swä1ELs of those phenotypic characters. 
Andrew Coles offers a second interpretation which attempts to preserve the 
identification of a 8v'vaILS with a property of the , 
generator's body while at the same time 
respecting its ontological status as the source of a corresponding KivrIol5 in its seed. 
According to Coles, by referring to the characteristics of Socrates' body as "1'iuvapELS" 
Aristotle is assigning those bodily characteristics both phenotypic and genetic 
significance: 
... the specific characteristics which make an 
individual what he is are also 
responsible for reproducing other specific individuals.... So to describe a 
characteristic of Socrates as a bvvauns must be to specify its particular 
9 Peck 1990, li (§26; cf. §27). Peck claims that Aristotle's use of FV'svapts in GA 4.3 
reflects a specialised hereditary concept (liii, (§31)); however, he does not say how we 
are supposed to understand that specialised use. So it is not clear whether or not Peck 
thinks this hereditary application of &rvauis can be assimilated to any of the more 
familiar meanings of the concept he discusses. 
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hereditary significance as well as its phenotypic significance in 
characterising Socrates. 10 
On this reading the same characteristics which are displayed in Socrates' phenotype are 
also the SwäuELc from which the Ktvrj6Eis in Socrates' sperm are drawn. For example, 
there is a KIVT1cYLS in his sperm corresponding to his snub nose which is drawn directly 
from his nose itself. In this sense Socrates' snub nose is both an actual part of his body 
and the source of a change that terminates in that same part in his offspring. 
While I agree with Coles that the &IV PEIS in question are the sources of the 
Kw1IOEI in Socrates' sperm, they cannot refer to the actual parts of Socrates' body 
themselves. First, I am not sure that this reading leaves room for the distinction Aristotle 
makes between a phenotypic character and the bvvaptS of that phenotypic character. 
However, even if there is a way to preserve this distinction, Coles' understanding of the 
concept of FvvapiS here crucially depends on his assumption that Aristotle accepted the 
central tenet of the Hippocratic model of pangenesis, namely, that the capacity of sperm 
to transmit formal resemblances derives from its pansomatic origin in the parent's body. 
And this is extremely difficult to accept. 
Coles refers to Aristotle's model as "formal pangenesis", as opposed to 
Hippocratic "material pangenesis". According to Hippocratic material pangenesis, the 
seed out of which the offspring grows is made of tiny bits of tissue drawn from each part 
of the parent's body. l l Coles wants to argue that Aristotle picked up on this idea but held 
that instead of tiny bits of tissue the parent's genetic material contains formal "KLvrjoetc", 
though which also have a pansomatic origin. Coles takes these KLvrjßEis to be quite 
literally local motions (not of the sperm but (somehow? ) inside the sperm) that preserve 
10 Coles 1995,73. 
11 The underlying assumption behind this theory seems to be the idea that the various 
tissues drawn from the parent's body have the ability to regenerate themselves (cf. 
740b 12-18,741 b9-10). On this theory, resemblance in skin colour would be explained by 
the fact that there are tiny bits of skin tissue in the parent's seed drawn directly from the 
parts of its body which eventually become the new skin 
for the offspring. 
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the shape and form of the parent's body. ' 2 His idea is this: Socrates' sperm is made from 
a residue of blood that has (according to Coles) travelled around to every part of his body 
during the nutritive cycle (viz. the residue left over at the end of that cycle). The KivrjQEis 
which are carried inside his sperm are the very same (local) motions that the blood had 
undergone as it flowed around the contours of his body during nutrition; those motions 
are (somehow) preserved in his sperm. Once inside the female, the sperm releases its 
motions into the menstrual blood which then sketch out the parts of Socrates' body by 
retracing the path his blood followed as it travelled around his own body. 13 It is in this 
sense, Coles argues, that the parts of Socrates' body are bwä. Ets or sources of (local) 
motion: "parts can be sources or originators of movements, it seems, because blood flows 
around each and every part [sc. during the nutritive cycle]. " 
There are several reasons why formal pangenesis cannot be sustained as an 
interpretation of the GA. I shall confine myself to three. 
First, it is unclear why Aristotle's arguments against pangenesis in GA 1.17-18 
should not also apply to so-called formal pangenesis. This is especially pressing in cases 
where Aristotle's attacks are focused, not on the idea that what is drawn from the parts is 
some material component, but rather on the idea that anything at all should be drawn 
from the parts. One such argument appeals to an experiment with plants (722a 11-14). 
Aristotle says if you pulled off the parts of a plant, pangenesis predicts that those same 
parts will also be absent from the offspring's phenotype. Since this is not the case, 
Aristotle concluded that the reproductively significant units (whatever those might be) 
could not possibly be derived from the actual parts of the parent's body. And this applies 
equally to formal pangenesis. Coles' reading predicts that if we amputated Socrates' legs 
prior to spermatogenesis, Menexenos would be born without legs. For according to 
formal pangenesis there will be no KLvrj6EI in Socrates' sperm corresponding to those 
amputated parts. For there are no such parts for his blood to flow around during the 
nutritive cycle. 
12 This would be an example of the third reading of "Kivrgßts" discussed (and rejected) 
below. 
13 Coles 1995, b1f 
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Second, formal pangenesis is inconsistent with the text. For example, GA 726b9- 
15 is categorical that cars p to is formed out of an undistributed portion of blood: the 
parts of Socrates' body are nourished by the portion of blood that is distributed to them 
(TO' TTpoaEXOOv) while his csnýppa is formed out of that portion which "stays behind" in 
his heart (T4 rrroXEt(O v rt) and is not distributed. This is a restatement of Aristotle's 
position, which he had set up in opposition to pangenesis back at GA 725a21-7: 
Therefore, we must state the opposite of what our predecessors said 
[concerning the nature of ß-rr¬pua]. For while they said it is that which 
comes from the whole body (oi pEv yap To' rrrö TravTÖs äiriöv), we 
are going to say that CF-ff Eppa is that which naturally goes to the whole 
body (ij i¬is Se T6 irpös 'rav-t-' i vaL 'rrE(PuKÖ oTrEpµa Epov. Ev). And 
they said it was a colliquescence, while it is evident that it is more of a 
residue. For it is more reasonable to suppose that there is a resemblance 
between the final product that is sent out (T 6% Trpo(: YLöv EGKaTov) and the 
surplus of this product, just as in painting the paint left over (-rö 
irEptyivE-rat) on an artist's pallet often resembles that which he has 
actually used (T( ävaAcA)6EVTi). 
The "ot p. v To rrrö..., 1 IEis S¬ TO' Trpös... " construction that Aristotle uses in opposing 
his own view to that of his panspermatic rivals clearly shows that what he is rejecting is 
the idea that aTr¬p to is formed from a residue of nutriment that is derived from the parts 
of the body (he rejects the pansomatic origin of oir¬ppa). This is confirmed by the 
analogy Aristotle draws between qtr¬p . ia and paint. 
The portion of blood that gets 
distributed to the parent's body is analogous to the paint that the artist expends on the 
painting. The surplus that gets concocted into oir¬ppa, however, is analogous to the 
unused paint left behind on his pallet. And this is exactly what we are told at 726b9-15, 
namely that a-rr¬p is is formed out of a portion of blood left behind in the heart (-rC. 
vnoAEtc6¬vTt), the bit which does not get distributed to the body. 
Finally, formal pangenesis (like material pangenesis) will not be able to account 
for the phenomenon of atavism, which Aristotle thinks any adequate theory of inheritance 
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must explain. This is the most significant for my purposes here. Consider again the 
example of the woman from Elis (which Aristotle uses in Book I to undermine 
pangenesis). The woman from Elis, who was pale skinned, had a daughter with a man 
from Ethiopia, who was dark skinned. Their daughter (call her Hypatia) was pale 
skinned, but her son was dark skinned. What needs to be explained is how Hypatia is able 
to generate a dark-skinned offspring. Aristotle's theory explains this by pointing to a 
Kivnats in Hypatia's seed derived from a corresponding Swauic in herself (in 
accordance with 767b35-768a2). Obviously the Swaµis which is the source of that dark- 
skinned Kiv-n6Ls does not refer to an actual characteristic of Hypatia's body (even less 
could it refer to the actual characteristic of her father's body! ). 
Any one of these three arguments would be sufficient to show that Aristotle 
rejects the idea that the reproductively significant units in an organism's genetic material, 
which for Aristotle are the KLv1 cYEts, are derived from the parts of its body. Accordingly, 
the corresponding buväLELc from which the spermatic KLvr CYEIS are derived cannot be 
those parts themselves. 
Morsink offers a third possibility for understanding what the Fuväc1Ets in our text 
might be. According to Morsink a "bvvc pi " is not an actual phenotypic character but 
the causal power behind that character (presumably the power to produce that part of the 
organism). 14 Though I think Morsink goes too far in calling these bwäiEts "the most 
basic components of an organism", 15 this interpretation at least takes us in the right 
direction. For it recognises an ontological distinction between an organism's bodily 
characteristics and the ävvät. tEts of those characteristics. This distinction is critical for 
accommodating Aristotle's rejection of the panspermatic thesis that the units of 
inheritance are drawn directly from the parts of the body themselves. For example, since 
the SvväurtS in Socrates are not the actual parts of his body, there is nothing preventing 
14 Morsink 1982,134. Morsink compares the phenotypic characters of an organism to 
symptoms of underlying causes and argues that what we find here is one of the earliest 
recognitions of the difference between phenotype and genotype. 
15 Morsink 1982,134-5.1 return to this below. 
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Aristotle from postulating a set of bu ckpEic corresponding to the parts of his ancestors. 
Moreover, Aristotle's account is not vulnerable to the objections raised by his plant 
experiments. For the KwrjGELs in an organism's genetic material are derived from the 
SvväµEic of its parts which are ontologically distinct from the actual parts themselves. 
As such, removing the latter will not have an effect on the outcome of reproduction. 16 
The reading I shall defend here can be seen as building on Morsink's insight. 
Following Morsink, I shall take "the buvä. EtS of all these sorts of things" to refer to the 
productive sources of an organism's formal characteristics, not only those that make up 
its own observable form, but also those that correspond to various properties of its 
ancestors (which are not displayed in its observable form). I want to argue that these 
bvvapELs are in fact components of the organism's genetic nature, each of which is a 
separate potential for the formation of a specific part of its phenotypic nature. 
Where are two problems with Morsink's reading that my interpretation seeks to 
avoid. First, Morsink takes the bwäIEºS in question to be the reproductively significant 
units which are carried inside Socrates' sperm. '7 However, 767b35-768a2 is quite explicit 
that what is transmitted in Socrates' sperm are not the 6vvallEts but KLVT GEL derived 
from those bwäIELs. So the SwäPEIS in question must refer to entities located in 
Socrates' body (which are nevertheless distinct from the bodily characteristics for which 
they are Svväµrts). Second, it is entirely unclear what Morsink means by calling the 
&wv PEts the "most basic" components of an organism. One way we might cash this out 
is in terms of teleological priority. On this reading x is a more basic component of an 
organism than y if y is present for the sake of x. Given the general priority of the 
16 Although Morsink argues that by associating the characteristics of Socrates' body with 
Svväpets Aristotle has extended the concept of St vapts well beyond its ordinary use, he 
essentially takes these to be active potentials or causal powers. And this is one of the 
familiar senses of bwagts from 0 (assuming that by saying a 
Svvauis is the "power 
behind" a given phenotypic trait Morsink means, as I do, the productive source of that 
trait). 
17 Morsink 1982,135. 
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phenotypic nature over the genetic nature, the bvv PEIS will not be "more basic" than the 
phenotypic characters for which they are S vä niS in this teleological sense. For the 
former are present in the organism's genetic nature for the sake of generating those 
characters. Morsink's reading, on the other hand, suggests that the phenotypic characters 
themselves are instruments of the Swä jEts and are only present in an organism because 
they are necessary for propagating those more basic. entities. 18 
It is important to note also how my interpretation differs from formal 
preformationism. On the latter reading the BvvapEls that pre-exist in the embryo will be 
the offspring's potential parts. These potentialities are exhausted or used up as they 
develop into actual parts. However, the KLVT CYEls which are present in the adult 
organism's seed are supposed to be derived from those same potentials (ä(Trö TwV 
buvätEwv). On my reading the potentials which pre-exist in the embryo are not used up 
in the course of development but preserved in the adult organism as the components of its 
genetic nature. 19 
The 8wä1ELS that comprise an organism's genetic nature will play two distinct 
roles in Aristotle's ontogeny. In the first place, each bvvapis serves a developmental 
function in the embryo as the primary source of a change that terminates in some part of 
its phenotypic nature. 20 However, we also know that there are KlvrjaEls in the seed of the 
adult organism which are derived from these b, uvaPEls. Thus in addition to their 
18 This is the view of the relation between phenotype and genotype advocated by 
Dawkins (see chapter two, note 64). Gotthelf argues for the view that the phenotypic 
characters are only present in an organism because they are the products of entities (the 
& v&pr: iS) whose own existence is taken as epistemologically basic (1987,232-3). 1 shall 
return to this in chapter seven (see §4). 
19 Compare Furth 1988,119. 
20 See note 6 above. This does not mean that each potential in the creature's genetic 
nature actually does generate a part. Some of them (namely those corresponding to 
ancestor traits) will not be activated during development and thus will not be expressed in 
the offspring's phenotype. 
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developmental function, each &irvauts of the adult's genetic nature plays a major role in 
reproducing its phenotypic nature in another organism. I shall develop this interpretation 
further once we have a clearer picture of the nature of Aristotle's spermatic KIVTjGEL . 
§4 The "MTJOEI " 
Having determined that "the &iv u is of all these sorts of things" are the active 
potentials that make up an organism's genetic nature, the next thing to determine is the 
nature of the spermatic "KtV1 aEts" which are said to be derived from those potentials. 
The most common interpretation of GA 4.3 takes the Ktvrj6Ets in Socrates' sperm 
to be the motions of his sperm as it fashions the parts of the offspring's body out of 
menstrual blood. 21 Although it is extremely tempting to read the text in this way 
(especially given the fact that Aristotle refers to them as al KtV1 oEts at bqµnovpyovoal) 
we have already seen that this cannot be what Aristotle has in mind. For he insists that the 
offspring is responsible for the construction of its own body (save its heart). 
A second interpretation, suggested by Morsink, identifies the KiV1 YELS in question 
with the actual motions and changes that make up the process of development. On this 
reading the "movement" corresponding to Socrates' nose is just the development of a 
nose. 22 The picture Morsink has in mind thus looks something like this: Among the 
potentials that make up Socrates' genetic nature is a potential for the formation of a snub 
nose (of which his own nose is a product). During reproduction this potential (or a copy 
21 This is how Cooper and Furth read the text. 
22 See Morsink 1982,133: "the movements (KivrgoeLc) which cause the parts to develop 
from the embryo come from these &Jväp is. " Peck also appears to hold this reading (e. g. 
1990, Iii-liv (§29; §31; §35)). In the previous chapter I treated reading 1 and 2 as roughly 
equivalent. However, we can now see that they differ insofar as reading 2 does not take 
the KIV jGE15 that build the embryo to be actual formative movements of the father's 
sperm. Rather, each KivrlOis refers to the development of a specific part of the offspring's 
body which occurs independently of the action of the sperm. In this way reading 2 (unlike 
reading 1) is consistent with claim that the embryo is responsible for the construction of 
its own body. 
162 
of it) is transmitted to the female inside Socrates' sperm. 23 Once inside the menstrual 
blood, that potential initiates a change which terminates in a snub nose resembling 
Socrates'. 
While I think this picture is right insofar as the changes that physically transform 
the embryo into its adult form are initiated and controlled by a corresponding set of 
potentials in the embryo itself (the components of its own genetic nature), these cannot be 
the KtvrjOEts Aristotle has in mind in 767b35-768a2. For those Ktvrj6Ets are said to be 
present in Socrates' sperm (viräipXouoLv at KIVTjGELS EV TOIS o1T 1aoot; 768a 11-14, b7- 
8: EvEtaty) whereas the motions and changes that make up the process of development are 
located in the menstrual blood. 24 
Whatever the spermatic Ktvrj6Ets turn out to be, Aristotle is clearly referring to 
things which are present inside Socrates' sperm (presumably) while in transit into the 
female. This suggests a third possibility: the sperm acts as a vessel for carrying the 
motions and changes that make up the process of development into the female. 25 
Although there are some texts that might suggest this (e. g. GA 734b7-9,737al8-24), this 
interpretation encounters several problems. 
Aristotle tells us that there are both actual and potential KLvrj6ELs in the sperm. At 
768al 1-14, for example, we are told the KLVTj6E1s of the father and of the universals are 
present "in actuality" while those of the ancestors are "in potentiality" (cf. 767b35, 
23 Morsink 1982,135. 
24 While I take ij TOO äppEVOS Kivr)OLS at 767b18 to be the process of development 
initiated by the sperm, this is not identical with ij äTrö TOO äppEVOS KtVTI(3LS at 768a28. 
The latter is a Kiv ioic in Socrates' sperm derived from a corresponding potential in his 
body, whereas the former is a change occurring in the embryo (it is the development of 
the embryo into a male). And Aristotle denies that the sperm is the thing that undergoes 
development. Eventually I shall offer a picture of how I think this whole mechanism 
works that accommodates this reading of 767b 15-20. 
25 Balme 1972,157; 1987a, 281-2; 1987b, 292; King 2001,29; Coles 1995.1 eventually 
reject this. 
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768b5-7). 26 Any reading that identifies these KtVrjGEIS with ordinary Aristotelian changes 
thus runs up against the following problem. An ordinary Aristotelian change is a process 
whereby a material subject, in this case the sperm, changes from one thing into another. 
However, Aristotle denies that the sperm is the subject of change. It is not the thing that 
develops into the adult at the end of the process (see esp. GA 1.21). This means that the 
actual KIV'CYEIs in Socrates' sperm cannot be actual (or even potential) changes of his 
27 sperm. 
One might respond here by suggesting that the KIV1 GEis in Socrates* sperm are the 
changes that cause the parts of the embryo to develop and that these simply do not 
produce their effects until they are installed in the menstrual blood. 28 However, talk of 
changes that "cause" the parts to develop is misleading. The change and the process of 
development do not stand to one another as cause and effect. Rather, the process of 
development is the change. And it is equally misleading to talk about the process of 
development independently of the thing which is in the process of developing. For we 
cannot separate a process of change from the subject of that change. 29 The point is that 
26 1 shall explore this in the next chapter. 
27 In the previous chapter I argued that the mother also supplies a set of spermatic 
KLV1 CEI which have the same hereditary function as their paternal counterparts 
(whatever that function turns out to be). As such, we can extrapolate the conclusions of 
the present chapter to the spermatic KtvrjOEIS in Xanthippe's menstrual blood. I have been 
speaking exclusively in terms of the father's spermatic KLV1jOEt since it avoids confusion. 
For in the case of the mother we would have to distinguish between the actual changes of 
her menstrual blood (those that constitute the process of development) and the spermatic 
KtV1 JELs in her menstrual blood (assuming her spermatic KIVTj6EIS are supplied through 
her menstrual blood). Since the father's sperm does not undergo developmental changes, 
this confusion does not arise. 
28 cf. Morsink 1982,133. 
29 See Physics 3.3,200b32: "There is no such thing as change over-and-above the things 
[sc. the subjects of change]"; 201a1-3: "Hence, neither will motion and change have 
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Socrates' sperm cannot contain actual changes which are not actual changes of his sperm. 
And this is something Aristotle denies: the menstrual blood, not the sperm, is the thing 
that changes into the offspring. 
So if the KwrjGELc carried in Socrates' sperm are ordinary Aristotelian changes at 
all, then they must be changes of Xanthippe's menstrual blood (not changes of Socrates' 
sperm). But this leads to even more difficulties. First, it makes no sense to say that there 
are actual changes of Xanthippe's menstrual blood inside (EVEtoIv) Socrates' sperm. So 
at best we could say his sperm carries potential changes of Xanthippe's menstrual blood 
into her womb. But this still leaves the actual changes in the sperm unexplained. Second, 
the potential changes would have to be separable from Socrates' sperm (the vessel that 
carries them). For those potential changes have to be transferred from the sperm into the 
menstrual blood in order to become actual changes of the menstrual blood. But in that 
case we are no longer talking about ordinary Aristotelian changes. For ordinary 
Aristotelian changes cannot be separated from their subject in this way. 
It seems that the best we can do with reading 3 is to take the KtvrjoEiS in Socrates' 
sperm to be some special kind of pre-packaged bundle of changes that the sperm imports 
directly into the menstrual blood. Development on this reading would be the process 
whereby those different packets of preset changes gradually manifest themselves as 
changes of the menstrual blood. 30 However, again we would no longer be talking about 
ordinary Aristotelian changes. (Moreover, this still leaves the actual KLVIjßEL in Socrates' 
sperm unexplained, since "preset" changes would be potential changes. ) 
So far I have considered three possibilities for what the spermatic KLvrj6Eis in GA 
4.3 could be: 
reference to something over-and-above the things mentioned; for there is nothing over- 
and-above them". See also Metaphysics Z 1,1028a20-31. 
30 This seems to be Baime's view. For example, Balme (1987a) talks about "continuing 
changes" being transmitted from the father's body to the menstrual blood inside the 
father's sperm (282). Gradually these "latent movements" are said to "become actualized 






This study is divided into two parts. In the first part I examine Aristotle's 
concept of the "organism" and its role in his account of embryonic development. In 
the second part I turn to the question of how exactly an organism's form is passed on 
to its offspring in the act of reproduction. What are the mechanisms underlying the 
transmission of biological form? Although I shall draw on several texts in the 
Aristotelian corpus, the primary focus of this study is Aristotle's ontogenýy as 
presented in the Generation of Animals. l 
Chapter one addresses what has come to be seen as the fatal paradox of 
Aristotle's natural teleology. 2 The paradox in question is supposed to arise from 
Aristotle's claim that the "nature" of a biological substance (or organism) is both the 
source and end of its development: it is the internal principle of motion that directs 
the process of development towards the adult form and the form of the creature when 
fully developed. Thus it would appear that one and the same thing ("nature") is the 
cause of its own existence, which is absurd. By way of introduction to the main 
project of part one I consider - and subsequently reject - one of the more popular 
interpretations of Aristotle's ontogeny, what I call "formal preformationism". 
According to this interpretation, Aristotle holds that the offspring's adult form pre- 
exists in the embryo in a state of potentiality. On this reading development becomes 
the gradual actualisation of a pre-existing potential form, which is transmitted to the 
embryo inside the father's seed. 
In chapter two I develop an alternative solution to the paradox of teleology 
suggested by a key passage in the Parts of Animals. There Aristotle divides "nature 
understood as substantial being" (formal nature) into "nature as mover" and "nature as 
end" (641a27-33). What I argue is that these two natures are numerically distinct 
principles that stand to one another as cause and effect. Straightforwardly, nature "as 
end" is the adult form at the end of development while nature "as mover" is the 
moving cause that directs the process towards that end. Finally, I argue that by 
1 The second half of this study is focused almost exclusively on the Generation of 
. Animals, while part one 
is a more general philosophical discussion. 
2 This same paradox has been addressed most recently in King 2001. My own 
discussion of the paradox of teleology arises in part out of a dissatisfaction with 
King's solution. 
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